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Introduction
Optimal control problems deal with situations in which an agent aims at optimizing
a given performance criterion by suitably adjusting certain dynamics. Usually, the
variable chosen by the agent in order to fulfill her aim is called control, while the
controlled dynamical system is called state-variable.
Optimal control problems can be formulated in deterministic or in stochastic set-
tings with discrete or continuous time variable, and find a wide range of applications
in different fields such as Biology, Economics, Engineering, Finance, Physics etc. The
interested reader may refer to [86]. To find the optimal control, a popular solution
technique is based on the dynamic programming principle: the original optimal control
problem is split into simpler subproblems in a recursive way. The basic idea of this
approach is to consider a family of control problems parametrized by the initial state
values, and to find a relation between the associated subproblems. This solution tech-
nique, alternative to the so-called Pontryagin's maximum principle [114], dates back to
the works of the mathematician Richard Ernest Bellman in the early 1950s, see [24],
who pointed out:
An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and
initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal
policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision.
In the continuous time setting, the dynamic programming approach yields an evolution
equation which characterizes the solution to the problem. This equation is also known
as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, and can be viewed as an extension
of former results in classical Physics obtained by William Rowan Hamilton and Carl
Gustav Jacob Jacobi in the 19th century (see also Chapter 6 in [64]). In this thesis, we
consider two special classes of continuous time stochastic optimal control problems. In
particular, we study models dealing with so-called impulse and singular controls and
which are motivated by questions arising in commodity markets and environmental
economics.
In many real situations, optimization problems arise in which acting on a system
gives rise to both proportional and fixed costs. A typical example is stock management.
In general, when ordering a quantity, we pay an ordering cost comprising a fixed cost,
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which is independent of the quantity ordered, and a proportional cost, which is linearly
dependent on the ordered quantity. In the mathematical formulation of such a case,
it is then reasonable to think that the economic agent will exert control (i.e. make an
order) only at certain discrete dates in order to manage the amount of fixed costs due
to the interventions. If we also allow for a random environment, those situations can
be suitably modeled in a framework with stochastic impulse controls which, mathe-
matically, are collections of an increasing sequence of stopping times (the intervention
times) and a sequence of random variables (giving the sizes of interventions). The book
[27] provides an early mathematical theory of those impulse control problems. Further
contributions to this topic are given by [36, 97, 105] in the context of optimal control
of exchange and interest rates, [85] as an application to portfolio management with
fixed transaction costs, [29, 73] as examples for optimal inventory control, [7] in the
context of rational harvesting of renewable resources, and [37] in the context of optimal
dividend problems. In a Markovian setting, the HJB equation associated to stochas-
tic impulse control problems reads as a (quasi) variational inequality (QVI), which,
roughly speaking, is a differential problem with a nonlocal constraint. The optimal im-
pulse control strategy is then of pure jump type and usually characterized by regions
(whose geometry has to be endogenously determined) that divide the state space and
in which different control actions are applied. In Chapter 1, we study a two-player
stochastic impulse game which is motivated by a problem of optimal pollution control:
on the one hand, there is a firm which aims at maximizing its profits by expanding
its production, and thereby increasing the level of pollutants' emissions. On the other
hand, the government aims at minimizing the social costs of pollution, and introduces
regulatory constraints on the emissions' level, which then effectively reduce the output
of production. Further details will be provided later.
Singular stochastic controls have been designed to model the limiting behavior of
a control system in which the control can cause instantaneous displacements in the
state variable. When these displacements are small and very frequent it is appro-
priate to consider models involving singularly continuous displacements. A control is
now described by the cumulative amount of actions performed up to a certain time,
and it is mathematically modeled through a process with paths of bounded variation.
Such problems were originally introduced to deal with questions arising in aerospace
engineering (see, for example, [20]), but in the latest decades they have experienced
applications also in Biology, Economics, Finance, Physics etc. Singular controls can be
seen as a limit case of impulse controls by letting the fixed cost component go to zero,
and, conversely, any impulse control can be seen as a singular control (see, for example,
[28]). From the point of view of the theory of differential equations, the HJB equa-
tion associated to a singular stochastic control problem is simpler than that related to
impulse problems; in fact the nonlocal constraint is now replaced by a local gradient
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constraint. In many problems formulated in a Markovian framework, the HJB equa-
tion relates to a so-called free boundary problem and, similarly to the impulse control
setting, the state space usually splits into two regions called the inaction (or waiting)
and the action regions (in Chapter 2 the action region is referred to selling region,
whereas in Chapter 4 we use the term installation region). In the first region it is
optimal not to exert control while in the action region it is. Indeed, the optimal con-
trol rule usually prescribes to exert the minimal amount needed to keep the (optimally
controlled) state variable in the waiting region. Mathematically, such a policy leads to
a so-called Skorokhod reflection problem (see [48] and [88], among others). As a con-
sequence, the optimal control strategy is usually singular with respect to the Lebesgue
measure (in the sense that it increases only on a set of times of zero-Lebesgue measure),
and might even be discontinuous. Early mathematical contributions to those singular
stochastic control problems are given by [26, 72, 77] among others, and applications in
Economics/Finance are, for example, problems of optimal dividends, irreversible invest-
ment, optimal liquidation, optimal management of debt ratio, and optimal harvesting
(see, for example, [9, 12, 59, 89], among the references mentioned later). Chapter 2
studies a two-dimensional singular stochastic control problem with a so-called finite-
fuel constraint (i.e. the total amount of control to be used stays bounded) in which the
control variable decreases the level of the state variable proportionally to the exerted
control. This setting is used to model an optimal extraction problem: a price-maker
company extracts an exhaustible commodity from a reservoir, and sells it in the spot
market. While extracting, we assume that the company's actions have an impact on
the commodity's spot price which is considered as one component of the state variable.
Its second component is given by the level of the reservoir. The company then aims
at maximizing the total expected profits from selling the commodity, net of the total
expected costs of extraction.
In Chapter 4 we consider a singular stochastic control which affects linearly the drift
coefficient of one component of the state variable (which evolves as an Itô diffusion).
We use this setting for an application to an optimal installation problem of solar panels:
a price-maker company can increase its level of installed power (this is one component
of the state variable) by installations of solar panels, so to generate electricity and to
sell it in the spot market. Hereby, the current level of the company's installed power
has an impact on the electricity price (this is the other component of the state variable
and has a mean-reverting behavior), and affects its mean-reversion level. Then, the
company aims at maximizing the total expected net profits. Further details on Chapter
2 and Chapter 4 are provided later.
The solution of the problem of Chapter 4 relies on the result of Chapter 3 which is of
independent interest. There, we obtain so far unproved properties of a ratio involving
a class of Hermite and parabolic cylinder functions. In particular, this ratio is shown
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to be strictly decreasing and bounded by universal constants, and this result is closely
related to the so-called Turán types inequalities1. The ratio arises, for example, in
some problems of stochastic control when working with Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics
(see also Remark 6.8 in [22]).
Appendix A recalls the definition and some properties of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process, that is used to model the commodity's price in Chapter 2 and the electricity
price in Chapter 4. Properties of the increasing eigenfunctions of the infinitesimal gen-
erator of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process are included. These properties are exploited
when constructing an explicit solution to the corresponding HJB equation, and, espe-
cially, Appendix A provides a link between Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes and Hermite
functions (parabolic cylinder functions) that is essential for the proof of the main re-
sult in Chapter 3. Moreover, Appendix B and Appendix C contain some proofs and
auxiliary results that complete the results of Chapter 2 and of Chapter 4.
We now proceed by providing a more detailed outline of Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and
Chapter 4. Especially, in the following, we give a more precise review of the studied
model (including economic motivation), we discuss the contribution of each chapter to
the literature, and we describe the techniques used to solve the considered problems.
On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control (Chapter 1)2
In recent years, the growing importance of global environmental issues, such as the
global warming, pushed countries or institutions to adopt environmental policies aim-
ing at reducing the level of pollution. Some of these policies are the result of interna-
tional agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, or the Paris Climate Agreement
of 2016); some others are adopted more on a local scale: it is indeed a news of Decem-
ber 2016 that the authorities of Beijing issued a five-day warning and ordered heavy
industries to slow or halt their production due to increasing smog.3
Environmental problems have attracted the interest of the scientific community as
well (see, e.g, [98], and Chapter 9 of [106] for an exhaustive introduction to pollution
control policies). Many papers in the mathematical and economic literature take the
point of view of a social planner to model the problem of reducing emissions of pol-
lutants arising from the production process of the industrial sector. For example, in
[111, 112] a social planner aims at finding a time at which the reduction of the rate
of emissions gives rise to the minimal social costs. In [113] the optimal environmental
1These are special inequalities that hold for many special functions and polynomials. They have
been discovered by Paul Turán (see [126]).
2This chapter is based on a joint work with Giorgio Ferrari. Parts of this introduction and of
Chapter 1 have been first published in Ann. Oper. Res., volume 275, number 2, pages 297-319 (2019).
3See, for example, the article on The Guardian [124].
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policy to be adopted is the one that maximizes the economy's instantaneous net payoff,
i.e. the sum of the economic damage of pollution and of the economic benefits from
production. Finally, [70, 118] consider the planner's problem of choosing the abatement
policy, and research and development investment, that minimize the costs of achieving
a given target of CO2 concentration. All those works tackle the resulting mathematical
problems with techniques from (stochastic) optimal control theory, and provide policy
recommendations.
In Chapter 1, we do not take the point of view of a fictitious social planner, but
we propose a strategic model of pollution control. An infinitely-lived profit maximizing
firm, representative of the productive sector of a country, produces a single good, and
faces fixed and proportional costs of capacity expansion. In line with other articles in
the environmental economics literature (cf. [112, 113]), we suppose that the output of
production is proportional to the level of pollutants' emissions. Those are negatively
perceived by the society, and we assume that the social costs of pollution can be mea-
sured by a suitable penalty function. A government (or a government environmental
agency) intervenes in order to dam the level of emissions, e.g., by introducing regulatory
constraints on the emissions' level, which then effectively cap the output of production.
We suppose that the interventions of the government have also some negative impact
on the social welfare (e.g., they might cause an increase in the level of unemployment
or foregone taxes), and we assume that such negative externality can be quantified in
terms of instantaneous costs with fixed and proportional components. The government
thus aims at minimizing the total costs of pollution and of the interventions on it.
Due to the fixed costs of interventions faced by the firm and the government, it is
reasonable to expect that the two agents intervene only at discrete times on the output
of production. Between two consecutive intervention times, the latter is assumed to
evolve as a general regular one-dimensional Itô-diffusion4. We therefore model the
previously discussed pollution control problem as a stochastic impulse nonzero-sum
game between the government and the firm. The policy of each player is characterized
by a pair consisting of a sequence of times, and a sequence of sizes of interventions
on the output of production, and each player aims at picking a policy that optimizes
her own performance criterion, given the policy adopted by the other player. The two
players thus interact strategically in order to determine an equilibrium level of the
output of production, i.e. of the level of pollutants' emissions.
We assume that the policies of both the government and the firm are of barrier
type. Such policies are characterized by four constant trigger values chosen by the
agents: on the one hand, whenever the output of production falls below a constant
threshold, the firm pushes the output of production to an upper constant level; on the
4Uncertain capital depreciation or technological uncertainty might justify the stochastic nature of
the output of production (see also [11, 49, 53, 129]).
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other hand, whenever the level of emissions reaches an upper threshold, the government
provides regulatory constraints which let the output of production jump to a constant
lower value. By employing these policies, the two agents keep the output of production
(equivalently, the level of pollutants' emissions) within an interval whose size is the
result of their strategic interaction. We then construct accordingly a couple of candidate
equilibrium policies, and of associated equilibrium values.
In order to choose those four trigger values we require that the agents' performance
criteria associated to the previous policies are suitably smooth, as functions of the
current output of production level. Namely, each agent imposes that her own can-
didate equilibrium value is continuously differentiable at her own trigger values. We
then move on proving a verification theorem which provides sufficient conditions un-
der which the previous candidate strategies indeed form an equilibrium. In particular,
we show that if the solution of a suitable system of four highly nonlinear algebraic
equations exists and satisfies a set of appropriate inequalities, then such a solution will
trigger an equilibrium. Our results are finally complemented by a numerical study in
the case of (uncontrolled) output of production given by a geometric Brownian motion.
Also, we discuss the dependency of the (equilibrium) trigger values and of the equilib-
rium impulses' size on the model parameters. This comparative statics analysis shows
interesting new behaviors that we explain as a consequence of the strategic interaction
between the firm and the government. As an example, we find, surprisingly, that the
higher the fixed costs for the firm, the smaller the sizes of the impulses applied by both
the agents on the production process.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, we propose a general
strategic model that highlights the interplay between the productive sector and the
government of a country for the management of the pollution which inevitably arises
from the production process5. On the other hand, from a mathematical point of view,
our model is one of the first dealing with a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic impulse
game. It is worth noticing that a verification theorem for two-player nonzero-sum
stochastic impulse games, in which the uncontrolled process is a multi-dimensional
Itô-diffusion, has been recently proved in [2]. There the authors give a set of sufficient
conditions under which the solutions (in an appropriate sense) of QVIs identify with
equilibrium values of the game. Then, they consider a one-dimensional symmetric game
with linear running costs, and obtain equilibrium values and equilibrium policies by
finding the solutions of the related system of QVIs, and by verifying their optimality.
Our methodology is different with respect to that of [2]. Here, we obtain candi-
date equilibrium values without relying on solving the system of QVIs that would be
associated to our game. Indeed, our candidate equilibrium values are constructed as
5For other works modeling the pollution control problem as a dynamic game one can refer, among
others, to the example in Section 4 of [46], and [91, 128].
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the performance criteria that the players obtain by applying a potentially suboptimal
policy. This construction, which employs probabilistic properties of one-dimensional
Itô-diffusions, has been already used in single-agent impulse control problems (see,
e.g., [7, 8, 50]), and has the advantage of providing candidate equilibrium values which
are automatically continuous functions of the underlying state variable. As a compu-
tationally useful byproduct, in our asymmetric setting we only have to find the four
equilibrium trigger values, and for that we only need four equations. This is in con-
trast to the eight equations one would obtain by imposing C0 and C1-regularity of the
solutions to the system of QVIs (cf. [2]).
An Optimal Extraction Problem with Price Impact (Chapter 2)6
The problem of a company that aims at determining the extraction rule of an ex-
haustible commodity, while maximizing net profits, has been widely studied in the
literature. To the best of our knowledge, the first contribution on this topic is the
seminal paper [74], in which a deterministic model of optimal extraction has been pro-
posed. Since then, many authors have generalized the setting of [74] by allowing for
stochastic commodity prices and for different specifications of the admissible extraction
rules (see, e.g., [5, 25, 34, 57, 63, 104, 109, 110] among a huge literature in Economics
and applied Mathematics).
In Chapter 2, we consider an optimal extraction problem for an infinitely-lived
profit maximizing company. The company extracts an exhaustible commodity from a
reservoir with a finite capacity incurring constant proportional costs, and then imme-
diately sells the commodity in the spot market. The admissible extraction rules must
not be rates, also lump sum extractions are allowed. Moreover, we assume that the
company is a large player in the market, and therefore, its extraction strategies affect
the market price of the commodity. This happens in such a way that whenever the
company extracts the commodity and sells it in the market, the commodity's price is
instantaneously decreased proportionally to the extracted amount.
Our mathematical formulation of the previous problem leads to a two-dimensional
degenerate finite-fuel singular stochastic control problem (see [35, 79, 80, 82] as early
contributions, and [22, 71] for recent applications to optimal liquidation problems). The
underlying state variable is a two-dimensional process (X, Y ) whose components are
the commodity's price and the level of the reservoir (i.e. the amount of commodity still
available). The price process is a linearly controlled Itô-diffusion, while the dynamics
of the level of the reservoir are purely controlled and do not have any diffusive compo-
nent. In particular, we assume that, in absence of any interventions, the commodity's
6This chapter is joint work with Giorgio Ferrari. Parts of this introduction and of Chapter 2 have
been first published in Appl. Math. Optim., DOI: 10.1007/s00245-019-09615-9 (September 2019).
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price evolves either as a drifted Brownian motion or as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process,
and we solve explicitly the optimal extraction problem by following a guess-and-verify
approach. This relies on the construction of a classical solution to the associated HJB
equation, which, in our problem, takes the form of a variational inequality with state-
dependent gradient constraint. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that provides the explicit solution to an optimal extraction problem under uncertainty
for a price-maker company facing a diffusive commodity's spot price with additive and
mean-reverting dynamics.
In the simpler case of a drifted Brownian dynamics for the commodity's price, we
find that the optimal extraction rule prescribes at any time to extract just the minimal
amount needed to keep the commodity's price below an endogenously determined con-
stant critical level x?, the free boundary. A lump sum extraction (and therefore a jump
in the optimal control) may be observed only at initial time if the initial commodity's
price exceeds the level x?. In such a case, depending on the initial level of the reservoir,
it might be optimal either to deplete the reservoir or to extract a block of commodity
so that the price is reduced to the desired level x?.
If the commodity's price has additionally a mean-reverting behavior and evolves
as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, the analysis is much more involved and technical
than in the Brownian case. This is due to the unhandy and non-explicit form of
the eigenfunctions of the infinitesimal generator of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
We show that the optimal extraction rule is triggered by a critical price level that -
differently to the Brownian case - is not anymore constant, but it is depending on the
current level of the reservoir y. This critical price level - that we call F−1(y) - is the
inverse of a positive, strictly decreasing, C∞-function F that we determine explicitly.
It is optimal to extract in such a way that the joint process (X, Y ) is kept within the
region {(x, y) : x ≤ F−1(y)}, and a suitable lump sum extraction should be made
only if the initial data lie outside the previous region. The free boundary F has an
asymptote at a point x∞ and it is zero at the point x0. These two points have a clear
interpretation, as they correspond to the critical price levels triggering the optimal
extraction rule in a model with infinite fuel and with no market impact, respectively.
In both the Brownian and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck case, the optimal extraction rule
is mathematically given through the solution to a Skorokhod reflection problem with
oblique reflection at the free boundary in the direction (−α,−1). Here α > 0 is the
marginal market impact of the company's actions on the commodity's price. Indeed, if
the company extracts an amount, say dξt, at time t, then the price is linearly reduced
by αdξt and the level of the reservoir by dξt. Moreover, we prove that the value function
is a classical C2,1-solution to the associated HJB equation.
When the price follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics, our proof of the optimality
of the constructed candidate value function partly employs arguments developed in
8
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the study of an optimal liquidation problem tackled in the recent [22], which shares
mathematical similarities with our problem. Indeed, in the case of a small marginal
cost of extraction, due to the unhandy and implicit form of the increasing eigenfunction
of the infinitesimal generator of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, we have not been
able to prove via direct means an inequality that the candidate value function needed
to satisfy in order to solve the HJB equation. For this reason, in such a case, we
adopted ideas from [22] where an interesting reformulation of the original singular
control problem as a calculus of variations approach has been developed. However, it
is also worth noticing that when the marginal cost of extraction is large enough, the
approach of [22] is not directly applicable since a fundamental assumption in [22] (cf.
Assumption 2.2-(C5) therein) is not satisfied. Instead, a direct study of the variational
inequality leads to the desired result. This fact suggests that a combined use of the
calculus of variations method and of the standard guess-and-verify approach could
be successful in intricate problems where neither of the two methods leads to prove
optimality of a candidate value function for any choice of the model's parameters. We
refer to the proof of Proposition 2.4.10 and to Remark 2.4.11 for details.
As a byproduct of our results, we find that the directional derivative (in the direction
(−α,−1)) of the optimal extraction problem's value function coincides with the value
function of an optimal stopping problem. This fact, which is consistent with the
findings of [79, 80], also allows us to explain quantitatively why, in the case of a drifted
Brownian dynamics for the commodity's price, the level x? triggering the optimal
extraction rule is independent of the current level of the reservoir y. Indeed, in such
a case, the value function of the optimal stopping problem is independent of y and,
therefore, so is also its free boundary x?.
Thanks to the explicit nature of our results, we can provide a detailed comparative
statics analysis. We obtain theoretical results on the dependency of the value function
and of the critical price levels x?, x∞, and x0 with respect to some of the model's
parameters. In the case of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck commodity's price, numerical results
are also derived to show the dependency of the free boundary curve F with respect to
the volatility, the mean reversion level, and the mean-reversion speed.
Optimal Installation of Solar Panels with Price Impact: a Solv-
able Singular Stochastic Control Problem (Chapter 4)7
Chapter 4 proposes a model in which a company can increase its current electricity
production by irreversible investments in solar panels, while maximizing net profits.
7This chapter is based on a joint work with Tiziano Vargiolu. Parts of this introduction and of
Chapter 4 have been published in [84].
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Irreversible investment problems have been widely studied in the context of real op-
tions and optimal capacity expansion. Related models in the economics literature are,
for example, [30] and the monography [47]. Other relevant articles appearing in the
mathematical literature are [3, 41, 43, 56, 58, 62, 90, 101, 116, 122], among many
others.
We consider an infinitely-lived profit maximizing company which is a large player
in the market. The company can install solar panels in order to increase its produc-
tion level of electricity up to a given maximum level. The electricity generated will
immediately be sold in the market, and while installing additional panels, the company
incurs constant proportional costs. As it is assumed that the company is a large market
player, its activities have an impact on the electricity price. In particular, we assume
that the long-term electricity price level is negatively affected by the current level of
installed power; that is, the electricity price will tend to move towards a lower price
level if the electricity production is increased. Therefore, the company has to install
solar panels carefully in order to avoid permanently low electricity prices which clearly
decrease the marginal profits from selling electricity in the market.
The model is mathematically formulated as a two-dimensional degenerate singular
stochastic control problem (see, for example, [79, 80, 82] as early contributions) whose
components are the electricity price (modeled as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process) and
the current level of installed power which is purely controlled. To the best of our
knowledge, the work of this chapter is the first which provides the complete explicit
solution to a two-dimensional degenerate singular stochastic control problem in which
the drift of one component of the state process (the electricity price) is linearly affected
by the monotone process giving the cumulative amount of control (the level of installed
power). It is worth noticing that our mathematical formulation shares similarities with
the recent article [55] in which a central bank can choose a control of bounded variation
for managing the inflation. The methodology and results of [55] are indeed different
with respect to ours: an explicit solution is not constructed, but the authors provide
a theoretical study of the structure and regularity of the value function. Upon relying
on a combination of techniques from viscosity theory and free-boundary analysis, it
is shown that the control problem's value function satisfies a second-order smooth-fit
principle. The latter is then exploited in order to determine a system of functional
equations solved by two monotone curves that split the state space in three connected
regions where different control actions should be applied.
Price impact models have gained the interest of many researchers in recent years.
Some of these works are also formulated as a singular stochastic control problem and
study questions of optimal execution: [21] and [22] take into account a multiplicative
and transient price impact, whereas [71] considers an exponential parametrization in
a geometric Brownian motion setting allowing for a permanent price impact. Also, a
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price impact model with singular stochastic controls has been studied by [4], motivated
by an irreversible capital accumulation problem with permanent price impact, and in
Chapter 2 of this thesis (cf. [60]). In all of the aforementioned papers on price impact
models dealing with singular stochastic controls [4, 21, 22, 60, 71], the agents' actions
can lead to an immediate jump in the underlying price process, whereas in the setting
of Chapter 4, it cannot. Finally, [39, 40] show how to incorporate a market impact
due to cross-border trading in electricity markets, and [117] models the price impact
of wind electricity production on power prices.
In our model the firm's installation strategy is represented by an increasing control,
possibly non-absolutely continuous, and we take into account a running payoff function
which depends linearly on the level of installed power and on the electricity price. Fol-
lowing an educated guess for a classical solution to the associated HJB equation, and
imposing C2,1−regularity of the value function, we show that the optimal installation
rule is triggered by a threshold which is a function of the current level of installed
power, and we provide a closed-form expression of the value function. The threshold,
also called free boundary in the sequel, uniquely solves an ordinary differential equation
(ODE) for which we implement a numerical solution. Then, we characterize the ge-
ometry of the waiting and installation regions. We show that the optimal installation
strategy is such that the company keeps the state process inside the waiting region. In
particular, the state process is pushed towards the free boundary by installing a block
of solar panels immediately, if the initial electricity price is above the critical threshold
(if the maximum level of installed power, that the company is able to reach, is not suf-
ficiently high, the company will immediately install the maximum number of panels).
Thereafter, the joint process will be reflected along the free boundary. The construction
of the reflected diffusion relies on ideas in [42] that are based on the transformation of
probability measures in the spirit of Girsanov. The uniqueness of the optimal diffusion
process then follows by the global Lipschitz continuity of our free boundary. Then, as
a byproduct, we find that the derivative of the value function (in the direction (0, 1))
identifies with the value function of an optimal stopping problem. This fact highlights
the (economic) components which are taken into account in the company's decision of
acting. Our results are finally complemented by a numerical discussion of the depen-
dency on the model parameters. We find, for example, that a higher mean-reversion
level of the fundamental price process leads to a quicker installation of solar panels.
From the modeling point of view, it is common in the literature to represent elec-
tricity prices via a mean-reverting behavior, and to include (jump) terms to incorporate
seasonal fluctuations and daily spikes, cf. [32, 38, 68, 130] among others. Here, we do
not represent the spikes and seasonal fluctuations, with the following justification: the
installation time of solar panels usually takes several days or weeks, which makes the
company indifferent to daily or weekly spikes. Also, the high lifespan of solar panels and
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the underlying infinite time horizon setting allow us to neglect the seasonal patterns.
We therefore assume that the fundamental electricity price has solely a mean-reverting
behavior, and evolves according to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process8. We are also ne-
glecting the stochastic and seasonal effects of solar production. In fact, solar panels do
not obviously produce power during the night, produce less in winter than in summer
(these two effects could be covered via a deterministic seasonal component), and also
produce less when it is cloudy (this should be modelled with a stochastic process).
Since here we are interested in a long-term optimal behaviour, we interpret the average
electricity produced in a generic unit of time as proportional to the installed power. All
of this can be mathematically justified if we interpret our fundamental price to be, for
example, a weekly average price as e.g. in [33, 69], who used exactly this representation
to get rid of daily and weekly seasonalities.
8We allow for negative prices by modeling the electricity price via an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
Indeed, negative electricity prices can be observed in some markets, for example in Germany, cf. [99].
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Chapter 1
On a Strategic Model of Pollution
Control
1.1 Introduction
We propose a strategic model of pollution control. A firm, representative of the pro-
ductive sector of a country, aims at maximizing its profits by expanding its production.
Assuming that the output of production is proportional to the level of pollutants' emis-
sions, the firm increases the level of pollution. The government of the country aims at
minimizing the social costs due to the pollution, and introduces regulatory constraints
on the emissions' level, which then effectively cap the output of production. Supposing
that the firm and the government face both proportional and fixed costs in order to
adopt their policies, we model the previous problem as a stochastic impulse two-person
nonzero-sum game. The state variable of the game is the level of the output of pro-
duction which evolves as a general linearly controlled one-dimensional Itô-diffusion.
We construct a pair of candidate equilibrium policies and of corresponding equilibrium
values, and we provide a set of sufficient conditions under which they indeed realize
an equilibrium. Our results are complemented by a numerical study when the (uncon-
trolled) output of production evolves as a geometric Brownian motion, and the firm's
operating profit and the government's running cost functions are of power type. An
analysis of the dependency of the equilibrium policies and values on the model param-
eters yields interesting new behaviors that we explain as a consequence of the strategic
interaction between the firm and the government.
The present chapter is based on [61]. It is organized as follows. In Section 1.2
we introduce the setting and formulate the problem. In Section 1.3.1 we construct
candidate equilibrium policies and candidate equilibrium values, whereas in Section
1.3.2 we provide a verification theorem. Finally, in Section 1.4 we provide the numerical
solution to an example, and we study the dependency of the equilibrium with respect
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to the model parameters. Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 1.5.
1.2 Setting and Problem Formulation
We consider a firm (agent 1), and a government (agent 2). The firm produces a single
good, and its profits from production are described by a function pi : R+ 7→ R+ which
is continuous, strictly concave and increasing. We assume that the production process
leads to emissions, for example of greenhouse gases such as CO2, that are proportional
to the level of the output (see also [112, 113], among others). These emissions have
a negative externality on the social welfare, and the resulting disutility incurred by
the society is measured by a cost function C : R+ 7→ R+ that depends on the rate of
emissions. The function C is continuous, strictly convex and increasing.
The production process is assumed to be stochastic, since it may depend on uncer-
tain capital depreciation or other exogenous random factors (see also [11, 30, 53, 129],
among others). In particular, let W = (Wt)t≥0 be a one-dimensional, standard Brown-
ian motion on a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), where F := (Ft)t≥0 is
a filtration satisfying the usual conditions. The output of production at time t ≥ 0 is
denoted by Xt, and it evolves as a linear Itô-diffusion on (0,∞); that is,
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x > 0, (1.1)
for some Borel-measurable functions µ, σ to be specified. Here, µ is the trend of the
production, while σ is a measure of the fluctuations around this trend.
To account for the dependency of X on its initial level, from now on we shall write
Xx where appropriate, and Px to refer to the probability measure on (Ω,F) such that
Px( · ) = P( · |X0 = x), x ∈ (0,∞). Throughout this chapter we will equivalently use
the notations E[f(Xxt )] and Ex[f(Xt)], f : R→ R Borel-measurable and integrable, to
refer to expectations under the measure Px.
For the coefficients of the SDE (1.1) we make the following assumption, which will
hold throughout the chapter.
Assumption 1.2.1. The functions µ : R 7→ R and σ : R 7→ (0,∞) are such that
|µ(x)− µ(y)| ≤ K|x− y|, |σ(x)− σ(y)| ≤ h(|x− y|), x, y ∈ (0,∞), (1.2)
for some K > 0, and h : R+ 7→ R+ strictly increasing such that h(0) = 0 and∫
(0,ε)
du
h2(u)
=∞ for every ε > 0. (1.3)
As a consequence of the above assumption one has that if a solution to (1.1) exists,
then it is pathwise unique by the Yamada-Watanabe's Theorem (cf. [81], Proposition
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5.2.13 and Remark 5.3.3, among others). Moreover, from (1.2) and (1.3) it follows that
for every x ∈ (0,∞) there exists ε > 0 such that∫ x+ε
x−ε
1 + |µ(y)|
σ2(y)
dy < +∞. (1.4)
Local integrability condition (1.4) implies that (1.1) has a weak solution (up to a
possible explosion time) that is unique in the sense of probability law (cf. [81], Section
5.5C). Therefore, (1.1) has a unique strong solution (possibly up to an explosion time)
due to [81], Corollary 5.3.23. Moreover, X is also regular in the sense that any point
of the interior of its state space can be reached in finite time with positive probability.
In line with applications, we assume that the boundary point +∞ is not attainable for
the process X, that is +∞ cannot be reached in finite time with positive probability.
One-dimensional diffusions like the geometric Brownian motion and the CIR process
(under a suitable restriction on the parameters, i.e. the so-called Novikov's conditions)
satisfy the assumptions of our setting.
Remark 1.2.2. An example of microfoundation for a stochastic dynamics of the output
of production is the following (cf. [30]). Assume that at time t ≥ 0 the output of
production Xt is given in terms of the capital stock, Kt, and the output of labor, Lt, by
Xt =
(
Kρt L
1−ρ
t
)γ
, 0 < ρ ≤ 1, and γ > 0. (1.5)
Also, suppose that the firm is faced with a constant elasticity demand function
Pt = X
λ−1
t , 0 < γλ < 1, (1.6)
where Pt is the product price at time t ≥ 0, and λ is a measure of the firm's monopoly
power. Since the input of labor Lt is chosen such that Lt = arg maxL
{
PtXt − wL
}
,
for some wage w > 0, one can obtain from (1.5) and (1.6) that
Lt =
[
γλ
w
(1− ρ)
] 1
1−(1−ρ)γλ
K
ργλ
1−(1−ρ)γλ
t = αˆK
ργλ
1−(1−ρ)γλ
t , (1.7)
where αˆ :=
[
γλ
w
(1− ρ)] 11−(1−ρ)γλ . Hence, by plugging (1.7) into (1.5) we have
Xt = αˆ
(1−ρ)γK
γρ
1−(1−ρ)γλ
t . (1.8)
If now capital stock is stochastic and depreciates at a rate δ > 0, i.e. dKt = −δKtdt+
σKtdWt for some Brownian motion W (see, e.g., [129]), by Itô's formula one finds
that Xt evolves as
dXt = µˆXtdt+ σˆXtdWt,
for suitable constants µˆ, σˆ.
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Both the agents can influence the process of production: on the one hand, the firm
can instantaneously increase the level of production, for example by increasing the
capital stock. This leads to instantaneous costs for the firm which have both a variable
and a fixed component, and that we model through a function g1 : R+ 7→ R+ of the
size of interventions on the production. In particular we take
g1(ξ) := K1 + κ1ξ, ξ ≥ 0,
with K1, κ1 > 0. On the other hand, the government can introduce regulatory con-
straints that effectively force the firm to decrease the level of production1, hence of
the emissions. A similar situation has happened in December 2016 in Beijing where
authorities issued a five-day warning and ordered heavy industries to slow or halt pro-
duction in order to reduce the smog in the air. We assume that the instantaneous
costs of a similar action incurred by the government can be measured by a function
g2 : R+ 7→ R+ given by
g2(η) := K2 + κ2η, η ≥ 0,
with K2, κ2 > 0. Such costs might arise because of an increase in the rate of unem-
ployment or forgone taxes due to a possible decrease of the production capacity.
Because of the presence of fixed costs, it is reasonable to expect that the firm
(resp. the government) intervenes only at discrete times on the output of production
by shifting the current level of output up (resp. down) of some nonzero amount. More
formally, the action of any agent is defined as follows.
Definition 1.2.3. The actions ν1 and ν2 of the firm and of the government, respec-
tively, are pairs
ν1 := (τ1,1, . . . , τ1,n, . . . ; ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . ),
ν2 := (τ2,1, . . . , τ2,n, . . . ; η1, . . . , ηn, . . . ),
where 0 ≤ τi,1 ≤ τi,2 ≤ . . . , for i = 1, 2, is an increasing sequence of F-stopping times,
ξn are positive Fτ1,n-measurable random variables, and ηn are positive Fτ2,n-measurable
random variables.
Intervening on the output of production, the two agents modify the dynamics of
the production process which then becomes
Xx,ν1,ν2t = x+
t∫
0
µ(Xx,ν1,ν2s )ds+
t∫
0
σ(Xx,ν1,ν2s )dWs
+α
∑
k:τ1,k≤t
ξk
∏
l≥1
1{τ1,k 6=τ2,l} −
∑
k:τ2,k≤t
ηk, t ≥ 0,
Xx,ν1,ν20− = x > 0,
(1.9)
1Restrictions on the output of production can be achieved by the government in different ways.
The interested reader may refer to the classical book [108].
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where α > 0 measures the effect of an increase in the capital stock on the output of
production, and Xx,ν1,ν2t− := limε↓0X
x,ν1,ν2
t−ε for any t ≥ 0.
In (1.9) ξk represents the lump-sum increase of the output of production made
by the firm at time τ1,k. Moreover, ηk is the impact on production of the regulatory
constraints imposed by the government at time τ2,k. If both the agents are willing to
intervene on the output of production at the same time, it is reasonable to allow the
government to have the priority: the infinite product
∏
l≥1
1{τ1,k 6=τ2,l} in (1.9) takes care
of that. We write Xx,ν1,ν2 to stress the dependence of the output of production on its
initial level, and on the actions ν1 and ν2 adopted by the two agents.
Remark 1.2.4. Following the microfoundation of Remark 1.2.2, suppose that at a cer-
tain time τ1,k the firm increases the capital stock by an amount ξk, while the government
does not intervene. Then we have by (1.8) that
Xτk = αˆ
(1−ρ)γK
ργ
1−(1−ρ)γλ
τk = αˆ
(1−ρ)γ
(
Kτk− + ξk
) ργ
1−(1−ρ)γλ
.
Taking γ > 1, for ρ = 1−γλ
γ−γλ ∈ (0, 1) and λ such that γλ ∈ (0, 1), we find
Xτk = Xτk− + αˆ
(1−ρ)γξk,
that is consistent with (1.9) if we set α := αˆ(1−ρ)γ.
The firm's total expected profits arising from production, net of present costs, are
J1(x, ν1, ν2) := Ex
[ ∞∫
0
e−r1tpi(Xν1,ν2t )dt−
∑
k≥1
e−r1τ1,kg1(ξk)1{τ1,k<∞}
]
, (1.10)
where r1 > 0 is the subjective discount factor of the firm.
Furthermore, the government's total expected costs arising from the emissions of
pollutants is
J2(x, ν1, ν2) := Ex
[ ∞∫
0
e−r2tC(βXν1,ν2t )dt+
∑
k≥1
e−r2τ2,kg2(ηk)1{τ2,k<∞}
]
, (1.11)
for some r2 > 0 and β > 0. The constant β is the proportional factor between the rate
of emissions and the output of production, while r2 characterizes the time preferences
of the government.
Remark 1.2.5. We notice that the choice of a constant β > 0 in (1.11), and of a
constant α > 0 in (1.9) is just to simplify exposition. Indeed, the results of this chapter
do hold even if we allow for suitable state dependent β(·) or α(·).
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The set of admissible actions is given as follows.
Definition 1.2.6. For any initial level of the production x > 0, we say that the actions
ν1 := (τ1,1, . . . , τ1,n, . . . ; ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . ) and ν2 := (τ2,1, . . . , τ2,n, . . . ; η1, . . . , ηn, . . . ) are
admissible, and we write (ν1, ν2) ∈ T (x), if the following hold true:
(i) There exists a unique strong solution to (1.9) with right-continuous sample paths
such that Xx,ν1,ν2t ≥ 0 P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0.
(ii) The functionals (1.10) and (1.11) are finite; that is,
(a) Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−r1tpi(Xν1,ν2t )dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−r2tC(βXν1,ν2t )dt
]
<∞,
(b) Ex
[∑
k≥1
e−r1τ1,kg1(ξk)1{τ1,k<∞} +
∑
k≥1
e−r2τ2,kg2(ηk)1{τ2,k<∞}
]
<∞.
(iii) If τi,k = τi,k+1 for some i = 1, 2 and k ≥ 1, then τi,k = τi,k+1 =∞ Px-a.s.
(iv) One has lim
k→∞
τi,k = +∞ Px-a.s. for i = 1, 2.
Notice that requirements (iii) and (iv) prevent each agent to act twice at the same
time, and to accumulate her interventions. For future use, we make the following
standing assumption.
Assumption 1.2.7. It holds
Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−r1tpi(Xt)dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−r2tC(βXt)dt
]
<∞.
Remark 1.2.8. Notice that in the benchmark cases in which the uncontrolled output
of production is such that dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt, i.e. Xt = x exp{(µ− 12σ2)t+ σWt},
µ ∈ R, σ > 0, and pi(x) = xa, a ∈ (0, 1), and C(x) = xb, b > 1, one has that
Assumption 1.2.7 is satisfied by taking
r1 >
[
µa− σ
2a
2
(1− a)
]+
and r2 >
[
µb+
σ2b
2
(b− 1)
]+
.
We now introduce the policies (strategies) of the firm and of the government that
they are allowed to follow in order to intervene on the output of production. We assume
that these policies are of so-called barrier type that can be informally described as
follows (see also [2]).
(i) The firm increases its production instantaneously by exerting an impulse when-
ever the output of production is such that Xt ≤ b11, and shifts the process upwards
to some b12, where b
1
j , j = 1, 2, are real constants chosen by the firm such that
b12 > b
1
1.
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(ii) The government introduces regulatory constraints whenever the level of produc-
tion, hence of emissions, is too large, i.e. Xt ≥ b22, and induces a shift of the
process downwards to some b21, where b
2
j , j = 1, 2, are real constants chosen by
the government such that b22 > b
2
1.
More formally, a policy of an agent is defined as follows.
Definition 1.2.9. The policies ϕ1 and ϕ2 of the firm and of the government, respec-
tively, are given by pairs
ϕ1 := (b
1
1; b
1
2) ∈ ([0,∞) ∪ {−∞})× (0,∞),
ϕ2 := (b
2
1; b
2
2) ∈ [0,∞)× (0,∞],
where b11 < b
1
2 and b
2
1 < b
2
2.
Notice that the firm does not intervene on the output of production whenever it
picks b11 = −∞. Similarly, the government does not intervene if b22 = ∞. Therefore,
for any b12, b
2
1 ∈ (0,∞), we denote the non-intervention policies by ϕ1 := (−∞; b12)
and ϕ2 := (b
2
1;∞), respectively. The constant barriers bij, i, j = 1, 2, of the government
(resp. the firm) are decided ex-ante and do not dynamically react to the policy followed
by the firm (resp. government). Therefore, they trigger precommitted policies of the
two agents.
In the following, we describe the actions that are induced by the policies. To
simplify the notations, the associated action to the policy ϕi of agent i is denoted by
νi(ϕi), and we write X
x,ϕ1,ϕ2
t in order to stress the dependency of the policies on the
output of production, that is Xx,ϕ1,ϕ2t ≡ Xx,ν1(ϕ1),ν2(ϕ2)t . Then, for any x > 0 given and
fixed and ϕi 6= ϕi, i = 1, 2, we set
ν1(ϕ1) := (τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1,1 , . . . , τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1,n , . . . ; ξ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1 , . . . , ξ
ϕ1,ϕ2
n , . . . ),
ν2(ϕ2) := (τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
2,1 , . . . , τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
2,n , . . . ; η
ϕ1,ϕ2
1 , . . . , η
ϕ1,ϕ2
n , . . . ),
where we have introduced:
(a) the sequence of the firm's intervention times {τϕ1,ϕ21,k }k≥1 such that τϕ1,ϕ21,k :=
inf{t > τϕ1,ϕ21,k−1 : Xx,ϕ1,ϕ2t ≤ b11} with τϕ1,ϕ21,0 := 0 P-a.s.;
(b) the sequence of the government's intervention times {τϕ1,ϕ22,k }k≥1 such that τϕ1,ϕ22,k :=
inf{t > τϕ1,ϕ22,k−1 : Xx,ϕ1,ϕ2t ≥ b22} with τϕ1,ϕ22,0 := 0 P-a.s.;
(c) the sequence of interventions of the firm ξϕ1,ϕ2k :=
1
α
(b12 −Xx,ϕ1,ϕ2τϕ1,ϕ21,k −) for all k ≥ 1;
(d) the sequence of impulses applied by the government ηϕ1,ϕ2k := X
x,ϕ1,ϕ2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
2,k −
− b21 for
all k ≥ 1.
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By the definition of τϕ1,ϕ21,k and τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
2,k one has that the sequence of impulses ξ
ϕ1,ϕ2
k
and ηϕ1,ϕ2k are constant-sized (apart the initial impulses, that depend on the initial
state x). In particular, ξϕ1,ϕ2k := (b
1
2 − b11)/α and ηϕ1,ϕ2k := b22 − b21 for all k ≥ 2, and
ξϕ1,ϕ21 := (b
1
2 − x ∧ b11)/α and ηϕ1,ϕ21 := x ∨ b22 − b21.
Moreover, νi(ϕi) is associated to the non-intervention action, that is τ1,k = ∞
Px-a.s. for any k ≥ 1 if i = 1, and τ2,k =∞ Px-a.s. for any k ≥ 1 if i = 2.
The agents pick their policies within the following admissible class.
Definition 1.2.10. We say that the policies ϕ1 = (b
1
1; b
1
2) and ϕ2 = (b
2
1; b
2
2) are ad-
missible, and we write (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ S, if at least one of the following conditions hold
true:
(i) The firm or the government follows a non-intervention policy, that is ϕi = ϕi for
some i ∈ {1, 2}.
(ii) One has b11 < b
2
2 and b
1
2, b
2
1 ∈ (b11, b22).
We define the firm's action region as A1 := [0, b11] and the government's action
region as A2 := [b22,∞) with the convention that [0,−∞] = ∅ = [∞,∞). In the rest of
this chapter, we will denote by Ii := R+ \ Ai the inaction region of agent i.
Notice that admissible policies (ϕ1, ϕ2) exist because the constant trigger values b
i
j,
i, j = 1, 2, of agent i do not depend on the policy employed by agent j 6= i. That
is, independently of the policy of agent j, agent i will always force the process X to
stay in her inaction region Ii. A rigorous formalization of (ϕ1, ϕ2) can be obtained by
the arguments employed in Definition 2.2 of [2]. We now show that admissible policies
(ϕ1, ϕ2) in fact imply admissible actions.
Lemma 1.2.11. Recall Definition 1.2.6. Then for any x > 0 and (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ S, the
actions (ν1(ϕ1), ν2(ϕ2)) ∈ T (x).
Proof. Let x > 0 be given and fixed. Existence of a unique strong solution to (1.9)
with right-continuous paths can be obtained by arguing as in Lemma 2.3 of [2]. Also,
Xx,ϕ1,ϕ2t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s. for all t > 0 since b12, b21 ∈ [0,∞). Hence, Condition (i) of
Definition 1.2.6 is satisfied.
Now suppose that ϕi 6= ϕi for any i = 1, 2. The fact that Xx,ϕ1,ϕ2t ∈ [b11, b22] P-a.s. for
all t > 0 and the continuity of pi and C in particular imply that (ii)− (a) of Definition
1.2.6 is fulfilled. As for (ii) − (b) note that ξϕ1,ϕ2k ≤ b12/α Px-a.s. for all k ∈ N, and
that ηϕ1,ϕ2k ≤ max(b22 − b21, x − b21) Px-a.s. for all k ∈ N. Hence there exists a positive
constant Θ (possibly depending on x) such that g1(ξ
ϕ1,ϕ2
k ) + g2(η
ϕ1,ϕ2
k ) ≤ Θ Px-a.s. for
all k ∈ N. In order to prove that (ii)− (b) of Definition 1.2.6 holds true, it thus suffices
to show that for any i = 1, 2 one has
Ex
[∑
k≥1
e−riτ
ϕ1,ϕ2
i,k
]
<∞.
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To accomplish that one can adapt to our setting arguments from the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.7 in [2]. We provide these arguments here for the sake of completeness. Without
loss of generality we consider the case i = 1, since the treatment of the case i = 2 is anal-
ogous. Defining τ˜ := inf{t > 0 : Xb12,ϕ1,ϕ2t ≤ b11}, and exploiting the time-homogeneity
of the production process X and the independence of the Brownian increments, we can
write for any k ≥ 1
Ex
[
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1,k
]
= Ex
[
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1,k−1
]
E
[
e−r1τ˜
]
.
By iterating the previous argument one finds
Ex
[
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1,k
]
= Ex
[
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1,1
](
E
[
e−r1τ˜
])k−1
.
Then summing over k on both sides of the previous equation and applying Fubini-
Tonelli's theorem, we obtain
Ex
[∑
k≥1
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1,k
]
= Ex
[
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ2
1,1
]∑
k≥0
(
E
[
e−r1τ˜
])k
,
and the series on the right-hand-side above converges as E[e−r1τ˜ ] < 1.
Because b11 < b
2
2 by assumption, and b
1
2, b
2
1 ∈ (b11, b22), condition (iii) and (iv) of
Definition 1.2.6 are satisfied.
Finally, if ϕi = ϕi for some i ∈ {1, 2}, also the actions (ν1(ϕ1), ν2(ϕ2)) ∈ T (x). In
fact, conditions (ii) − (b), (iii) and (iv) can be shown to be valid by proceeding as
above. Condition (ii) − (a) instead follows by using Assumption 1.2.7 and exploiting
the arguments of the proof of Proposition 1.3.2 below (with τ2 = ∞ therein, that is,
when ϕ1 6= ϕ1 and ϕ2 = ϕ2).
Given the policy adopted by the other agent, the firm aims at maximizing its
profit, whereas the government at minimizing the social costs of pollution. Hence, for
any x > 0, the two agents aim at finding (ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ∈ S such thatJ1(x, ν1(ϕ∗1), ν2(ϕ∗2)) ≥ J1(x, ν1(ϕ1), ν2(ϕ∗2)), ∀ϕ1 such that (ϕ1, ϕ∗2) ∈ S,J2(x, ν1(ϕ∗1), ν2(ϕ∗2)) ≤ J2(x, ν1(ϕ∗1), ν2(ϕ2)), ∀ϕ2 such that (ϕ∗1, ϕ2) ∈ S. (P)
Definition 1.2.12. Let x > 0. If (ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ∈ S satisfying (P) exist, we call them
equilibrium policies, and we define the equilibrium values as
V1(x) := J1(x, ν1(ϕ∗1), ν2(ϕ∗2)) and V2(x) := J2(x, ν1(ϕ∗1), ν2(ϕ∗2)).
1.3 Solving the Strategic Pollution Control Problem
In this section, we first construct a pair of admissible candidate equilibrium policies
which is such that both agents do not follow a non-intervention policy. Then, under
suitable requirements, we show that these policies indeed solve problem (P).
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1.3.1 Construction of a Candidate Solution
We conjecture that both agents follow an admissible intervention policy, that is, the
equilibrium boundaries b˜ij, i, j = 1, 2, are such that b˜
1
1 6= −∞ and b˜22 6= ∞. The
associated policies are denoted by ϕ˜i, i = 1, 2, and the expected payoffs associated to
(ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) are defined as
v1(x) := J1(x, ν1(ϕ˜1), ν2(ϕ˜2)) and v2(x) := J2(x, ν1(ϕ˜1), ν2(ϕ˜2)), x > 0.
Moreover, thanks to Assumption 1.2.7, the performance criteria associated with no
interventions are finite and given by
G1(x) := Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−r1spi(Xs)ds
]
and G2(x) := Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−r2sC(βXs)ds
]
. (1.12)
For frequent future use, we define the infinitesimal generator L of the uncontrolled
diffusion Xx by (Lu)(x) := 1
2
σ2(x)u′′(x) + µ(x)u′(x), x > 0,
for any u ∈ C2((0,∞)). Then, for fixed r > 0, under Assumption 1.2.1 there always
exist two linearly independent, strictly positive solutions to the ordinary differential
equation Lu = ru satisfying a set of boundary conditions based on the boundary
behaviour of Xx (see, e.g., pp. 18-19 of [31]). These functions span the set of solutions
of Lu = ru, and are uniquely defined up to multiplication if one of them is required
to be strictly increasing and the other one to be strictly decreasing. We denote the
strictly increasing solution by ψr and the strictly decreasing one by φr. From now on
we set ψi := ψri and φi := φri for i = 1, 2.
Remark 1.3.1. The functions G1 and G2 are the expected cumulative present value
of the flows pi(Xxt ) and C(βX
x
t ), respectively. It is well known that Gi, i = 1, 2, can
be represented in terms of the fundamental solutions ψi and φi, i = 1, 2. We refer the
reader to equation (3.3) in [7], among others.
For any i = 1, 2 we introduce the strictly decreasing and positive function Fi such
that Fi(x) := φi(x)/ψi(x). Also, for given b˜
i
j, i, j = 1, 2, such that 0 < b˜
1
1 < b˜
1
2 < b˜
2
2
and b˜11 < b˜
2
1 < b˜
2
2, we set
Ai(x) :=
ψi(x)
ψi(b˜11)
[
Fi(b˜
2
2)− Fi(x)
Fi(b˜22)− Fi(b˜11)
]
, Bi(x) :=
ψi(x)
ψi(b˜22)
[
Fi(x)− Fi(b˜11)
Fi(b˜22)− Fi(b˜11)
]
i = 1, 2.
(1.13)
We define wi as the restriction of vi on I1 ∩ I2 = (b˜11, b˜22), i.e. wi := vi|I1∩I2 . The
next result provides a representation of vi, i = 1, 2.
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Proposition 1.3.2. Recall (1.13), let x > 0, and b˜ij, i, j = 1, 2, such that 0 < b˜
1
1 <
b˜12 < b˜
2
2 and b˜
1
1 < b˜
2
1 < b˜
2
2. Then, the performance criteria v1(x) and v2(x) associated to
the policies (ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) ∈ S can be represented as
v1(x) =

w1(b˜
1
2)−K1 − κ1α (b˜12 − x), x ≤ b˜11,[
w1(b˜
1
2)−K1 − κ1α (b˜12 − b˜11)−G1(b˜11)
]
A1(x)
+
[
w1(b˜
2
1)−G1(b˜22)
]
B1(x) +G1(x), x ∈ (b˜11, b˜22),
w1(b˜
2
1), x ≥ b˜22,
(1.14)
and
v2(x) =

w2(b˜
1
2), x ≤ b˜11[
w2(b˜
2
1) +K2 + κ2(b˜
2
2 − b˜21)−G2(b˜22)
]
B2(x)
+
[
w2(b˜
1
2)−G2(b˜11)
]
A2(x) +G2(x), x ∈ (b˜11, b˜22),
w2(b˜
2
1) +K2 + κ2(x− b˜21), x ≥ b˜22.
(1.15)
Moreover, under the requirement(
1− Ai(b˜12)
)(
1−Bi(b˜21)
)−Bi(b˜12)Ai(b˜21) 6= 0, i = 1, 2, (1.16)
one has
w1(b˜
1
2) =
[
1− A1(b˜12)−
B1(b˜
1
2)A1(b˜
2
1)
1−B1(b˜21)
]−1[
G1(b˜
2
1)B1(b˜
1
2)
1−B1(b˜21)
+G1(b˜
1
2)
−
(
K1 + κ1(b˜
1
2 − b˜11) +G1(b˜11)
)(
A1(b˜
2
1)B1(b˜
1
2)
1−B1(b˜21)
+ A1(b˜
1
2)
)
−G1(b˜22)
(
B1(b˜
2
1)B1(b˜
1
2)
1−B1(b˜21)
+B1(b˜
1
2)
)]
,
(1.17)
w1(b˜
2
1) =
[
1−B1(b˜21)
]−1[(
w1(b˜
1
2)−K1 − κ1(b˜12 − b˜11)−G1(b˜11)
)
A1(b˜
2
1)
−G1(b˜22)B(b˜21) +G1(b˜21)
]
,
(1.18)
and
w2(b˜
1
2) =
[(
1− A2(b˜12)
)(
1−B2(b˜21)
)
B2(b˜12)
− A2(b˜21)
]−1
×[
G2(b˜
1
2)
(
1−B2(b˜21)
)
B2(b˜12)
+G2(b˜
2
1) +K2 + κ2(b˜
2
2 − b˜21)−G2(b˜22)
−G2(b˜11)
(
A2(b˜
1
2)
1−B2(b˜21)
B2(b˜12)
+ A2(b˜
2
1)
)]
,
(1.19)
w2(b˜
2
1) =
[
1−B2(b˜21)
]−1[(
K2 + κ2(b˜
2
2 − b˜21)−G2(b˜22)
)
B2(b˜
2
1)
+
(
w2(b˜
1
2)−G2(b˜11)
)
A2(b˜
2
1) +G2(b˜
2
1)
]
.
(1.20)
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Proof. We consider only the case i = 1 since the arguments are symmetric for i = 2.
Let x > 0 be given and fixed, and define τ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ b˜11} and τ2 := inf{t ≥
0 : Xxt ≥ b˜22}. According to the policies (ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2), the stopping time τ1 ∧ τ2 is the first
time at which either the firm or the government intervenes. Then, noticing that X is
uncontrolled up to time τ1 ∧ τ2, the payoff of the firm associated to (ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) satisfies
the functional relation
v1(x) = Ex
[ τ1∧τ2∫
0
e−r1tpi(Xt)dt+ e−r1τ11{τ1<τ2}
(
v1(b˜
1
2)−K1 −
κ1
α
(b˜12 −X ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2τ1 )
)
+ e−r1τ21{τ1>τ2}v1(b˜
2
1)
]
.
(1.21)
Recall that wi denotes the restriction of vi on I1∩I2. Then, taking x ∈ (b˜11, b˜22) = I1∩I2
in (1.21), noticing that b˜12 and b˜
2
1 belong to I1 ∩ I2 and recalling (1.12), by the strong
Markov property we can write
w1(x) =
(
w1(b˜
1
2)−K1 −
κ1
α
(b˜12 − b˜11)−G1(b˜11)
)
Ex
[
e−r1τ11{τ1<τ2}
]
+
(
w1(b˜
2
1)−G1(b˜22)
)
Ex
[
e−r1τ21{τ1>τ2}
]
+G1(x).
By using now the formulas for the Laplace transforms of hitting times of a linear
diffusion (see, e.g., [45], eq. (4.3)), we find (cf. (1.13))
Ex
[
e−r1τ11{τ1<τ2}
]
= A1(x), Ex
[
e−r1τ21{τ1>τ2}
]
= B1(x),
so that
w1(x) =
(
w1(b˜
1
2)−K1−
κ1
α
(b˜12− b˜11)−G1(b˜11)
)
A1(x) +
(
w1(b˜
2
1)−G1(b˜22)
)
B1(x) +G1(x),
for all x ∈ (b˜11, b˜22).
Taking x ≤ b˜11 in (1.21) we obtain τ1 = 0 and then v1(x) = w1(b˜12)−K1− κ1α (b˜12−x),
while picking x ≥ b˜22 we have τ2 = 0 and thus v1(x) = w1(b˜21). Therefore we can write
v1(x) =

w1(b˜
1
2)−K1 − κ1α (b˜12 − x), x ≤ b˜11,[
w1(b˜
1
2)−K1 − κ1α (b˜12 − b˜11)−G1(b˜11)
]
A1(x)
+
[
w1(b˜
2
1)−G1(b˜22)
]
B1(x) +G1(x), x ∈ (b˜11, b˜22),
w1(b˜
2
1), x ≥ b˜22.
(1.22)
Let (1.16) hold. Recalling again that b˜12, b˜
2
1 ∈ (b˜11, b˜22) by construction, and taking
first x = b˜12 and then x = b˜
2
1 in (1.22), we obtain a linear system of two equations for
24
Strategic Pollution Control
the two unknowns w1(b˜
1
2) and w1(b˜
2
1). Once solved, this system yields
w1(b˜
1
2) =
[
1− A1(b˜12)−
B1(b˜
1
2)A1(b˜
2
1)
1−B1(b˜21)
]−1[
G1(b˜
2
1)B1(b˜
1
2)
1−B1(b˜21)
+G1(b˜
1
2)
−
(
K1 + κ1(b˜
1
2 − b˜11) +G1(b˜11)
)(
A1(b˜
2
1)B1(b˜
1
2)
1−B1(b˜21)
+ A1(b˜
1
2)
)
−G1(b˜22)
(
B1(b˜
2
1)B1(b˜
1
2)
1−B1(b˜21)
+B1(b˜
1
2)
)]
,
and
w1(b˜
2
1) =
[
1−B1(b˜21)
]−1[(
w1(b˜
1
2)−K1 − κ1(b˜12 − b˜11)−G1(b˜11)
)
A1(b˜
2
1)
−G1(b˜22)B(b˜21) +G1(b˜21)
]
.
Notice that the denominators in the definition of w1(b˜
1
2) are nonzero. Indeed, B1(b˜
2
1) 6= 1
since τ2 > 0 P-a.s. for x = b˜21 < b˜22, and (1−A1(b˜12))(1−B1(b˜21))−B1(b˜12)A1(b˜21) 6= 0 by
(1.16).
The proof is then completed.
It is easy to see from (1.14) and (1.15) that vi, i = 1, 2, is by construction a
continuous function on (0,∞). In order to obtain the equilibrium four boundaries b˜ij,
i, j = 1, 2, we first assume that each agent picks her own action boundary b˜ii, i = 1, 2,
such that vi is also continuously differentiable there. This gives
v′1(b˜
1
1 +) =
κ1
α
, (1.23)
v′2(b˜
2
2−) = κ2, (1.24)
where we have set v′i(· ± ) := limε↓0 v′i( · ± ε).
The two equations (1.23) and (1.24) may be interpreted as the so-called smooth-
fit equations, well known optimality conditions in the literature on singular/impulse
control and optimal stopping (see, e.g., [66, 107]). Furthermore, we assume that at
each intervention the firm and the government shift the process X to the points that
give rise to the maximal net profits and minimal total costs, respectively. This means
that b˜12, b˜
2
1 ∈ (b˜11, b˜22) are selected such that
b˜12 = arg supy≥b˜11
{
v1(y)− κ1
α
(y − x)−K1
}
, x ≤ b˜11,
and
b˜21 = arg infy≤b˜22
{
v2(y) + κ2(x− y) +K2
}
, x ≥ b˜22.
Consequently,
v′1(b˜
1
2) =
κ1
α
, (1.25)
v′2(b˜
2
1) = κ2. (1.26)
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The four equations (1.23)-(1.26) can be used in order to obtain the four unknowns
b˜11, b˜
1
2, b˜
2
1, b˜
2
2, whenever a solution to such a highly nonlinear system exists.
1.3.2 The Verification Theorem
Here, we prove a verification theorem providing a set of sufficient conditions under
which the solution to (1.23)-(1.26) (if it exists) characterizes an equilibrium; that is,
(ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) = (ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2), and v1 ≡ V1, v2 ≡ V2 (cf. Definition 1.2.12). For its proof the
following assumption is needed.
Assumption 1.3.3.
(i) There exists xˆ1 > 0 such that the function θ1 : R+ 7→ R with θ1(x) := pi(x) +
κ1
α
(µ(x)− r1x) attains a local maximum at xˆ1 and is increasing on (0, xˆ1);
(ii) There exists xˆ2 > 0 such that the function θ2 : R+ 7→ R with θ2(x) := C(βx) +
κ2(µ(x)− r2x) attains a local minimum at xˆ2 and is increasing on (xˆ2,∞).
Remark 1.3.4. It is worth noticing that Assumption 1.3.3 is verified by the benchmark
cases µ(x) = µx, µ ∈ R, pi(x) = xa, a ∈ (0, 1), and C(x) = xb, b > 1, with xˆ1 =[
κ1
aα
(r1 − µ)
] 1
a−1 , xˆ2 =
[
κ2
bβb
(r2 − µ)
] 1
b−1 (whenever r1 ∧ r2 > µ).
Theorem 1.3.5 (Verification Theorem). Let Assumption 1.3.3 hold. Let b˜ij, i, j = 1, 2,
be a solution of (1.23)-(1.26) such that 0 < b˜11 < b˜
1
2 < b˜
2
2, b˜
1
1 < b˜
2
1 < b˜
2
2 and satisfying
(1.16), recall v1, v2 as in (1.14) and (1.15), and suppose that
v′1(x) ≥
κ1
α
, for all x ∈ (b˜11, b˜12], (1.27)
v′1(x) <
κ1
α
, for all x ∈ (b˜12, b˜22], (1.28)
v′2(x) < κ2, for all x ∈ (b˜11, b˜21), (1.29)
v′2(x) ≥ κ2, for all x ∈ [b˜21, b˜22), (1.30)
and
b˜11 ≤ xˆ1, (1.31)
pi(b˜11) +
c1
α
µ(b˜11)− r1v1(b˜11) ≤ 0, (1.32)
b˜22 ≥ xˆ2, (1.33)
C(βb˜22) + κ2µ(b˜
2
2)− r2v2(b˜22) ≥ 0. (1.34)
Then, for x > 0, the policies (ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) ∈ S such thatτ
ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2
i,k = inf{t > τ ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2i,k−1 : X ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2t /∈ Ii}, k ≥ 1, Px-a.s.,
τ ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2i,0 = 0, Px-a.s.,
(1.35)
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for i = 1, 2, and
ξ˜ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2k =
1
α
(
b˜12−X ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2τ ϕ˜1,ϕ˜21,k −
)
, η˜ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2k = X
ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ˜1,ϕ˜2
2,k −
− b˜21, k ≥ 1, Px-a.s., (1.36)
form an equilibrium, and v1 and v2 are the corresponding equilibrium values; that is,
v1 = V1, v2 = V2 on (0,∞).
Proof. The proof is organized in two steps.
Step 1. Here, we discuss the regularity properties of the function vi, i = 1, 2,
constructed in Proposition 1.3.2. Note that by (1.14) and (1.15) one can directly check
that vi ∈ C((0,∞)) for i = 1, 2. Moreover, by (1.23) and (1.24) one has v1 ∈ C1((0, b˜22)),
v2 ∈ C1((b˜11,∞)) and it can be checked by direct calculations that v′′1 ∈ L∞loc((0, b˜22))
and v′′2 ∈ L∞loc((b˜11,∞)). Also, for any x ∈ (b˜11, b˜22) we have from (1.14) and (1.15) that(Lv1 − r1v1)(x) + pi(x) = 0 and (Lv2 − r2v2)(x) + C(βx) = 0.
Because θ1 is increasing on (0, xˆ1) (cf. Assumption 1.3.3), and b˜
1
1 ≤ xˆ1 by assump-
tion, we obtain from (1.14) that for any x < b˜11 one has
(Lv1 − r1v1)(x) + pi(x) = θ1(x)− r1(v1(b˜12)−K1 − κ1α b˜12)
≤ θ1(b˜11)− r1
(
v1(b˜
1
2)−K1 −
κ1
α
b˜12
)
= pi(b˜11) +
κ1
α
µ(b˜11)− r1v1(b˜11) ≤ 0,
(1.37)
where we have used that v1(b˜
1
2) = v1(b˜
1
1) +K1 +
κ1
α
(b˜12 − b˜11), (1.31) and (1.32).
Similarly, one can check that
(Lv2 − r2v2)(x) + C(βx) ≥ 0 for all x > b˜22 due to
(1.33), (1.34), and the fact that θ2 is increasing on (xˆ2,∞) (cf. Assumption 1.3.3).
Step 2. Given x > 0 we now prove that (ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) ∈ S are equilibrium policies; that
is,
v1(x) ≥ J1(x, ν1(ϕ1), ν2(ϕ˜2)), ∀ϕ1 s.t. (ϕ1, ϕ˜2) ∈ S,
v2(x) ≤ J2(x, ν1(ϕ˜1), ν2(ϕ2)), ∀ϕ2 s.t. (ϕ˜1, ϕ2) ∈ S,
with equalities when we pick ϕ1 = ϕ˜1 and ϕ2 = ϕ˜2. Without loss of generality we
consider i = 1, since the arguments for i = 2 are analogous.
Let ϕ1 be such that (ϕ1, ϕ˜2) ∈ S, and for N > 0 set τR,N := τR ∧ N, where
τR := inf{s > 0 : Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2s /∈ (−R,R)}, with the usual convention inf ∅ = ∞. Since
Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2t ≤ b˜22 P-a.s. for all t > 0, by the regularity of v1 discussed in Step 1 we can
apply the generalized Itô's formula for semimartingales (see, e.g., [102], Theorems 2.1
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and 6.2), so to obtain
v1(x) = Ex
[
−
τR,N∫
0
e−r1t(Lv1 − r1v1)(Xϕ1,ϕ˜2t )dt+ e−r1τR,Nv1(Xϕ1,ϕ˜2τR,N )
−
∑
k: τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k <τR,N
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k
(
v1(X
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k
)− v1(Xϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k −
)
)
−
∑
k: τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k <τR,N
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k
(
v1(X
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k
)− v1(Xϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k −
)
)]
. (1.38)
By using again that Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2t ≤ b˜22 for all t > 0 P-a.s., and since (Lv1−r1v1)(x) ≤ −pi(x)
for a.e. x < b˜22 due to (1.37), we obtain from (1.38) that
v1(x) ≥ Ex
[ τR,N∫
0
e−r1tpi(Xϕ1,ϕ˜2t )dt −
∑
k: τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k <τR,N
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k
(
v1(X
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k
)− v1(Xϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k −
)
)
−
∑
k: τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k <τR,N
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k
(
v1(X
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k
)− v1(Xϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k −
)
)
+ e−r1τR,Nv1(Xϕ1,ϕ˜2τR,N )
]
.
(1.39)
In order to take care of the two sums in the expectation above, we define the
nonlocal operator (M1v1)(x) := sup
ξ≥0
{
v1(x+ αξ)− g1(ξ)
}
,
and we notice that ξ˜ϕ1,ϕ˜2k of (1.36) is such that ξ˜
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
k = arg supξ≥0
{
v1(x+αξ)−g1(ξ)
}
,
for all k ∈ N, due to (1.27) and (1.28). Hence
(M1v1)(x) =
v1(b˜
1
2)−K1 − κ1α (b˜12 − x), if x ≤ b˜12,
v1(x)−K1, if x > b˜12.
(1.40)
One can easily see from (1.14) and (1.40) that v1(x) ≥
(M1v1)(x) for all x ∈
(0, b˜11]∪(b˜12,∞), with equality for x ≤ b˜11. Then, noticing that x 7→ v1(x)−
(M1v1)(x) is
increasing for any x ∈ (b˜11, b˜12] by (1.27) and (1.40), we conclude that v1(x) ≥
(M1v1)(x)
for all x > 0. Therefore
v1(X
x,ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k −
) ≥ (M1v1)(Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k −
) ≥ v1
(
Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k
)− g1(ξϕ1,ϕ˜2k ). (1.41)
Moreover, because Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k −
≥ b˜22 P-a.s. and Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2τϕ1,ϕ˜22,k = b˜
2
1 P-a.s., we find by (1.14) that
v1(X
x,ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k −
) = v1(X
x,ϕ1,ϕ˜2
τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
2,k
), (1.42)
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upon noticing that v1(b˜
2
1) = w1(b˜
2
1) since b˜
2
1 ∈ (b˜11, b˜22). It thus follows from (1.41) and
(1.42) that
v1(x) ≥ Ex
[ τR,N∫
0
e−r1tpi(Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2t )dt
−
∑
k:τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k <τR,N
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k g1(ξ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
k ) + e
−r1τR,Nv1(Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2τR,N )
]
.
(1.43)
Now, v1 is continuous and X
x,ϕ1,ϕ˜2
t ∈ [0, b˜22] P-a.s. by admissibility of (ϕ1, ϕ˜2). Hence,
e−r1τR,Nv1(Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2τR,N ) ≥ −e−r1τR,N |v1(Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2τR,N )| ≥ −e−r1τR,N max
x∈[0,b˜22]
|v1(x)|,
and from (1.43) we have
v1(x) ≥ Ex
[ τR,N∫
0
e−r1tpi(Xx,ϕ1,ϕ˜2t )dt
−
∑
k:τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k <τR,N
e−r1τ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
1,k g1(ξ
ϕ1,ϕ˜2
k )− e−r1τR,N max
x∈[0,b˜22]
|v1(x)|
]
.
(1.44)
By using the dominated convergence theorem for the last term in (1.44) and the mono-
tone convergence theorem for the integral and the series in (1.44), we let first R→∞
and then N →∞, and we find
v1(x) ≥ J1(x, ν1(ϕ1), ν2(ϕ˜2)).
Finally, by construction we also have v1(x) = J1(x, ν1(ϕ˜1), ν2(ϕ˜2)).
Because arguments analogous to the ones employed for v1 we have that v2(x) ≤
J2(x, ν1(ϕ˜1), ν2(ϕ2)) for all ϕ2 such that (ϕ˜1, ϕ2) ∈ S, and v2(x) = J2(x, ν1(ϕ˜1), ν2(ϕ˜2)),
we conclude that (ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) are equilibrium policies and (v1, v2) are the corresponding
equilibrium values.
Remark 1.3.6. As a byproduct of Theorem 1.3.5 we have that, if (1.27)-(1.34) are
fulfilled, then v1 and v2 satisfy a.e. the system of quasi-variational inequalities
max{(Lv1 − r1v1)(x) + pi(x),M1v1(x)− v1(x)} = 0, for a.e. x < b˜22,
min{(Lv2 − r2v2)(x) + C(βx),M2v2(x)− v2(x)} = 0, for a.e. x > b˜11,
v1(x) ≥M1v1(x), ∀x > 0,
v2(x) ≤M2v2(x), ∀x > 0,
v1(x) = v1
(
b˜21
)
, ∀x ≥ b˜22,
v2(x) = v2
(
b˜12
)
, ∀x ≤ b˜11.
(1.45)
A system analogous to (1.45) has been introduced in the context of nonzero-sum stochas-
tic differential games with impulse controls in [2].
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1.4 A Numerical Example and Comparative Statics
Verification Theorem 1.3.5 involves the highly nonlinear system of four algebraic equa-
tions (1.23)(1.26) for the four boundaries. We have solved this system numerically in
a specific setting by using MATLAB. In particular, for the numerical example we have
assumed that the uncontrolled output of production evolves as a geometric Brownian
motion, i.e. µ(x) = µx and σ(x) = σx for some µ ∈ R and σ > 0. Moreover, we have
taken an operating profit function of Cobb-Douglas type pi(x) = xa, a ∈ (0, 1), and a
social disutility function of the form C(x) = xb, b > 1.
Among the possible parameters' values satisfying Assumption 1.2.7, we pick for ex-
ample those provided in Table 1.1, and we notice that for such a choice the performance
µ σ r1 r2 α β K1 κ1 K2 κ2 a b
0.02 0.20 0.10 0.10 1 1 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.5 2
Table 1.1: Parameters' values for the numerical example.
criteria associated with no interventions (cf. (1.12)) are given by
G1(x) =
1
r1 − µ2 + σ
2
8
√
x =
1000
95
√
x, and G2(x) =
1
r2 − 2µ− σ2x
2 = 50x2. (1.46)
Also, by an application of the Newton method in MATLAB, we find that the
numerical solution to (1.23)-(1.26) is given by
b˜11 = 0.1558984470, b˜
1
2 = 0.3825673799,
b˜21 = 0.2359455020, b˜
2
2 = 0.5746537199,
where we have evaluated wi(b˜
1
2) and wi(b˜
2
1), i = 1, 2, by (1.17)-(1.20). One also finds
(cf. (1.31)-(1.34))
xˆ1 =
[
2κ1(r1 − µ)
]−2
= 61.03515625 > b˜11,
pi(b˜11) +
c1
α
µ(b˜11)− r1v1(b˜11) = −0.0727643376 ≤ 0,
xˆ2 =
κ2(r2 − µ)
2
= 0.012 < b˜22,
C(βb˜22) + κ2µ(b˜
2
2)− r2v2(b˜22) = 0.1390988361 ≥ 0.
The plots of the equilibrium values and of their derivatives in the joint inaction region
(b˜11, b˜
2
2) are provided in Figures 1.1(a), 1.1(b), and 1.2(a) and 1.2(b), respectively. In
Figures 1.1(c) and 1.1(d) one observes the drawings of the value functions that the
firm and the government would have in a non-strategic setting (i.e. if the two agents
optimize their own performance criterion in absence of the other agent).
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(a) Equilibrium value V1 in (b˜
1
1, b˜
2
2). (b) Equilibrium value V2 in (b˜
1
1, b˜
2
2).
(c) Value function of the firm in the inaction region
for a non-strategic model.
(d) Value function of the government in the inac-
tion region for a non-strategic model.
Figure 1.1: Value functions in the strategic and non-strategic setting.
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Comparing Figures 1.1(a) and 1.1(b) with Figures 1.1(c) and 1.1(d), one can notice
that the value functions that the two agents would have in a non-strategic setting are
monotone with respect to the state variable. On the contrary, the equilibrium values
V1 and V2 are not monotone functions, and this is clearly a consequence of the strategic
interaction between the two agents. From Figures 1.2(a) and 1.2(b) one can also check
that conditions (1.27)-(1.30) are satisfied.
(a) Derivative of V1. (b) Derivative of V2.
Figure 1.2: Derivatives of the equilibrium values.
We now discuss the dependency of our equilibrium policies with respect to the model
parameters. The following plots are obtained with MATLAB through an application
of the Newton method initialized at the parameters' values specified in Table 1.1.
Figure 1.3(a) displays the behavior of the equilibrium boundaries (optimal action
thresholds) b˜11 and b˜
2
2 when the volatility σ varies in the range [0.19, 0.22]. Furthermore,
Figure 1.3(b) shows how the optimal size of interventions, b˜12 − b˜11 and b˜22 − b˜21, changes
with σ. One can observe that the optimal action threshold of the government increases
with σ, whereas the firm's action threshold decreases. This behavior is well-known in
the real options literature (see the seminal article by [93]): when uncertainty increases,
the agent is more reluctant to act and her inaction region becomes larger. Further-
more, Figure 1.3(b) reveals that the strength of interventions of the firm and of the
government increases with increasing volatility. The higher are the fluctuations of the
production/pollution process, the more the agents are afraid of a quicker need of a new
costly intervention. Hence both the agents increase the size of their impulses in order
to postpone their next action.
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(a) The equilibrium boundaries b˜11 (black),
b˜12 (blue), b˜
2
1 (red), b˜
2
2 (green).
(b) Optimal size of interventions: firm (blue) and
government (black).
Figure 1.3: Dependency of the equilibrium on the volatility σ.
(a) The equilibrium boundaries b˜11 (black),
b˜12 (blue), b˜
2
1 (red), b˜
2
2 (green).
(b) Optimal size of interventions: firm (blue) and
government (black).
Figure 1.4: Dependency of the equilibrium on the drift µ.
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(a) The equilibrium boundaries b˜11 (black),
b˜12 (blue), b˜
2
1 (red), b˜
2
2 (green).
(b) Optimal size of interventions: firm (blue) and
government (black).
Figure 1.5: Dependency of the equilibrium on the firm's fixed cost K1.
(a) The equilibrium boundaries b˜11 (black),
b˜12 (blue), b˜
2
1 (red), b˜
2
2 (green).
(b) Optimal size of interventions: firm (blue) and
government (black).
Figure 1.6: Dependency of the equilibrium on the firm's variable cost κ1.
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We now take σ = 0.2, and we let µ vary in the interval [0.01, 0.025]. Figure
1.4(a) leads us to the following conclusion: as the drift µ increases, the firm's action
region becomes smaller. That is, a higher trend of the output of production decreases
the firm's willingness to intervene. We can also observe from Figure 1.4(a) that the
government's threshold decreases with µ: since the output of production, and therefore
the rate of emissions, increases faster, the government tries to dam the increasing social
cost by introducing more severe regulatory constraints. Figure 1.4(b) shows that the
higher the trend of the output of production is, the lower is the size of interventions
b˜12 − b˜11, i.e. the lower the willingness of the firm to pay for additional capacity. Also,
one can observe that the government's size of interventions decrease with increasing µ.
We believe that this effect is due to the strategic interactions between the two agents,
and it might be justified as follows. The higher µ is, the smaller is the length of the
joint inaction region (see Figure 1.4(a)). Hence, the government reduces the size of
interventions when µ increases so to likely reduce the firm's incentive to intervene.
Finally, we analyze the dependency of the action thresholds and of the equilibrium
impulses' size with respect to the cost components K1 and κ1 (see Figures 1.5 and 1.6).
Similar behaviors are also observed with respect toK2 and κ2. Higher fixed costs lead to
decreasing equilibrium boundaries, see Figure 1.5(a), and therefore to a larger inaction
region of the firm. As a consequence, the government exploits the firm's reluctance to
invest when fixed costs are larger and confines the production process below a lower
level. A particular comment is deserved by Figure 1.5(b) where we observe that the
sizes of interventions of both agents are decreasing with respect to K1. This behavior
might be explained once more as an effect of the strategic interaction between the two
agents. When K1 increases, the firm reduces the size of its interventions in order to
likely avoid a possible further action by the government, and, in turn, a further costly
capacity expansion. As a result of the reduction of the joint inaction region (see Figure
1.5(a)), the government also diminishes its size of interventions so to try to prevent
the firm from undertaking a further capacity expansion. A similar rationale might also
explain the behavior of the equilibrium thresholds and equilibrium impulses' sizes with
respect to the variable costs κ1.
1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a government and a firm, representative of the productive sector of
a country, are the two players of a stochastic nonzero-sum game of impulse control.
The firm faces both proportional and fixed costs to expand its stochastically fluctuating
production with the aim of maximizing its expected profits. The government introduces
regulatory constraints with the aim of reducing the level of emissions of pollutants
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and of minimizing the related total expected costs. Assuming that the emissions'
level is proportional to the output of production, by issuing environmental policies the
government effectively forces the firm to decrease its production.
We have modeled the agent's policies by barrier strategies that are characterized
by four constant trigger values, chosen by the agents. We have then constructed a
candidate equilibrium in this strategic problem when both agents do not follow a non-
intervention policy. Under a set of sufficient conditions, those policies do indeed form an
equilibrium. Finally, we have studied numerically the case in which the (uncontrolled)
output of production evolves as a geometric Brownian motion, and the firm's operating
profit and the government's running cost function are of power type. Within such a
setting, a study of the dependency of the equilibrium policies and values on the model
parameters have yielded interesting new behaviors that we have explained as a result
of the strategic interaction between the firm and the government.
There are many directions in which it would be interesting to extend the present
study. As an example, one might consider a two-dimensional formulation of our game
in which the state variables are given by the production capacity of the firm and the
level of pollution. The firm faces a costly capacity expansion and maximizes its net
expected profits. The output of production, however, increases the emissions, which
in turn contribute to the accumulation of a pollution stock. The government aims at
reducing the level of the pollution stock by issuing costly environmental policies. This
would lead to a daunting two-dimensional stochastic game with impulse controls for
which a sophisticated theoretical and numerical analysis might be needed.
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Chapter 2
An Optimal Extraction Problem with
Price Impact
2.1 Introduction
A price-maker company extracts an exhaustible commodity from a reservoir, and sells
it in the spot market. In absence of any actions of the company, the commodity's
spot price evolves either as a drifted Brownian motion or as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process. While extracting, the company's actions have an impact on the commodity's
spot price. The company aims at maximizing the total expected profits from selling
the commodity, net of the total expected proportional costs of extraction. We model
this problem as a two-dimensional degenerate singular stochastic control problem with
finite fuel that we solve explicitly. On the one hand, when the (uncontrolled) price is
a drifted Brownian motion, it is optimal to extract whenever the current price level
is larger or equal than an endogenously determined constant threshold. On the other
hand, when the (uncontrolled) price evolves as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, the
optimal extraction rule is triggered by a curve depending on the current level of the
reservoir. Such a curve is a strictly decreasing C∞-function for which we provide an
explicit expression. Finally, our study is complemented by a theoretical and numerical
analysis of the dependency of the optimal extraction strategy and value function on
the model's parameters.
This chapter is based on the article [60]. In Section 2.2 we introduce the setting and
formulate the problem. In Section 2.3 we provide preliminary results and a Verification
Theorem. The explicit solution to the optimal extraction problem is then constructed
in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 when the commodity's price is a drifted Brownian motion
and an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, respectively. A connection to an optimal stopping
problem is derived in Section 2.4.2.1. A sensitivity analysis is presented in Section 2.5.
Finally, we conclude in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Setting and Problem Formulation
Let (Ω,F ,F := (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space, with filtration F generated
by a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion (Wt)t≥0, and as usual augmented by
P-null sets.
We consider a company extracting a commodity from a reservoir with a finite
capacity y ≥ 0, and selling it instantaneously in the spot market. We assume that,
in absence of any interventions of the company, the (fundamental) commodity's price
(Xxt )t≥0 evolves stochastically according to the dynamics
dXxt =
(
a− bXxt
)
dt+ σdWt, X
x
0 = x ∈ R, (2.1)
for some constants a ∈ R, b ≥ 0 and σ > 0. In the following, we identify the fundamen-
tal price when b = 0 with a drifted Brownian motion with drift a. On the other hand,
when b > 0 the price is of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type, thus having a mean-reverting
behavior typically observed in the commodity market (see, e.g., Chapter 2 of [92]).
In this latter case, the parameter a
b
represents the mean-reversion level, and b is the
mean-reversion speed. In our model we do not restrict our attention to positive funda-
mental prices, since certain commodities have been traded also at negative prices. For
example, that happened in Alberta (Canada) in October 2017 and May 2018 where
the producers of natural gas faced the tradeoff between paying customers to take gas,
or shutting down the wells1.
The reserve level can be decreased at a constant proportional cost c > 0. The ex-
traction does not need to be performed at a rate, and we identify the cumulative amount
of commodity that has been extracted up to time t ≥ 0, ξt, as the company's control
variable. It is an F-adapted, nonnegative, and increasing càdlàg (right-continuous with
left-limits) process (ξt)t≥0 such that ξt ≤ y a.s. for all t ≥ 0 and ξ0− = 0 a.s. The
constraint ξt ≤ y for all t ≥ 0 has the clear interpretation that at any time it cannot
be extracted more than the initial amount of commodity available in the reservoir. For
any given y ≥ 0, the set of admissible extraction strategies is therefore defined as
A(y) := {ξ : Ω× [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) : (ξt)t≥0 is F-adapted, t 7→ ξt is increasing, càdlàg,
with ξ0− = 0 and ξt ≤ y a.s.}.
Clearly, A(0) = {ξ ≡ 0}.
The level of the reservoir at time t, Yt, then evolves as
dY y,ξt = −dξt, Y y,ξ0− = y ≥ 0,
1See, e.g., the article on the Financial Post [65], or the news on the website of the U.S. Energy
Information Administration [127]
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where we have written Y y,ξ in order to stress the dependency of the reservoir's level on
the initial amount of commodity y and on the extraction strategy ξ.
While extracting, the company affects the market price of the commodity. In par-
ticular, when following an extraction strategy ξ ∈ A(y), the market price at time t, Xt,
is instantaneously reduced by αdξt, for some α > 0, and the spot price thus evolves as
dXx,ξt =
(
a− bXx,ξt
)
dt+ σdWt − αdξt, Xx,ξ0− = x ∈ R. (2.2)
We notice that for any ξ ∈ A(y) there exists a unique strong solution to (2.2) by
Theorem 6 in Chapter V of [115], and we denote it by Xx,ξ in order to keep track of
its initial value x ∈ R, and of the adopted extraction strategy ξ ∈ A(y).
Remark 2.2.1. Notice that when b = 0, the impact of the company's extraction on
the price is permanent. On the other hand, it is transient (or temporary) in the mean-
reverting case b > 0 because, in the absence of any interventions from the company,
the impact decreases since X reverts back to its mean-reversion level.
The company aims at maximizing the total expected profits, net of the total ex-
pected costs of extraction. That is, for any initial price x ∈ R and any initial value of
the reserve y ≥ 0, the company aims at determining ξ? ∈ A(y) that attains
V (x, y) := J (x, y, ξ?) = sup
ξ∈A(y)
J (x, y, ξ), (2.3)
where
J(x, y, ξ) := E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(Xx,ξt − c)dξct +
∑
t≥0:∆ξt 6=0
e−ρt
[
(Xx,ξt− − c)∆ξt −
1
2
α(∆ξt)
2
]]
,
(2.4)
for any ξ ∈ A(y), and for a given discount factor ρ > 0. Here, and also in the following,
∆ξt := ξt − ξt−, t ≥ 0, and ξc denotes the continuous part of ξ ∈ A(y).
Remark 2.2.2. In (2.4) the integral term in the expectation is intended as a standard
Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral with respect to the continuous part ξc of ξ. The sum takes
instead care of the lump sum extractions, and its form might be informally justified by
interpreting any lump sum extraction of size ∆ξt at a given time t as a sequence of
infinitely many infinitesimal extractions made at the same time t. In this way, setting
t :=
∆ξt
N
, the net profit accrued at time t by extracting a large amount ∆ξt of the
commodity is
N−1∑
j=0
e−ρt
(
Xx,ξt− − c− jαt
)
t
N→∞−→
∫ ∆ξt
0
e−ρt
(
Xx,ξt− − c− αu
)
du = e−ρt
[(
Xx,ξt− − c
)
∆ξt − 1
2
α(∆ξt)
2
]
.
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This heuristic argument - also discussed at pp. 329330 of [6] in the context of one-
dimensional monotone follower problems - can be rigorously justified, and technical
details on the convergence can be found in the recent [23]. We also refer to [75, 132]
as other papers on singular stochastic control problems employing such a definition for
the integral with respect to the control process.
2.3 Preliminary Results and a Verification Theorem
In this section, we derive the HJB equation associated to V and we provide a verification
theorem. We start by proving the following preliminary properties of the value function
V .
Proposition 2.3.1. There exists a constant K > 0 such that for all (x, y) ∈ R× [0,∞)
one has
0 ≤ V (x, y) ≤ Ky(1 + y)(1 + |x|). (2.5)
In particular, V (x, 0) = 0. Moreover, V is increasing with respect to x and y.
Proof. The proof is organized in two steps. We first prove that (2.5) holds true, and
then we show the monotonicity properties of V .
Step 1. The nonnegativity of V follows by taking the admissible (no-)extraction
rule ξ ≡ 0 such that J (x, y, 0) = 0 for all (x, y) ∈ R× [0,∞). The fact that V (x, 0) = 0
clearly follows by noticing that A(0) = {ξ ≡ 0} and J (x, y, 0) = 0.
To determine the upper bound in (2.5), let (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) be given and fixed,
and for any ξ ∈ A(y) we have∣∣∣∣E[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
Xx,ξt − c
)
dξct +
∑
t≥0:∆ξt 6=0
e−ρt
[
(Xx,ξt− − c)∆ξt −
α
2
(∆ξt)
2
]]∣∣∣∣
≤E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt|Xx,ξt |dξct
]
+ cy + E
[ ∑
t≥0:∆ξt 6=0
e−ρt
[|Xx,ξt− |∆ξt + α2 (∆ξt)2]
]
,
(2.6)
where we have used the fact that c
∫∞
0
e−ρtdξt = c
∫∞
0
ρe−ρtξtdt ≤ cy to obtain the term
cy in right-hand side above.
We now aim at estimating the two expectations appearing in right-hand side of
(2.6). To accomplish that, denote by Xx,0 the solution to (2.2) associated to ξ ≡ 0 (i.e.
the solution to (2.1)). Then, if b = 0 one easily finds Xx,ξt = X
x,0
t −αξt ≥ −|Xx,0t |−αy
a.s., since ξt ≤ y a.s. If b > 0, because Xx,ξt ≤ Xx,0t a.s. for all t ≥ 0 and ξt ≤ y a.s.,
one has
Xx,ξt = x+
∫ t
0
(
a− bXx,ξs
)
ds+ σWt − αξt ≥ x+
∫ t
0
(
a− bXx,0s
)
ds+ σWt − αy
= Xx,0t − αy ≥ −|Xx,0t | − αy.
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Moreover, one clearly has Xx,ξt ≤ Xx,0t ≤ |Xx,0t |+ αy for b ≥ 0. Hence, in any case,
|Xx,ξt | ≤ |Xx,0t |+ αy. (2.7)
By an application of Itô's formula we find for b = 0 that
|e−ρtXx,0t | ≤ |x|+ ρ
∫ t
0
e−ρu|Xx,0u |du+ |a|
∫ t
0
e−ρudu+
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρuσdWu
∣∣∣∣,
and for b > 0 that
|e−ρtXx,0t | ≤ |x|+ ρ
∫ t
0
e−ρu|Xx,0u |du+
∫ t
0
e−ρu(|a|+ b|Xx,0u |)du+
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρuσdWu
∣∣∣∣.
The previous two equations imply that, in both cases b = 0 and b > 0, there exists
C1 > 0 such that
E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρt|Xx,0t |
]
≤ |x|+ C1
(
1 +
∫ ∞
0
e−ρuE
[|Xx,0u |]du)+ σE[ sup
t≥0
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρudWu
∣∣∣∣].
Then, the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy's inequality (see, e.g., Theorem 3.28 in Chapter 3
of [81]) yields
E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρt|Xx,0t |
]
≤ |x|+ C1
(
1 +
∫ ∞
0
e−ρuE
[|Xx,0u |]du)+ C2E[(∫ ∞
0
e−2ρudu
) 1
2
]
.
for a constant C2 > 0, and therefore
E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρt|Xx,0t |
]
≤ C4
(
1 + |x|), (2.8)
for some constant C4 > 0, since there exists C3 > 0 such that
∫∞
0
e−ρuE
[|Xx,0u |]du ≤
C3(1 + |x|) by Lemma A.1.1 with q = 1, κ ≡ b and κµ ≡ a.
Now, exploiting (2.7) and (2.8), in both cases b = 0 and b > 0 we have the following:
(i) For a suitable constant K0 > 0 (independent of x and y)
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt|Xx,ξt |dξct
]
≤ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt|Xx,0t |dξct
]
+ αyE
[ ∫ ∞
0
ρe−ρtξctdt
]
≤ yE
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρt|Xx,0t |
]
+ αy2 ≤ C4y
(
1 + |x|)+ αy2 ≤ K0y(1 + y)(1 + |x|).
(2.9)
Here we have used: (2.7) and an integration by parts for the first inequality; the
fact that ξct ≤ y a.s. for the second one; equation (2.8) to have the penultimate
step.
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(ii) Employing again (2.7), the fact that
∑
t≥0:∆ξt 6=0 ∆ξt ≤ y, and (2.8), we also have
E
[ ∑
t≥0:∆ξt 6=0
e−ρt
[|Xx,ξt− |∆ξt + α2 (∆ξt)2]
]
≤ 3
2
αy2 + E
[ ∑
t≥0:∆ξt 6=0
e−ρt|Xx,0t |∆ξt
]
≤ 3
2
αy2 + yE
[
sup
t≥0
(
e−ρt|Xx,0t |
)] ≤ 3
2
αy2 + C4y
(
1 + |x|) ≤ K1y(1 + y)(1 + |x|),
(2.10)
for some K1 > 0.
Thus, using (i) and (ii) in (2.6), we conclude that there exists a constant K > 0 such
that |J (x, y, ξ)| ≤ Ky(1 + y)(1 + |x|) for any ξ ∈ A(y), and therefore (2.5) holds.
Step 2. To prove that x 7→ V (x, y) is increasing for any y ≥ 0, let x2 ≥ x1, and
observe that one clearly has Xx2,ξt ≥ Xx1,ξt a.s. for any t ≥ 0 and ξ ∈ A(y). Therefore
J (x2, y, ξ) ≥ J (x1, y, ξ) which implies V (x2, y) ≥ V (x1, y). Finally, letting y2 ≥ y1,
we have A(y2) ⊇ A(y1), and thus V (x, y2) ≥ V (x, y1) for any x ∈ R.
We now move on by providing an heuristic derivation of the dynamic programming
equation that we expect that V should satisfy. At initial time the company is faced
with two possible actions: extract or wait. On the one hand, suppose that at time zero
the company does not extract for a short time period ∆t, and then it continues by
following the optimal extraction rule (if one exists). Since this action is not necessarily
optimal, it is associated to the inequality
V (x, y) ≥ E
[
e−ρ∆tV (Xx∆t−, y)
]
, (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞).
Then supposing V is C2,1(R× [0,∞)), we can apply Itô's formula, divide by ∆t, invoke
the mean value theorem, let ∆t→ 0, and obtain
LV (x, y)− ρV (x, y) ≤ 0, (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞).
Here L is given by the second order differential operator
L := 1
2
σ2
∂2
∂x2
+

(a− bx) ∂
∂x
, if b > 0,
a
∂
∂x
, if b = 0.
(2.11)
On the other hand, suppose that the company immediately extracts an amount
ε > 0 of the commodity, sells it in the market, and then follows the optimal extraction
rule (provided that one exists). With reference to (2.4), this action is associated to the
inequality
V (x, y) ≥ V (x− αε, y − ε) + (x− c)ε− 1
2
αε2,
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which, adding and substracting V (x− αε, y), dividing by ε, and letting ε→ 0, yields
0 ≥ −αVx(x, y)− Vy(x, y) + x− c.
We expect that only one of those two actions can be optimal, and given the Marko-
vian nature of our setting, the previous inequalities suggest that V should identify with
an appropriate solution w to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
max
{
Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y),−αwx(x, y)− wy(x, y) + x− c
}
= 0, (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞),
(2.12)
with boundary condition w(x, 0) = 0 (cf. Proposition 2.3.1), and satisfying the growth
condition in (2.5). Equation (2.12) takes the form of a variational inequality with
state-dependent gradient constraint.
With reference to (2.12) we introduce the waiting region
W := {(x, y) ∈ R×(0,∞) : Lw(x, y)−ρw(x, y) = 0, −αwx(x, y)−wy(x, y)+x−c < 0},
(2.13)
in which we expect that it is not optimal to extract the commodity, and the selling
region
S := {(x, y) ∈ R×(0,∞) : Lw(x, y)−ρw(x, y) ≤ 0, −αwx(x, y)−wy(x, y)+x−c = 0},
(2.14)
where it should be profitable to extract and sell the commodity. In the following, we
will denote by W the topological closure of W.
The next theorem shows that a suitable solution to HJB equation (2.12) identifies
with the value function, whenever there exists an admissible extraction rule that keeps
(with minimal effort) the state process (X, Y ) inside W.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Verification Theorem). Suppose there exists a function w : R ×
[0,∞) 7→ R such that w ∈ C2,1(R× [0,∞)), solves HJB equation (2.12) with boundary
condition w(x, 0) = 0, is increasing in y, and satisfies the growth condition
0 ≤ w(x, y) ≤ Ky(1 + y)(1 + |x|), (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞), (2.15)
for some constant K > 0. Then w ≥ V on R× [0,∞).
Moreover, suppose that for all initial values (x, y) ∈ R × (0,∞), there exists a
process ξ? ∈ A(y) such that
(Xx,ξ
?
t , Y
y,ξ?
t ) ∈W, for all t ≥ 0, P-a.s., (2.16)
ξ?t =
∫
[0,t]
1{(Xx,ξ?s ,Y y,ξ?s )∈S}dξ
?
s , for all t ≥ 0, P-a.s. (2.17)
Then we have w = V on R × [0,∞) and ξ? is optimal; that is, J (x, y, ξ?) = V (x, y)
for all (x, y) ∈ R× [0,∞).
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Proof. The proof is organized in two steps. Since by assumption w(x, 0) = 0 = V (x, 0),
x ∈ R, in the following argument we can assume that y > 0.
Step 1. Let (x, y) ∈ R × (0,∞) be given and fixed. Here, we show that V (x, y) ≤
w(x, y). Let ξ ∈ A(y), and for N ∈ N set τR,N := inf{s ≥ 0 : Xx,ξs /∈ (−R,R)} ∧N. By
Itô-Tanaka-Meyer's formula, we find
e−ρτR,Nw(Xx,ξτR,N , Y
y,ξ
τR,N
)− w(x, y)
=
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
(
Lw(Xx,ξs , Y y,ξs )− ρw(Xx,ξs , Y y,ξs )
)
ds+ σ
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρswx(Xx,ξs , Y
y,ξ
s )dWs︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:MτR,N
+
∑
0≤s≤τR,N
e−ρs
[
w(Xx,ξs , Y
y,ξ
s )− w(Xx,ξs− , Y y,ξs− )
]
+
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
[− αwx(Xx,ξs , Y y,ξs )− wy(Xx,ξs , Y y,ξs )]dξcs.
(2.18)
Now,
w(Xx,ξs , Y
y,ξ
s )− w(Xx,ξs− , Y y,ξs− ) = w(Xx,ξs− − α∆ξs, Y y,ξs− −∆ξs)− w(Xx,ξs− , Y y,ξs− )
=
∫ ∆ξs
0
∂w(Xξs− − αu, Y y,ξs− − u)
∂u
du
=
∫ ∆ξs
0
[
− αwx(Xx,ξs− − αu, Y y,ξs− − u)− wy(Xx,ξs− − αu, Y y,ξs− − u)
]
du,
which used in (2.18) gives the equivalence∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
(
Xx,ξs − c
)
dξcs +
∑
0≤s≤τR,N
e−ρs
∫ ∆ξs
0
(
Xx,ξs− − αu− c
)
du− w(x, y)
=
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
(
Lw(Xx,ξs , Y y,ξs )− ρw(Xx,ξs , Y y,ξs )
)
ds+MτR,N
+
∑
0≤s≤τR,N
e−ρs
∫ ∆ξs
0
[
− αwx(Xx,ξs− − αu, Y y,ξs− − u)− wy(Xx,ξs− − αu, Y y,ξs− − u)
+ (Xx,ξs− − αu− c)
]
du− e−ρτR,Nw(Xx,ξτR,N , Y y,ξτR,N )
+
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
[
− αwx(Xx,ξs , Y y,ξs )− wy(Xx,ξs , Y y,ξs ) +Xx,ξs − c
]
dξcs.
Since w satisfies (2.12) and w ≥ 0, by taking expectations on both sides of the latter
equation, and using that E[MτR,N ] = 0, we have
w(x, y) ≥ E
[ ∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
(
Xx,ξs − c
)
dξcs +
∑
0≤s≤τR,N
e−ρs
∫ ∆ξs
0
(
Xx,ξs− − αu− c
)
du
]
.
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We now want to take limits as N ↑ ∞ and R ↑ ∞ on the right-hand side of the
equation above. To this end notice that one has a.s.∣∣∣ ∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
(
Xx,ξs − c
)
dξcs +
∑
0≤s≤τR,N
e−ρs
∫ ∆ξs
0
(
Xx,ξs− − αu− c
)
du
∣∣∣
≤
∫ ∞
0
e−ρs|Xx,ξs |dξcs + cy +
∑
s≥0:∆ξs 6=0
e−ρs
(|Xx,ξs− |∆ξs + α2 (∆ξs)2),
(2.19)
and the right-hand side of (2.19) is integrable by (2.9) and (2.10). Hence, we can
invoke the dominated convergence theorem in order to take limits as R ↑ ∞ and then
as N ↑ ∞, so as to get
J (x, y, ξ) ≤ w(x, y).
Since ξ ∈ A(y) is arbitrary, we have
V (x, y) ≤ w(x, y), (2.20)
which yields V ≤ w by arbitrariness of (x, y) in R× (0,∞).
Step 2. Here, we prove that V (x, y) ≥ w(x, y) for any (x, y) ∈ R × (0,∞). Let
ξ? ∈ A(y) satisfying (2.16) and (2.17), and let τ ?R,N := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xx,ξ
?
t /∈ (−R,R)}∧N ,
for N ∈ N. Then, by employing the same arguments as in Step 1, all the inequalities
become equalities and we obtain
E
[ ∫ τ?R,N
0
e−ρs
(
Xx,ξ
?
s − c
)
dξ?,cs +
∑
0≤s≤τ?R,N
e−ρs
∫ ∆ξ?s
0
(
Xx,ξ
?
s− − c− αu
)
du
]
+ E
[
e−ρτ
?
R,Nw(Xx,ξ
?
τ?R,N
, Y ξ
?
τ?R,N
)
]
= w(x, y),
where ξ?,c denotes the continuous part of ξ?. If now
lim
N↑∞
lim
R↑∞
E
[
e−ρτ
?
R,Nw(Xx,ξ
?
τ?R,N
, Y ξ
?
τ?R,N
)
]
= 0, (2.21)
then we can take limits as R ↑ ∞ and N ↑ ∞, and by (2.19) (with ξ = ξ?) together
with (2.9) and (2.10) we find J (x, y, ξ?) = w(x, y). Since clearly V (x, y) ≥ J (x, y, ξ?),
then V (x, y) ≥ w(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ R × (0,∞). Hence, using (2.20), V = w on
R× (0,∞), and therefore on R× [0,∞) because V (x, 0) = 0 = w(x, 0) for all x ∈ R.
To complete the proof it thus only remains to prove (2.21), and we accomplish that
in the following. Since y 7→ w(x, y) is increasing by assumption, we have by (2.15) and
(2.7) that
0 ≤ e−ρτ?R,Nw(Xx,ξ?τ?R,N , Y
ξ?
τ?R,N
) ≤ e−ρτ?R,Nw(Xx,ξ?τ?R,N , y) ≤ e
−ρτ?R,NKy(1 + y)
(
1 + |Xx,ξ?τ?R,N |
)
≤ Ky(1 + y)[(1 + αy)e−ρτ?R,N + e−ρτ?R,N |Xx,0τ?R,N |]
≤ Ky(1 + y)[(1 + αy)e−ρτ?R,N + e− ρ2 τ?R,N sup
t≥0
e−
ρ
2
t|Xx,0t |
]
.
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Taking expectations and employing Hölder's inequality
0 ≤ E[e−ρτ?R,Nw(Xx,ξ?τ?R,N , Y ξ?τ?R,N )]
≤ Ky(1 + y)
[
(1 + αy)E
[
e−ρτ
?
R,N
]
+ E
[
e−ρτ
?
R,N
] 1
2E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρt|Xx,0t |2
] 1
2
]
.
(2.22)
To take care of the third expectation on right hand side of (2.22), observe that by Itô's
formula we have (in both cases b = 0 and b > 0)
e−ρt(Xx,0t )
2 ≤ x2 +
∫ t
0
e−ρu
[
ρ(Xx,0u )
2 + σ2
]
du
+
∫ t
0
2e−ρu|Xx,0u |(|a|+ b|Xx,0u |)du+ 2σ sup
t≥0
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρuXx,0u dWu
∣∣∣∣.
(2.23)
Notice that
∫∞
0
e−2ρuE
[|Xx,0u |2]du ≤ C1(1 + |x|2), for some constant C1 > 0, which is
due to Lemma A.1.1 with q = 2, κ ≡ b and κµ ≡ a, and therefore an application of
the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy's inequality (see, e.g., Theorem 3.28 in [81]) gives
E
[
sup
t≥0
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρuXx,0u dWu
∣∣∣] ≤ C2(1 + |x|), (2.24)
for a suitable C2 > 0. Then taking expectations in (2.23), employing (2.24), we easily
obtain that there exists a constant C3 > 0 such that
E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρt|Xx,0t |2
] ≤ C3(1 + |x|2).
Hence, when taking limits as R ↑ ∞ and N ↑ ∞ in (2.22), the right-hand side of (2.22)
converges to zero, thus proving (2.21) and completing the proof.
2.4 Constructing the Optimal Solution
We make the guess that the company extracts and sells the commodity only when the
current price is sufficiently large. We therefore expect that for any y > 0 there exists a
critical price level G(y) (to be endogenously determined) separating the waiting region
W and the selling region S (cf. (2.13) and (2.14)). In particular, we suppose that
W = {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : y > 0 and x < G(y)},
S = {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : y > 0 and x ≥ G(y)}.
According to such a guess, and with reference to (2.12), the candidate value function
w should satisfy
Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) = 0, for all (x, y) ∈W. (2.25)
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It is well known that (2.25) admits two fundamental strictly positive solutions ϕ(x) and
ψ(x), with the former one being strictly decreasing and the latter one being strictly
increasing. Therefore, any solution to (2.25) can be written as
w(x, y) = A(y)ψ(x) +B(y)ϕ(x), (x, y) ∈W,
for some functions A(y) and B(y) to be found. In both cases b = 0 and b > 0 (cf.
(2.2)), the function ϕ increases exponentially to +∞ as x ↓ −∞ (see, e.g., Appendix 1
in [31]). In light of the growth conditions of V proved in Proposition 2.3.1, we therefore
guess B(y) = 0 so that
w(x, y) = A(y)ψ(x) (2.26)
for any (x, y) ∈W.
For all (x, y) ∈ S, w should instead satisfy
−αwx(x, y)− wy(x, y) + x− c = 0, (2.27)
implying
−αwxx(x, y)− wyx(x, y) + 1 = 0. (2.28)
To find G(y) and A(y), y > 0, we impose that w ∈ C2,1, and therefore by (2.26),
(2.27), and (2.28) we obtain for all (x, y) ∈W ∩ S, i.e. x = G(y), that
−αA(y)ψ′(x)− A′(y)ψ(x) + x− c = 0 at x = G(y), (2.29)
−αA(y)ψ′′(x)− A′(y)ψ′(x) + 1 = 0 at x = G(y). (2.30)
From (2.29) and (2.30) one can easily derive that A(y) and G(y), y > 0, satisfy
−αA(y) (ψ′(x)2 − ψ(x)ψ′′(x))+ (x− c)ψ′(x)− ψ(x) = 0 at x = G(y). (2.31)
In the following we continue our analysis by studying separately the cases b = 0
and b > 0, corresponding to a fundamental price of the commodity that is a drifted
Brownian motion and an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, respectively. We will see that
the form of the optimal extraction rule substantially differs among these two cases,
and we will also provide a quantitative explanation of this by identifying an optimal
stopping problem related to our optimal extraction problem (see Section 2.4.2.1 and
Remark 2.4.16).
2.4.1 The Case of a Drifted Brownian Motion Fundamental
Price
We start with the simpler case b = 0, and we therefore study the company's extraction
problem (2.3) when the fundamental commodity's price is a drifted Brownian motion.
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Dynamics (2.1) with b = 0 yield
dXx,ξt = adt+ σdWt − αdξt, Xx,ξ0− = x ∈ R,
for any ξ ∈ A(y), and consequently (2.25) reads as
σ2
2
wxx(x, y) + awx(x, y)− ρw(x, y) = 0, (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞).
The increasing fundamental solution ψ to the latter equation is given by
ψ(x) = enx with n := − a
σ2
+
√( a
σ2
)2
+ 2
ρ
σ2
> 0. (2.32)
For future use, we notice that n solves Ψ(n) = 0 with
Ψ(u) :=
σ2
2
u2 + au− ρ, u ∈ R. (2.33)
Upon observing that ψ′(x)2−ψ(x)ψ′′(x) = 0 for all x ∈ R, we see that any explicit
dependency on y disappears in (2.31), and we therefore obtain that the critical price
G(y) identifies for any y > 0 with the constant value
x? = c+
1
n
, (2.34)
which uniquely solves the equation (x? − c)n− 1 = 0 (cf. (2.31) and (2.32)).
Moreover, by using either (2.29) or (2.30), and by imposing A(0) = 0 (since we
must have V (x, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ R; cf. Theorem 2.3.2), the function A in (2.26) is
given by
A(y) :=
1
αn2
e−cn−1
(
1− e−αny), y ≥ 0.
In light of the previous findings, the candidate waiting region W is given by
W = {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : y > 0 and x < x?},
and we expect that the selling region S is such that S = S1 ∪ S2, where
S1 := {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : x ≥ x? and y ≤ (x− x?)/α},
S2 := {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : x ≥ x? and y > (x− x?)/α}.
In S1, we believe that it is optimal to deplete the reservoir immediately. In S2 the
company should make a lump sum extraction of size (x − x?)/α, and then sell the
commodity continuously and in such a way that the joint process (X, Y ) is kept inside
W, until there is nothing left in the reservoir. These considerations suggest to introduce
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the candidate value function
w(x, y) :=

1
αn2
e(x−c)n−1(1− e−αny), if (x, y) ∈W ∪ ((−∞, x?]× {0}),
1
αn2
(
1− e−αn(y−x−x?α )
)
+(x− c)(x−x?
α
)− 1
2α
(x− x?)2 if (x, y) ∈ S2,
(x− c)y − 1
2
αy2, if (x, y) ∈ S1 ∪ ((x?,∞)× {0}).
(2.35)
Notice that the first term in the second line of (2.35) is the continuation value starting
from the new state (x?, y − x−x?
α
), and that w above is continuous by construction.
From now on, we will refer to the critical price level x? as to the free boundary.
The next proposition shows that w actually identifies with the value function V .
Proposition 2.4.1. The function w : R × [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) defined in (2.35) is a
C2,1(R× [0,∞)) solution to the HJB equation (2.12) such that
0 ≤ w(x, y) ≤ Ky(1 + y)(1 + |x|), (x, y) ∈ R× [0,∞), (2.36)
for a suitable constant K > 0.
Moreover, it identifies with the value function V from (2.3), and the admissible
control
ξ?t := y ∧ sup
0≤s≤t
1
α
[
x− x? + as+ σWs
]+
, t ≥ 0, ξ?0− = 0, (2.37)
with x? as in (2.34), is an optimal extraction strategy.
Proof. The proof is organized in steps.
Step 1. We start proving that w ∈ C2,1(R × [0,∞)). One can easily check that
w(x, 0) = 0 for any x ∈ R, and that w is continuous on R × [0,∞) (recall also the
comment after (2.35)). Denote by Int(·) the interior of a set. Then, for all (x, y) ∈
Int(W) we derive from (2.35)
wx(x, y) =
1
αn
e(x−c)n−1(1− e−αny), wxx(x, y) = 1
α
e(x−c)n−1(1− e−αny), (2.38)
and
wy(x, y) =
1
n
e(x−c)n−1e−αny. (2.39)
Also, for all (x, y) ∈ Int(S2) we find from (2.35) by direct calculations that
wx(x, y) = − 1
αn
e−αn(y−
x−x?
α
) +
x− c
α
, wxx(x, y) =
1
α
(
1− e−αn(y−x−x
?
α
)
)
, (2.40)
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and
wy(x, y) =
1
n
e−αn(y−
x−x?
α
). (2.41)
Finally, for (x, y) ∈ Int(S1) we have
wx(x, y) = y, wxx(x, y) = 0, wy(x, y) = x− c− αy. (2.42)
From the previous expressions it is now straightforward to check that w ∈ C2,1(R ×
[0,∞)) upon recalling x? = c+ 1
n
(cf. (2.34)).
Step 2. Here we prove that w solves HJB equation (2.12). By construction we
have −αwx(x, y) − wy(x, y) + x − c = 0 for (x, y) ∈ S, and Lw(x, y) − ρw(x, y) = 0
for (x, y) ∈ W. Hence it remains to prove that −αwx(x, y) − wy(x, y) + x − c ≤ 0 for
(x, y) ∈ W and Lw(x, y) − ρw(x, y) ≤ 0 for (x, y) ∈ S. This is accomplished in the
following.
On the one hand, letting (x, y) ∈W we obtain from the first equation in (2.38) and
(2.39) that
−αwx(x, y)− wy(x, y) + x− c = − 1
n
e(x−c)n−1 + x− c ≤ 0,
where the last inequality is due to e(x−c)n−1 ≥ (x − c)n, which derives from the well-
known property of the exponential function eq ≥ q + 1 for all q ∈ R.
On the other hand, for (x, y) ∈ S1 we find from the third line of (2.35) and (2.42)
that
Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) = ay − ρ(x− c)y + α
2
ρy2 =: H1(x, y).
We now want to prove that H1(x, y) ≤ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ S1. Because y ≤ x−x?α with
x? = c+ 1
n
, we find
∂H1
∂y
(x, y) = a− ρ(x− c) + αρy ≤ a− ρ
n
.
In order to study the sign of ∂H1
∂y
, we need to distinguish two cases. If a ≤ 0, then it
follows immediately ∂H1
∂y
(x, y) ≤ 0. If a > 0, then recall Ψ from (2.33) and notice that
because u 7→ Ψ(u) is increasing on (−a/σ2,∞) ⊃ R+, Ψ(n) = 0, and Ψ(ρa) > 0, one
has ρ
a
≥ n. Hence again ∂H1
∂y
(x, y) ≤ 0. Since now limy↓0H1(x, y) = 0 for any x ≥ x?,
then we have just proved that H1(x, y) ≤ 0 for all y ≤ x−x?α , and for any x ≥ x?.
Hence, Lw − ρw ≤ 0 in S1.
Also, for (x, y) ∈ S2, we find
Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) = a
α
(x− x?)− ρ(x− c)(x− x?
α
)
+
ρ
2α
(x− x?)2 =: H2(x).
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To obtain the first equality in the equation above we have used the second line of (2.35),
(2.40), and that n solves Ψ(n) = 0 with Ψ as in (2.33). Notice that H2(x
?) = 0 and
H ′2(x) =
1
α
(
a− ρ(x− c)). If a ≤ 0, we clearly have that H ′2(x) ≤ 0, since x ≥ x? > c.
If a > 0, then H ′2(x) ≤ 0 if and only if x ≥ c + aρ , but the latter inequality holds for
any x ≥ x? since we have proved above that for a > 0 we have ρ
a
≥ n, and therefore,
x? = c+ 1
n
≥ c+ a
ρ
. Hence, in any case, H ′2(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≥ x?, and then Lw−ρw ≤ 0
in S2.
Combining all the previous findings we have that w is a C2,1(R × [0,∞)) solution
to the HJB equation (2.12).
Step 3. Here we verify that w satisfies all the requirements needed to apply Theorem
2.3.2.
The fact that y 7→ w(x, y) is increasing in W and S2 easily follows from (2.39) and
(2.41), respectively. The monotonicity of w(x, ·) in S1 is instead due to (2.42) and to
the fact that y ≤ (x− x?)/α in S1 and x? > c.
In order to show the upper bound in (2.36), notice that
w(x, y) ≤ 1
αn2
, for all (x, y) ∈W, (2.43)
since x < x?. Further, we find for all (x, y) ∈ S2 that
w(x, y) =
1
αn2
(
1− e−αn(y−x−x
?
α
)
)
+ (x− c)
(
x− x?
α
)
− 1
2α
(x− x?)2
≤ 1
αn2
+ (x− c)
(
x− x?
α
)
≤ 1
αn2
+ (x− c)y,
where we have used that y > (x− x?)/α for all (x, y) ∈ S2. Finally, for all (x, y) ∈ S1
it is clear that
w(x, y) = (x− c)y − 1
2
αy2 ≤ (x− c)y. (2.44)
Hence, from (2.43)-(2.44) we see that w satisfies the required growth condition.
We now show the nonnegativity of w. Since y ≤ (x− x?)/α in S1, we find by both
(2.34) and (2.42)
wy(x, y) = x− c− αy ≥ x? − c ≥ 0, (x, y) ∈ S1.
Clearly, wy ≥ 0 onW∪S2 by (2.39) and (2.41). Thus, wy is nonnegative on R× [0,∞),
and this fact, together with w(·, 0) = 0, implies that w is nonnegative on R× [0,∞).
Step 4. The control ξ? given by (2.37) is admissible, and satisfies (2.16) and (2.17).
Since by Step 1 and Step 2 w is a C2,1-solution to the HJB equation (2.12), and by
Step 3 satisfies all the requirements of Theorem 2.3.2, we conclude that
w(x, y) = V (x, y), (x, y) ∈ R× [0,∞),
by Theorem 2.3.2.
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Figure 2.1: A graphical illustration of the optimal extraction rule ξ? (cf. (2.37)) and
of the free boundary x?. The plot has been obtained by using a = 0.4, σ = 0.8, ρ =
3/8, c = 0.3, α = 0.25. The optimal extraction rule prescribes the following. In the
region {(x, y) ∈ R × (0,∞) : x < x?} it is optimal not to extract. If at initial time
(x, y) is such that x > x? and y ≤ (x−x?)/α, then the reservoir should be immediately
depleted. On the other hand, if (x, y) is such that x > x? and y > (x−x?)/α, then one
should make a lump sum extraction of size (x − x?)/α, and then keep on extracting
until the commodity is exhausted by just preventing the price to rise above x?.
Remark 2.4.2. Notice that, as α ↓ 0, the optimal extraction rule ξ? of (2.37) converges
to the extraction rule ξ̂ that prescribes to instantaneously deplete the reservoir as soon
as the price reaches x?; i.e., defining, for any given and fixed (x, y) ∈ R × [0,∞),
τ̂(x, y) := inf{t ≥ 0 : x + at + σWt ≥ x?}, one has ξ̂t = 0 for all t < τ̂(x, y) and
ξ̂t = y for all t ≥ τ̂(x, y). The latter control can be easily checked to be optimal for the
extraction problem in which the company does not have market impact (i.e. α = 0).
2.4.2 The Case of a Mean-Reverting Fundamental Price
In this section, we assume b > 0, and we study the optimal extraction problem (2.3)
when the commodity's price evolves as a linearly controlled Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dXx,ξt = (a− bXx,ξt )dt+ σdWt − αdξt, Xx,ξ0− = x ∈ R,
for any ξ ∈ A(y). In the following, we will often refer to Lemma A.1.2 in Appendix A,
in which, regarding the notations, we exploit the results with κ ≡ b and κµ ≡ a. Here,
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for instance, (A.5) reads as
ψ(x) = e
(bx−a)2
2σ2b D− ρ
b
(
− (bx− a)
σb
√
2b
)
. (2.45)
For any y > 0, from (2.31) we find a representation of A(y) in terms of G(y); that
is,
A(y) =
(G(y)− c)ψ′(G(y))− ψ(G(y))
α[ψ′(G(y))2 − ψ′′(G(y))ψ(G(y))] . (2.46)
Notice that the denominator of A(y) is nonzero due to Lemma A.1.2-(3).
For our subsequent analysis it is convenient to look at G as a function of the state
variable y ∈ (0,∞), and, in particular, we conjecture that it is the inverse of an injective
nonnegative function F to be endogenously determined together with its domain and
its behavior. This is what we are going to do in the following. From now on we set
G ≡ F−1.
Since we have V (x, 0) = 0 (cf. Theorem 2.3.2) for any x ∈ R, we impose A(0) = 0.
Then, from (2.46) we obtain the boundary condition
x0 := F
−1(0) solving (x0 − c)ψ′(x0)− ψ(x0) = 0. (2.47)
In fact, existence and uniqueness of such x0 is given by the following (more general)
result. Its proof can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 2.4.3. Recall that ψ(k) denotes the derivative of order k, k ∈ N0, of ψ. Then,
for any k ∈ N0, there exists a unique solution on (c,∞) to the equation
(x− c)ψ(k+1)(x)− ψ(k)(x) = 0.
In particular, there exists x0 > c uniquely solving (x− c)ψ′(x)− ψ(x) = 0 and x∞ > c
uniquely solving (x− c)ψ′′(x)− ψ′(x) = 0.
From (2.29) and (2.30) we have
A′(y) =
(F−1(y)− c)ψ′′(F−1(y))− ψ′(F−1(y))
ψ′′(F−1(y))ψ(F−1(y))− ψ′(F−1(y))2 , y > 0, (2.48)
and the denominator of A′(y) is nonzero due to Lemma A.1.2-(3).
Now, we define the functions M : R 7→ R and N : R 7→ R such that for any x ∈ R
M(x) :=
(x− c)ψ′(x)− ψ(x)
α[ψ′(x)2 − ψ′′(x)ψ(x)] , N(x) :=
(x− c)ψ′′(x)− ψ′(x)
ψ′′(x)ψ(x)− ψ′(x)2 , (2.49)
and, by differentiating M and rearranging terms, we obtain
M ′(x) =
[ψ′′′(x) [(x− c)ψ′(x)− ψ(x)]− ψ′′(x) [(x− c)ψ′′(x)− ψ′(x)]]ψ(x)
α[ψ′(x)2 − ψ′′(x)ψ(x)]2 .
53
Optimal Extraction Problem with Price Impact
However, by noticing that M(x) = A(F (x)) (cf. (2.46) and (2.49)), the chain rule
yields M ′(x) = A′(F (x))F ′(x), which in turn gives
F ′(x) =
M ′(x)
N(x)
, (2.50)
upon observing that N(x) = A′(F (x)) from (2.48) and (2.49).
Recall that by Lemma 2.4.3 there exists a unique x∞ > c solving N(x∞) = 0; that
is, solving (x − c)ψ′′(x) − ψ′(x) = 0. Due to (2.50), this point is a vertical asymptote
of F ′, and the next result shows that x∞ is located to the left of x0. The proof can be
found in Appendix B.
Lemma 2.4.4. Recall Lemma 2.4.3 and let x0 and x∞ be the unique solutions to
M(x) = 0 (i.e. (x− c)ψ′(x)−ψ(x) = 0) and N(x) = 0 (i.e. (x− c)ψ′′(x)−ψ′(x) = 0),
respectively. We have x∞ < x0.
The following useful corollary immediately follows from the proof of Lemma 2.4.3.
Corollary 2.4.5. One has
(x− c)ψ′(x)− ψ(x) < 0, for all x < x0,
and
(x− c)ψ′′(x)− ψ′(x) > 0, for all x > x∞.
By integrating (2.50) in the interval [x, x0], for x ∈ (x∞, x0], and using the fact that
F (x0) = 0 (cf. (2.47)), we obtain
F (x) =
∫ x0
x
[ψ′′′(x) [(x− c)ψ′(x)− ψ(x)]− ψ′′(x) [(x− c)ψ′′(x)− ψ′(x)]]ψ(x)
−α[ψ′′(z)ψ(z)− ψ′(z)2][(z − c)ψ′′(z)− ψ′(z)] dz,
(2.51)
which is well defined, but possibly infinite for x = x∞. In the following we will refer
to F as to the free boundary. We now prove properties of F that have been only
conjectured so far.
Proposition 2.4.6. The free boundary F defined in (2.51) is strictly decreasing for all
x ∈ (x∞, x0) and belongs to C∞((x∞, x0]). Moreover,
lim
x↓x∞
F (x) =∞ = lim
x↓x∞
F ′(x). (2.52)
Proof. Step 1. We start by proving the claimed monotonicity. Notice that by (2.51)
one has F ′(z) = −Θ(z), where the function Θ : (x∞,∞] 7→ R is given by
Θ(z) :=
[ψ′′′(z) [(z − c)ψ′(z)− ψ(z)]− ψ′′(z) [(z − c)ψ′′(z)− ψ′(z)]]ψ(z)
−α[ψ′′(z)ψ(z)− ψ′(z)2][(z − c)ψ′′(z)− ψ′(z)] .
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By Lemma A.1.2 one has ψ′′(z)ψ(z) − ψ′(z)2 > 0 for any z ∈ R. Moreover, Φ(z) :=
(z − c)ψ′′(z) − ψ′(z) > 0 for all z > x∞ > c by Corollary 2.4.5. Therefore the
denominator of Θ is strictly negative for any z ∈ (x∞, x0). Again, an application of
Corollary 2.4.5 implies that the numerator of Θ is strictly negative for any z ∈ (x∞, x0),
and therefore Θ > 0 and F ′ < 0. Thus, we conclude that F is strictly decreasing.
Step 2. To prove (2.52), recall that from Step 1 we have set Φ(z) = (z − c)ψ′′(z)−
ψ′(z) > 0 for all z ∈ (x∞, x0), and define for any z ∈ (x∞, x0)
h(z) :=
[ψ′′′(z) [(z − c)ψ′(z)− ψ(z)]− ψ′′(z) [(z − c)ψ′′(z)− ψ′(z)]]ψ(z)
−α[ψ′′(z)ψ(z)− ψ′(z)2] ,
which is continuous and nonnegative by Step 1. Notice that h/Φ = Θ, with Θ as in
Step 1.
By de l'Hopital's rule,
lim
z↓x∞
Φ(z)
z − x∞ = limz↓x∞Φ
′(z) = (x∞ − c)ψ′′′(x∞) =: ` > 0,
so that, for any ε > 0, there exists δε > 0 such that if |z−x∞| < δε, then
∣∣ Φ(z)
z−x∞−`
∣∣ < ε.
Thus, for any ε > 0, we let δε be as above, and we take x ∈ (x∞, x∞ + δε). Then,
recalling (2.51), we see that there exists a constant C > 0 (possibly depending on x∞
and x0, but not on x) such that
F (x) =
∫ x0
x
Θ(z)dz =
∫ x0
x
h(z)
(z − x∞) Φ(z)(z−x∞)
dz
≥
∫ x∞+δε
x
C
(`+ ε)
dz
(z − x∞) + C
∫ x0
x∞+δε
dz
Φ(z)
→∞
as x ↓ x∞.
Finally, since the integrand in (2.51) is a C∞-function on (x∞, x0], it follows that
F is so as well.
Remark 2.4.7. The critical price levels x0 and x∞ have a clear interpretation. x0
is the free boundary arising in the optimal extraction problem when we set α = 0, so
that the company's actions have no market impact. x∞ is the free boundary of the
optimal extraction problem when there is an infinite amount of commodity available in
the reservoir, i.e. y =∞.
Given F as above, we now introduce the sets S1 and S2 that partition the (candidate)
selling region S:
S1 := {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : x ≥ F−1(y) and y ≤ (x− x0)/α},
S2 := {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : x ≥ F−1(y) and y > (x− x0)/α}.
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and the (candidate) waiting region
W := {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : x < F−1(y)}.
We now make a guess on the structure of the optimal strategy in terms of the setsW
and S1 and S2. If the current price x is sufficiently low, and in particular it is such that
x < F−1(y) (i.e. (x, y) ∈W), we conjecture that the company does not extract, and the
payoff accrued is just the continuation value A(y)ψ(x). Whenever the price attempts to
cross the critical level F−1(y), then the company makes infinitesimal extractions that
keep the state process (X, Y ) inside the region {(x, y) ∈ R×(0,∞) : x ≤ F−1(y)} (that
is, insideW). If the current price x is sufficiently high (i.e. x > F−1(y)) and the current
level of the reservoir is sufficiently large (i.e. lies in S2), then the company makes an
instantaneous lump sum extraction of suitable amplitude z, and pushes the joint process
(X, Y ) to the locus of points {(x, y) ∈ R × (0,∞) : y = F (x)}, and then continues
extracting as before. The associated payoff is then the sum of the continuation value
starting from the new state (x−αz, y− z), and the profits accrued from selling z units
of the commodity, that is (x − c)z − 1
2
αz2. If the current capacity level is not large
enough (i.e. y ≤ x−x0
α
, so that (x, y) ∈ S1), then the company immediately depletes the
reservoir. This action is associated to the net profit (x− c)y − 1
2
αy2.
In light of the previous conjecture we therefore define our candidate value function
as
w(x, y) :=

A(y)ψ(x), if (x, y) ∈W ∪ ((−∞, x0]× {0}),
A
(
F (x− αz))ψ(x− αz)
+(x− c)z − 1
2
αz2, if (x, y) ∈ S2,
(x− c)y − 1
2
αy2, if (x, y) ∈ S1 ∪ ((x0,∞)× {0}),
(2.53)
where, for any (x, y) ∈ S2, we denote by z := z(x, y) the unique solution to
y − z = F (x− αz). (2.54)
In fact, its existence and uniqueness is guaranteed by the next lemma, whose proof is
in Appendix B.
Lemma 2.4.8. For any (x, y) ∈ S2, there exists a unique solution z(x, y) to (2.54).
Moreover, we have z(x, y) ∈ (x−x0
α
, x−x∞
α
∧ y],
z(x, F (x)) = 0 for any x ∈ (x∞, x0), (2.55)
and
z(x, y) =
x− x0
α
, for any (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) such that x ≥ x0 and y = x− x0
α
.
(2.56)
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Next, we verify that w is a classical solution to the HJB equation (2.12). This is
accomplished in the next two results.
Lemma 2.4.9. The function w is C2,1(R× [0,∞)).
Proof. Continuity is clear by construction. We therefore need to evaluate the deriva-
tives of w.
Denoting by Int(·) the interior of a set, we have by (2.53) that for all (x, y) ∈ Int(W)
wx(x, y) = A(y)ψ
′(x), wxx(x, y) = A(y)ψ′′(x), wy(x, y) = A′(y)ψ(x), (2.57)
and that for all (x, y) ∈ Int(S1)
wx(x, y) = y, wxx(x, y) = 0, wy(x, y) = x− c− αy. (2.58)
All the previous equations easily give the continuity of the derivatives in Int(W) and
Int(S1).
To evaluate wx, wxx and wy for (x, y) ∈ Int(S2), we need some more work. From
(2.54), we calculate the derivatives of z = z(x, y) with respect to x and y by the help
of the implicit function theorem, and we obtain
zx(x, y) =
F ′(x− αz)
αF ′(x− αz)− 1 , (2.59)
and
zy(x, y) =
1
1− αF ′(x− αz) , (2.60)
for any (x, y) ∈ Int(S2). Moreover, recalling that we have set G ≡ F−1, and taking
y = F (x− αz), we find from (2.29)
A′(F (x− αz)) = x− αz − c
ψ(x− αz) − αA(F (x− αz))
ψ′(x− αz)
ψ(x− αz) , (2.61)
and from (2.30)
A′(F (x− αz)) = 1− αA(F (x− αz))ψ
′′(x− αz)
ψ′(x− αz) . (2.62)
By differentiating w with respect to x strictly inside S2 (cf. the second line of (2.53)),
and using (2.59) and (2.61), we obtain
wx(x, y) = A(F (x− αz))ψ′(x− αz) + z. (2.63)
Also, by (2.62) and (2.59)
wxx(x, y) = A(F (x− αz))ψ′′(x− αz). (2.64)
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Moreover, differentiating with respect to y the second line of (2.53), and using (2.60)
and (2.61), yields
wy(x, y) = A
′(F (x− αz))ψ(x− αz). (2.65)
Equations (2.63)-(2.65) hold for any (x, y) ∈ Int(S2), and give that w ∈ C2,1(Int(S2)).
Moreover, the previous calculations obtained in Int(W), Int(S1) and Int(S2) reveal that
the derivatives of w are also continuous in R× {0}.
Now, let (xn, yn)n ⊆ Int(S2) be any sequence converging to (x, F (x)), x ∈ (x∞, x0].
Since limn→∞ z(xn, yn) = 0 by continuity of z, and because A, ψ, ψ′ and ψ′′ are also
continuous, we conclude from (2.57) and (2.63)(2.65) that w ∈ C2,1(W ∩ S2), where
W and S2 denote the closures of W and S2.
In order to prove that w ∈ C2,1(S1∩S2), consider a sequence (xn, yn)n ⊆ S2 converg-
ing to (x, x−x0
α
), x ≥ x0. Again by the continuity of F and exploiting that F (x0) = 0
we get lim
n→∞
z(xn, yn) =
1
α
(x− x0). Therefore, we have w ∈ C2,1(S1 ∩ S2) by (2.58) and
(2.63)(2.65), and upon employing A(F (x0)) = 0 and ψ(x0)A
′(F (x0)) =
ψ(x0)
ψ′(x0)
= x0− c
by (2.62).
Collecting all the previous results, the claim follows.
Proposition 2.4.10. The function w as in (2.53) is a C2,1(R× [0,∞)) solution to the
HJB equation (2.12), and it is such that w(x, 0) = 0.
Proof. The claimed regularity follows from Lemma 2.4.9, whereas we see from (2.53)
that w(x, 0) = 0 upon recalling that A(0) = 0. Hence, we assume in the following
that y > 0. Moreover, it is important to recall that in (2.29) and (2.30) we have set
G ≡ F−1.
By construction Lw(x, y)−ρw(x, y) = 0 for all (x, y) ∈W. Moreover, −αwx(x, y)−
wy(x, y) + (x− c) = 0 for all (x, y) ∈ S1. Also, −αwx(x, y)−wy(x, y) + (x− c) = 0 for
all (x, y) ∈ S2 by employing (2.63) and (2.65), and observing that from (2.29) one has
−αA(F (x− αz))ψ′(x− αz)− A′(F (x− αz))ψ(x− αz) + (x− αz)− c = 0.
Hence, it is left to show that
−αwx(x, y)− wy(x, y) + x− c ≤ 0, ∀(x, y) ∈W, (2.66)
Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) ≤ 0, ∀(x, y) ∈ S = S1 ∪ S2 (2.67)
In Step 1 below we prove that (2.66) holds, whereas the proof of (2.67) is separately
performed for S1 and S2 in Step 2 and Step 3 respectively.
Step 1. Here we prove that (2.66) holds for any (x, y) ∈W. Notice that (2.29) gives
A′(y) =
F−1(y)− c
ψ(F−1(y))
− αA(y)ψ
′(F−1(y))
ψ(F−1(y))
. (2.68)
58
Optimal Extraction Problem with Price Impact
Then, by using the first and the third equation of (2.57), and (2.68), we rewrite the
left-hand side of (2.66) (after rearranging terms) as
αA(y)
[
ψ′(F−1(y))ψ(x)
ψ(F−1(y))
− ψ′(x)
]
− F
−1(y)− c
ψ(F−1(y))
ψ(x) + x− c = Q(x, F−1(y)),
for any (x, y) ∈W. Here, we have defined
Q(x, q) := αA(F (q))
[
ψ′(q)ψ(x)
ψ(q)
− ψ′(x)
]
− q − c
ψ(q)
ψ(x) + x− c,
for any (x, q) ∈ R × [x∞, x0]. Since Q(q, q) = 0, in order to have (2.66) it suffices to
show that one has (recall that (x∞, x0] is the domain of F )
Qx(x, q) ≥ 0, for any x ≤ q, for all q ∈ (x∞, x0].
We prove this in the following.
Differentiating Q with respect to x, and using (2.46), gives
Qx(x, q) =
ψ(q)− (q − c)ψ′(q)
ψ′′(q)ψ(q)− ψ′(q)2
[
ψ′(x)ψ′(q)
ψ(q)
− ψ′′(x)
]
− (q − c)ψ
′(x)
ψ(q)
+ 1. (2.69)
Take x ≤ x∞ and q = x∞, and recall that x∞ > c solves (x∞ − c) = ψ′(x∞)ψ′′(x∞) . Then,
after some simple algebra, we have
Qx(x, x∞) = 1− ψ
′′(x)
ψ′′(x∞)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that x 7→ ψ′′(x) is strictly increasing.
Moreover, we find
Qx(x, x0) = 1− (x0 − c)ψ
′(x)
ψ(x0)
≥ 0, for any x ≤ x0, (2.70)
due to the fact that x0 > c uniquely solves (x0 − c)ψ′(x0) − ψ(x0) = 0 and x 7→
1− (x0 − c) ψ′(x)ψ(x0) < 0 is strictly decreasing.
By differentiating Qx of (2.69) with respect to q one obtains
Qxq(x, q) =
[
ψ′′′(q) [(q − c)ψ′(q)− ψ(q)]− ψ′′(q) [(q − c)ψ′′(q)− ψ′(q)](
ψ′′(q)ψ(q)− ψ′(q)2)2
]
Φ(x, q),
(2.71)
where we have introduced the function
Φ(x, q) := ψ′(x)ψ′(q)− ψ′′(x)ψ(q), for all (x, q) ∈ R2,
that is such that
Φq(x, q) = ψ
′(x)ψ′′(q)− ψ′′(x)ψ′(q) > 0, ∀x ≤ q, (2.72)
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since ψ′/ψ′′ is decreasing due to Lemma A.1.2 with k = 1.
By Corollary 2.4.5 we have that
ψ′′′(q) [(q − c)ψ′(q)− ψ(q)]− ψ′′(q) [(q − c)ψ′′(q)− ψ′(q)] ≤ 0, (2.73)
for all q ∈ [x∞, x0]. Hence, the term multiplying Φ in the right-hand side of (2.71) is
negative.
In light of (2.72), we know that Φ(x, q) is increasing in q for q ≥ x. We now have
three possible cases.
(a) If Φ is such that Φ(x, q) < 0 for all q ∈ [x∞, x0], then by (2.73) (and noticing
that the function in (2.73) in fact appears in the numerator of Qxq) we must have
Qxq(x, q) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ [x∞, x0], so that
0 ≤ Qx(x, x∞) ≤ Qx(x, q) ≤ Qx(x, x0), for all q ∈ [x∞, x0], and x ≤ x∞. (2.74)
(b) If Φ is such that Φ(x, q) > 0 for all q ∈ [x∞, x0], then by (2.73) we must have
Qxq(x, q) ≤ 0 for all q ∈ [x∞, x0], so that
0 ≤ Qx(x, x0) ≤ Qx(x, q) ≤ Qx(x, x∞), for all q ∈ [x∞, x0], and x ≤ x∞.
(c) If Φ is such that Φ(x, q) ≤ 0 for all q ∈ [x∞, q¯], where q¯ ∈ [x∞, x0], and
Φ(x, q) > 0 for all q ∈ [q¯, x0], then by (2.73) we must have Qxq(x, q) ≥ 0 for all
q ∈ [x∞, q¯], and Qxq(x, q) ≤ 0 for all q ∈ [q¯, x0], so that
Qx(x, q) ≥ min{Qx(x, x∞), Qx(x, x0)} ≥ 0, for all q ∈ [x∞, x0] and x ≤ x∞. (2.75)
From (2.74)-(2.75), we then conclude that (2.66) holds for any (x, y) ∈ W such that
x ≤ x∞.
Now, take x ∈ (x∞, x0] and let q ∈ [x, x0]. For q = x we find from (2.69) that
Qx(x, x) = 0. (2.76)
Then, proceeding as above, from (2.70) and (2.76), we obtain that Qx(x, q) ≥ 0 for all
x ∈ (x∞, x0] with q ∈ [x, x0].
Hence, in conclusion, Qx(x, F
−1(y)) ≥ 0 for all x ≤ F−1(y) and y > 0, and (2.66)
is then established.
Step 2. Here, we show that (2.67) holds in S1. Setting
x¯ =
a+ ρc
ρ+ b
,
by Lemma B.2.1 in Appendix B we have x¯ ≤ x0, with x0 solving (x0−c)ψ′(x0)−ψ(x0) =
0 (cf. Lemma 2.4.3).
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Now, let (x, y) ∈ S1 be given and fixed. Thanks to the first and second equation in
(2.58) we have
Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) = (a− bx)y − ρ
[
(x− c)y − 1
2
αy2
]
=: Q˜(x, y).
Clearly Q˜(x, 0) = 0. Also, since (x, y) ∈ S1 is such that y ≤ 1α(x− x0) and x ≥ x0, we
have
Q˜y(x, y) = a− bx− ρ(x− c) + αρy ≤ a− bx− ρ(x0 − c) ≤ a+ ρc− x0(ρ+ b) ≤ 0,
where the last inequality is due to x0 ≥ x¯. Hence Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) ≤ 0 on S1.
Step 3. Here we provide the proof of (2.67) in S2, separately for the two cases:
(i) a − bc ≤ 0 and (ii) a − bc > 0, and different approaches are followed in these two
cases (see also Remark 2.4.11).
(i) Assume a−bc ≤ 0. Let (x, y) ∈ S2 be given and fixed, and recall that x ≥ F−1(y)
and y > 1
α
(x − x0) for all (x, y) ∈ S2. By employing (2.63) and (2.64), and observing
that from (2.25) one has[σ2
2
A(F (x− αz))ψ′′(x− αz) + (a− b(x− αz))A(F (x− αz))ψ′(x− αz)
− ρA(F (x− αz))ψ(x− αz)
]∣∣∣
z=z(x,y)
= 0,
we get
Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y)
=
[
(a− bx)z − ρ(x− c)z + 1
2
ραz2 − bαzA(F (x− αz))ψ′(x− αz)
]∣∣∣
z=z(x,y)
.
(2.77)
Since z > 0, A > 0, and ψ′ > 0, one has that Lw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) ≤ Q̂(x, y), where we
have set
Q̂(x, y) :=
[
(a− bx)z − ρ(x− c)z + 1
2
ραz2
]∣∣∣
z=z(x,y)
.
Observe that Q̂(F−1(y), y) = 0 since z(F−1(y), y) = 0 (cf. (2.55)). Hence, it suffices
to show that Q̂x(x, y) < 0 for all (x, y) ∈ S2. Differentiating Q̂ with respect to x gives
Q̂x(x, y) = z(x, y)
(
− b− ρ+ ραzx(x, y)
)
+ zx(x, y)
[
(a− bx)− ρ(x− c)
]
.
Since zx > 0 and αzx < 1 (cf. (2.59) and recall that F
′ < 0), and x ≥ F−1(y) ≥ x∞,
we find
Q̂x(x, y) ≤ zx(x, y)
[
a+ ρc− F−1(y)(ρ+ b)
]
≤ zx(x, y)
[
a+ ρc− x∞(ρ+ b)
]
= zx(x, y)(ρ+ b)
(
x¯− x∞
)
,
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and clearly Q̂x(x, y) ≤ 0 if a− bc ≤ 0, since the latter implies x¯ ≤ c < x∞.
This shows that Q̂ < 0 on S2, and therefore that w solves (2.67) in S2 if a− bc ≤ 0.
(ii) Assume that a− bc > 0. In this case, as discussed in Remark 2.4.11, we did not
succeed proving (2.67) by studying the sign of Lw−ρw as done in (i) above. Therefore,
we follow a different approach which is based on that developed in the proof of Lemma
6.7 in [22]. Here we just provide the main ideas, since most of the arguments follow
from [22].
Let (x, y) ∈ W ∩ S2 be given and fixed, and consider an arbitrary zo > 0. From
(2.54) we find z(x + αzo, y + zo) = zo, and employing the latter we have from (2.53),
(2.63) and (2.64) that
Lw(x+ αzo, y + zo)− ρw(x+ αzo, y + zo)
= −αbzoA(F (x))ψ′(x) +
(
a− b(x+ αzo)
)
zo − ρ
(
(x+ αzo)− c
)
zo +
1
2
ραz2o =: U(zo).
Notice that U(0) = 0, hence to show negativity of U it suffices to prove that U ′(zo) ≤ 0
for all zo > 0. We find
U ′(zo) = −αbA(F (x))ψ′(x)− αbzo + (a− b(x+ αzo))− ρ(x+ αzo − c)
= b (x− c− αA(F (x))ψ′(x)) + (x+ αzo − c)
[
−(b+ ρ) + a− b(x+ αzo)
(x+ αzo)− c
]
,
after rearranging terms, and adding and substracting the term b(x − c) to obtain the
second equality above. Now, define the function
κ(x) := −(b+ ρ) + a− bx
x− c , (2.78)
and notice that
κ(x∞) = (ψ′(x∞))
−1
((a− bx∞)ψ′′(x∞)− (b+ ρ)ψ′(x∞)) = −σ
2
2
ψ′′′(x∞)
ψ′(x∞)
< 0,
where we have used that x∞ solves x∞ − c = ψ′(x∞)ψ′′(x∞) for the first equality, and Lemma
A.1.2-(2) with k = 1 for the second equality. Moreover,
κ′(x) =
bc− a
(x− c)2 < 0,
since a > bc, which then yields κ(x) < 0 for all x > x∞. From the monotonicity and
the negativity of κ, and the fact that zo 7→ (x + αzo − c) is positive and increasing as
x ≥ x∞ > c, one obtains that zo 7→ (x + αzo − c)κ(x + αzo) is decreasing. Therefore,
one has U ′(zo) ≤ 0 for all zo > 0 if U ′(0+) ≤ 0.
To prove that the right-derivative U ′(0+) is negative, we now explain how to employ
in our setting the arguments of the proof of Lemma 6.7 in [22]. First of all, we discuss
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the standing Assumption 2.2 in [22]. Conditions C2 and C3 are satisfied for f(x) ≡
x − c. If a − bc > 0, then Condition C5 in Assumption 2.2 of [22] is satisfied for
f(x) ≡ x− c, σˆ ≡ σ, δ ≡ ρ, σρσˆ ≡ a, and β ≡ b. Moreover, all the other requirements
in Assumption 2.2 of [22] are not needed in our case. Indeed, Condition C6 guarantees
the existence and uniqueness of (in our terminology) x0 and x∞, that we already have
by Lemma 2.4.3; Condition C4 only ensures a growth condition on the value function
that we have from Proposition 2.3.1, whereas, in our setting, Condition C1 of [22] just
means that the discount factor must be strictly positive.
Then, after reformulating our singular stochastic control problem as a calculus of
variations problem where one seeks for a decreasing C1 function triggering a strategy of
reflecting type (see Section 4 in [22]), proceeding as in Section 5 of [22] (see in particular
Theorem 5.6 therein), one can prove that our free boundary F−1 is a (one-sided) local
maximizer of our performance criterion (2.4). Hence, a contradiction argument as that
in the proof of Lemma 6.7 in [22] also applies in our case and yields that U ′(0+) ≤ 0.
This completes the proof.
Remark 2.4.11.
1. As we have seen, the proof of (2.67) in S2 when a − bc > 0 requires a different
analysis, and here we try to explain why a more direct approach seems not to
lead to the desired result. Assuming a− bc > 0, if one aims at proving (2.67) by
studying the sign of Lw−ρw in S2, given that z := z(x, y) ≥ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ S2,
one could try to prove that (cf. (2.77))
L(x, y) := a− bx− ρ(x− c) + 1
2
ραz − bαA(F (x− αz))ψ′(x− αz)
is negative for any (x, y) ∈ S2. Calculations, employing (2.29) and the definition
of A′ (cf. (2.48)), reveal that for any y > 0 one has L(F−1(y), y) = χ(F−1(y)),
where, for any u ∈ (x∞, x0], we have set
χ(u) := (ρ+ 2b)(x̂− u) + bψ(u)
[
(u− c)ψ′′(u)− ψ′(u)
ψ′′(u)ψ(u)− ψ′(u)2
]
,
with x̂ := a+(ρ+b)c
ρ+2b
< x∞. By noticing that A(F (x−αz))ψ′(x−αz) = wx(x, y)−z
in S2 (cf. (2.63)), one has that L rewrites as
L(x, y) = a− bx− ρ(x− c) + 1
2
ραz + bαz − bαwx(x, y),
and because αzx < 1 by (2.59) and wxx ≥ 0 by (2.64), it is easy to see that Lx < 0
on S2.
Hence, to prove that L < 0 on S2 it would suffice to show that χ < 0 on (x∞, x0].
However, we have not been able to prove this property due to the unhandy implicit
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expression of the function ψ, even if a numerical investigation seems to confirm
negativity of χ. For this technical reason in Step 3-(ii) of the proof of Proposi-
tion 2.4.10 we have hinged on arguments as those originally developed in [22] to
address the case a− bc > 0.
2. It is also worth noticing that the calculus of variations approach of [22] would
have not been directly applicable for any choice of the parameters. Indeed, when
a − bc < 0, the function κ of (2.78) is increasing and therefore it has not the
monotonicity required in Condition C5 of Assumption 2.2 of [22]. However, under
such a parameters' restriction, direct calculations as those developed in Step 3-(i)
of the proof of Proposition 2.4.10 lead to the desired result. This fact suggests
that a combined use of the calculus of variations method and of the more standard
direct study of the HJB equation could be successful in complex situations where
neither of the two methods seem to leed to the proof of optimality of a candidate
value function for any choice of the model's parameters.
We conclude by showing that w of (2.53) identifies with the value function V . As
a byproduct we also provide an optimal extraction rule. We first need the following
technical result. Its proof follows by suitably adopting the classical result in [48], upon
considering the following joint process (X, ζ) as a (degenerate) diffusion in R2 with
oblique reflection in the direction (−α,−1) at the C∞-free boundary F (see also [22],
Remark 4.2).
Lemma 2.4.12. Let (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞), F be given as in (2.51), z := z(x, y) solving
(2.54), and let ∆ := ∆(x, y) = y1{(x,y)∈S1}+z1{(x,y)∈S2}. Then there exists a (pathwise)
unique F-adapted continuous (X, ζ), with ζ increasing, such that
Xt ≤ F−1(y −∆− ζt),
dXt =
(
a− bXt
)
dt+ σdWt − αdζt,
dζt = 1{Xt=F−1(y−∆−ζt)}dζt,
for any 0 ≤ t ≤ τζ, with τζ := inf{t ≥ 0 : ζt ≥ y −∆}, and starting point (X0, ζ0) =
(x− α∆, 0).
Theorem 2.4.13. Recall the functions F and w from (2.51) and (2.53), respectively.
The function w identifies with the value function V from (2.3), and the optimal extrac-
tion strategy, denoted by ξ?, is given by
ξ?t =
∆ + ζt, t ∈ [0, τζ),y, t ≥ τζ , (2.79)
with ξ?0− = 0, and with ∆, ζ, and τζ as in Lemma 2.4.12.
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Proof. We aim at applying Theorem 2.3.2. We already know that w ∈ C2,1(R× [0,∞))
is a solution to the HJB equation (2.12) by Lemma 2.4.9 and Proposition 2.4.10, and
that satisfies w(x, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ R. Moreover, the function w is increasing with
respect to y. To see that, notice that one has from (2.48) that A′(y) > 0, for y > 0
(since the denominator of (2.48) is positive by Lemma A.1.2-(3) and the numerator
is positive as well due to F−1(y) ≥ x∞), and this gives wy > 0 on W and on S2 (cf.
(2.57) and (2.65)). Also, one can easily check from (2.58) that wy ≥ 0 on S1 because
y ≤ (x− x0)/α and x0 > c.
To prove the upper bound in (2.15), recall that (cf. (2.46))
A(y) =
(F−1(y)− c)ψ′(F−1(y))− ψ(F−1(y))
α[ψ′(F−1(y))2 − ψ′′(F−1(y))ψ(F−1(y))] , y ≥ 0.
Since x0 ≥ F−1(y) ≥ x∞ for any y ≥ 0, by using that ψ, ψ′ and ψ′′ are continuous we
have that there exists a constant K > 0 such that A(y) ≤ K for all y ≥ 0. Hence,
by (2.53) we have w(x, y) ≤ Kψ(F−1(y)) ≤ Kψ(x0) for all (x, y) ∈ W. Moreover,
0 ≤ z(x, y) ≤ y for all (x, y) ∈ S2 and thus (x − c)z − 12αz ≤ (x − c)z ≤ (x − c)y.
Since the upper bound in (2.15) is clearly satisfied in S1, we conclude that there exists
a constant K > 0 such that
w(x, y) ≤ Ky(1 + y)(1 + |x|) for all (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞).
As for the nonnegativity of w, notice that for all (x, y) ∈ S1 we have
w(x, y) = (x− c)y − 1
2
αy2 ≥ y[x− c− 1
2
(x− x0)
] ≥ y[x∞ − c
2
+
x0 − c
2
] ≥ 0,
since y ≤ x−x0
α
, x ≥ F−1(y) ≥ x∞ and x0 > x∞ > c. Moreover, the nonnegativity of ψ
and A imply
w(x, y) ≥ 0, for all (x, y) ∈W,
and also, given (x, y) ∈ S2, we have
w(x, y) = A(F (x− αz))ψ(x− αz) + (x− c)z − 1
2
αz2
≥
∫ z
0
(x− αu− c)du ≥
∫ z
0
(x∞ − c)du ≥ 0,
since 0 ≤ z ≤ x−x∞
α
and x∞ > c. Therefore w ≥ 0 on R× [0,∞).
Now, since ξ? satisfies (2.16) and (2.17), by Theorem 2.3.2 we therefore conclude
that w identifies with V , and that ξ? is an optimal extraction strategy.
Remark 2.4.14. It is worth noticing that, by adopting the optimal extraction rule ξ? as
in (2.79), all the commodity is extracted in finite time. In fact, by following arguments
as those in Theorem 3.1 of [22], one can show that the time τζ arising in Lemma 2.4.12
has finite moments.
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Figure 2.2: A graphical illustration of the optimal extraction rule ξ? (cf. (2.79)) and
of the free boundary F . The plot has been obtained by using a = 0.4, σ = 0.8, ρ =
3/8, c = 0.3, b = 1, α = 0.25, and by numerically evaluating the free boundary of
(2.51). The optimal extraction rule prescribes the following. In the region {(x, y) ∈
R× (0,∞) : y < F (x)} it is optimal not to extract. If at initial time (x, y) is such that
x > F−1(y) and y ≤ (x − x0)/α, then the reservoir should be immediately depleted.
On the other hand, if (x, y) is such that x ≥ F−1(y) and y > (x − x0)/α, then one
should make a lump sum extraction of suitable size z(x, y), and then keep on extracting
until the commodity is exhausted by just preventing the (optimally controlled) process
(X, Y ) to leave the region {(x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) : y ≤ F (x)}.
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2.4.2.1 A Related Optimal Stopping Problem
In this section, we show that the directional derivative u := αVx + Vy identifies with
the value function of an optimal stopping problem. Such a result is consistent with
that obtained - for a different model with Brownian dynamics - in [80], where connec-
tions between finite-fuel singular stochastic control problems and questions of optimal
stopping have been studied.
Proposition 2.4.15. The function u : R× (0,∞) 7→ R defined by
u(x, y) := αVx(x, y) + Vy(x, y)
admits the probabilistic representation
u(x, y) = sup
τ≥0
E
[
e−ρτ (Xxτ − c)−
∫ τ
0
e−ρsαbA(y)ψ′(Xxs )ds
]
, (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞),
(2.80)
where the optimization is taken over the set of F-stopping times. Moreover, for F as
in (2.51), we have that the stopping time
τ ?(x; y) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ F−1(y)}, (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞),
is optimal in (2.80).
Proof. For the rest of this proof, y ∈ (0,∞) will be given and fixed. Notice that
u(·, y) ∈ C1(R) by construction (cf. (2.29) and (2.30)). Moreover, direct calculations
on (2.53) show that uxx(·, y) ∈ L∞loc(R). We now show that u(·, y) solves the HJB
equation
max
{
Lw(x)− ρw(x)− αbA(y)ψ′(x), x− c− w(x)
}
= 0, a.e. x ∈ R. (2.81)
Recall the selling region S and the waiting region W. Let x ∈ R be such that
(x, y) ∈W, and notice that by (2.53) we have
Vx(x, y) = A(y)ψ
′(x), and Vy(x, y) = A′(y)ψ(x).
Then, since u = αVx + Vy,
Lu(x, y)− ρu(x, y)− αbA(y)ψ′(x)
=
1
2
σ2 (αA(y)ψ′′′(x) + A′(y)ψ′′(x)) + (a− bx) (αA(y)ψ′′(x) + A′(y)ψ′(x))
− (ρ+ b)αA(y)ψ′(x)− ρA′(y)ψ(x)
=αA(y)
(Lψ′(x)− (ρ+ b)ψ′(x))+ A′(y)(Lψ(x)− ρψ(x)) = 0,
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upon using that ψ(k) satisfies Lemma A.1.2-(2) with k = 0, 1.
Now, let x ∈ R be such that (x, y) ∈ S, so that u(x, y) = x − c (recall (2.27)). If
(x, y) ∈ S1 then x ≥ x0, and using that αbA(y)ψ′(x) > 0 we obtain
Lu(x, y)− ρu(x, y)− αbA(y)ψ′(x) = (a− bx)− ρ(x− c)− αbA(y)ψ′(x)
≤ a− (ρ+ b)x+ ρc = (ρ+ b)(x¯− x) ≤ 0,
since x0 ≥ x¯ by Lemma B.2.1 in Appendix B.
On the other hand, let x ∈ R be such that (x, y) ∈ S2, set H(x, y) := Lu(x, y) −
ρu(x, y)− αbA(y)ψ′(x), and notice that
∂H(x, y)
∂x
= −(ρ+ b)− αbA(y)ψ′′(x) < 0,
due to the positivity of A and ψ′′. Thus, in order to prove that Lu(x, y) − ρu(x, y) −
αbA(y)ψ′(x) ≤ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ S2, it is enough to prove that H(F−1(y), y) ≤ 0. Set
u := F−1(y); then, upon employing the definition of A (cf. (2.46)), we obtain
H(u, y) =
(
ψ(u)ψ′′(u)− ψ′(u)2)−1×
×
[
(a− bu− ρ(u− c)) (ψ(u)ψ′′(u)− ψ′(u)2)+ b(u− c)ψ′(u)2 − bψ(u)ψ′(u)]
=
σ2
2
(
ψ(u)ψ′′(u)− ψ′(u)2)−1×
×
[
ψ′′′(u) [(u− c)ψ′(u)− ψ(u)]− ψ′′(u) [(u− c)ψ′′(u)− ψ′(u)]
]
< 0,
where we have applied Lemma A.1.2-(2) with k = 0 and k = 1 for the last equality, and
the last inequality follows from Corollary 2.4.5 since x∞ < u ≤ x0. Hence, Lu(x, y)−
ρu(x, y)− αbA(y)ψ′(x) ≤ 0 on S2.
Finally, from Proposition 2.4.10 we have x− c− u(x, y) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ R.
The previous inequalities show that u(·, y) identifies with a W 2,∞loc (R)-solution to
(2.81). Then, a standard verification theorem based on an application of (a generalized
version of) Itô's formula, implies that u(·, y) admits representation (2.80) and that the
stopping time τ ?(x; y) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ F−1(y)} attains the supremum.
Remark 2.4.16. A few comments are worth being done.
1. With regard to the connection between problems of singular stochastic control and
questions of optimal stopping (see, e.g., [51, 52, 78, 80] as early contributions, and
the introduction of the recent [46] for a richer literature review), we can interpret
the stopping time τ ?(x; y) as the optimal time at which an additional unit of
the commodity should be extracted. Indeed, the underlying process at that time
is such that, in economic terms, equality between the marginal expected optimal
profit (i.e. αVx + Vy) and the marginal instantaneous net profit from extraction
(i.e. x− c) holds.
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2. If we do not consider price impact in our model (i.e. we take α = 0), it can be
easily seen that the value function of the resulting optimal extraction problem V
is such that
Vy(x, y) = sup
τ≥0
E
[
e−ρτ (Xxτ − c)
]
,
a result that is clearly consistent with (2.80). The integral term
−
∫ τ
0
e−ρsαbA(y)ψ′(Xxs )ds
appearing in (2.80) can then be seen as a running cost/penalty whose effect in-
creases with increasing price impact α.
3. It can be checked that the arguments of the proof of Proposition 2.4.15 carry over
also to the case of a fundamental price given by a drifted Brownian motion, i.e.
when b = 0 (cf. Section 2.4.1). As one would expect by setting b = 0 in the
right-hand side of (2.80), in such a case it holds
αVx(x, y) + Vy(x, y) = sup
τ≥0
E
[
e−ρτ (Xxτ − c)
]
,
so that the stopping problem related to the optimal extraction problem does not
depend on the current level of the reservoir y. This explains why, in in the drifted
Brownian motion case studied in Section 2.4.1, the free boundary x? triggering
the optimal extraction rule is y-independent.
2.5 Comparative Statics Analysis
In this section, we study the sensitivity of the solution to the extraction problem
separately for the case of a fundamental price given by a drifted Brownian motion
(Section 2.5.1) and by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (Section 2.5.2). In particular,
in Section 2.5.1 we analytically determine the dependency of the free boundary x? of
(2.34) and of the value function (2.35) on the parameters a and σ. In Section 2.5.2
we study analytically how the value function (2.53) and the critical price levels x0 and
x∞ from Lemma 2.4.4 depend on a and σ, and, numerically, the sensitivity of the free
boundary F with respect to a, σ and b.
2.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis in the Case of a Drifted Brownian
Motion Fundamental Price
Here we assume b = 0 in (2.2). Thanks to the explicit formula (2.34), studying the
sensitivity of the free boundary x? with respect to the parameters a and σ is a simple
exercise of differentiation.
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Proposition 2.5.1. The free boundary x? of (2.34) is increasing with respect to both
a and σ.
Proof. We look at the parameter n of (2.32) as a function of a and σ; that is, we set
n(a, σ) := − a
σ2
+
√( a
σ2
)2
+ 2
ρ
σ2
.
Then, it is not hard to find by direct calculations that
na(a, σ) =
1
σ4
 a√(
a
σ2
)2
+ 2 ρ
σ2
− σ2
 , (2.82)
and
nσ(a, σ) =
2
σ3
a− a2σ2 + ρ√(
a
σ2
)2
+ 2 ρ
σ2
 . (2.83)
Clearly, if a ≤ 0 one has na ≤ 0 and nσ ≤ 0. Then, suppose a > 0 and notice that√( a
σ2
)2
+ 2
ρ
σ2
≥ a
σ2
and
√( a
σ2
)2
+ 2
ρ
σ2
≤ a
σ2
+
ρ
a
, (2.84)
where the second inequality above follows by an application of the binomial formula.
By using the first inequality of (2.84) in (2.82), and the second inequality of (2.84) in
(2.83), one easily finds that na(a, σ) ≤ 0, as well as nσ(a, σ) ≤ 0.
Finally, the claim follows since x? is decreasing with respect to n (cf. (2.32)).
Proposition 2.5.2. The value function V defined in (2.3) is increasing with respect
to a and σ.
Proof. Let aˆ > a and σˆ > σ. We show the monotonicity with respect to a and σ
separately in two steps.
Step 1. Let (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) be given and fixed. For any ξ ∈ A(y), we denote by
X̂x,ξt the solution to (2.2) when b = 0 and the drift is aˆ. One clearly has X̂
x,ξ
t ≥ Xx,ξt
P-a.s. for any t ≥ 0. Therefore Ĵ (x, y, ξ) ≥ J (x, y, ξ) for any ξ ∈ A(y), where Jˆ is
given by (2.4) with underlying state (X̂x,ξ, Y y,ξ). Hence, we conclude
V̂ (x, y) ≥ V (x, y), ∀(x, y) ∈ R× [0,∞),
where V̂ (x, y) := supξ∈A(y) Jˆ (x, y, ξ).
Step 2. To prove the monotonicity of V with respect to σ we adapt to our setting
ideas from Theorem 4 in [6]. Let V̂ be the value function when the volatility coefficient
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in (2.2) is σˆ. Recall L as in (2.11), and let L̂ be as in (2.11) but with volatility coefficient
σ̂. Then, for all (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞) we have
LV̂ (x, y)− ρV̂ (x, y)
=
σˆ2
2
V̂xx(x, y) + aV̂x(x, y)− ρV̂ (x, y) + (σ
2 − σˆ2)
2
V̂xx(x, y)
= L̂V̂ (x, y)− ρV̂ (x, y) + (σ
2 − σˆ2)
2
V̂xx(x, y) ≤ (σ
2 − σˆ2)
2
V̂xx(x, y) ≤ 0,
(2.85)
since V̂ (·, y) is convex by the second equations in (2.38) and (2.40), and the second
equation of (2.42). Furthermore, since V̂ is the value function of the optimal extraction
problem when in (2.2) the volatility is σˆ, V̂ must satisfy
−αV̂x(x, y)− V̂y(x, y) + (x− c) ≤ 0, (2.86)
for all (x, y) ∈ R× (0,∞), and V̂ (x, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ R. Now, arguing as in the first
step of the proof of Theorem 2.3.2, by using (2.85) and (2.86), we obtain V̂ ≥ V , and
thus the claimed monotonicity.
Propositions 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 show that the higher the level of the drift a is, and
hence the higher the expected prices are, the later the company starts extracting in
order to obtain larger profits. Moreover, higher uncertainty, and hence larger price's
fluctuations, are exploited by the company that then sells the commodity at higher
prices and increases the resulting profits.
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis in the Case of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
Fundamental Price
We start by studying the sensitivity of x0 and x∞ (cf. Lemma 2.4.4) on the model
parameters a and σ. In the following, when needed, we write g(·; a, σ) in order to
emphasize the dependency of a given real-valued function g with respect to a and σ.
Recall that the fundamental increasing solution to the equation (L − ρ)u = 0 is
given by (2.45). In the following, when needed, we denote by ψ(k)(x; a, σ) the k−th
derivative with respect to x of ψ. By an application of the dominated convergence
theorem one obtains the relation
∂ψ(k)
∂a
(x; a, σ) := ψ(k)a (x; a, σ) = −
1
b
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ), for all k ∈ N0. (2.87)
Analogously, one finds
∂ψ(k)
∂σ
(x; a, σ) := ψ(k)σ (x; a, σ) =
(
a− bx
bσ
)
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)− k
σ
ψ(k)(x; a, σ), (2.88)
for all k ∈ N0
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By employing (2.87), and Lemma A.1.2, one can easily prove the next result.
Lemma 2.5.3. One has that
∂(ψ(k)(x; a, σ)/ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ))
∂a
=
ψ(k)(x; a, σ)ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)− ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)2
bψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)2
> 0,
(2.89)
The proof of the next result can be found in Appendix B. It employs (2.88).
Lemma 2.5.4. One has that
∂(ψ(k)(x; a, σ)/ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ))
∂σ
=
(a− bx)[ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)2 − ψ(k)(x; a, σ)ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)] + bψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)ψ(k)(x; a, σ)
bσψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)2
> 0.
(2.90)
The previous results on the dependency of ψ/ψx with respect to a and σ (i.e. (2.89)
and (2.90)) allow us to determine the dependency of x0 and x∞ on a and σ as well.
One may intuitively expect that the company exploits a higher mean reversion level,
and thus sells the commodity at higher prices. As an indication of this, we indeed find
that x0, x∞, and the value function V increase as a increases.
In the following we denote by x0, x∞ the unique solutions on (c,∞) to (x −
c)ψx(x; a, σ) − ψ(x; a, σ) = 0 and (x − c)ψxx(x; a, σ) − ψx(x; a, σ) = 0, respectively.
Also, V (x, y) denotes the value function when in (2.2) the mean-reversion level is a/b
and the volatility is σ.
Proposition 2.5.5. Let aˆ > a, and denote by xˆ0 and xˆ∞ the unique solutions on
(c,∞) to (x − c)ψx(x; aˆ, σ) − ψ(x; aˆ, σ) = 0 and (x − c)ψxx(x; aˆ, σ) − ψx(x; aˆ, σ) = 0,
respectively. Furthermore, we denote by V̂ (x, y), (x, y) ∈ R× [0,∞), the value function
when in (2.2) the mean-reversion level is aˆ/b and the volatility is σ. We have
xˆ0 > x0 and xˆ∞ > x∞,
and
V̂ (x, y) ≥ V (x, y), ∀(x, y) ∈ R× [0,∞). (2.91)
Proof. For any given q ∈ R and σ > 0, set H(x; q, σ) := (x− c)ψx(x; q, σ)− ψ(x; q, σ),
x ∈ R. We have Hx(x; q, σ) > 0 for all x > c. Moreover,
H(xˆ0; a, σ) =
ψ(xˆ0; aˆ, σ)
ψx(xˆ0; aˆ, σ)
ψx(xˆ0; a, σ)− ψ(xˆ0; a, σ) > 0 = H(x0; a, σ),
where we have used that H(xˆ0; aˆ, σ) = 0 for the first equality, and Lemma 2.5.3 with
k = 0 for the inequality. Thus, by monotonicity ofH(·; q, σ) on (c,∞), we have xˆ0 > x0.
Analogously, we can prove that xˆ∞ > x∞ by employing Lemma 2.5.3 with k = 1.
In order to prove (2.91), we can proceed in the same way as in Step 1 of the proof
of Proposition 2.5.2.
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The next proposition shows that the critical price levels x0 and x∞ increase as the
price's fluctuations become larger.
Proposition 2.5.6. Let σˆ > σ, and denote by xˆ0 and xˆ∞ the unique solutions on
(c,∞) to (x − c)ψx(x; a, σˆ) − ψ(x; a, σˆ) = 0 and (x − c)ψxx(x; a, σˆ) − ψx(x; a, σˆ) = 0,
respectively. Furthermore, denote by V̂ the value function when in (2.2) the mean-
reversion level is a/b and the volatility is σˆ. We have
xˆ0 > x0 and xˆ∞ > x∞,
and
V̂ (x, y) ≥ V (x, y), ∀(x, y) ∈ R× R+. (2.92)
Proof. For any given q > 0 and a ∈ R, set H(x; a, q) := (x− c)ψx(x; a, q)− ψ(x; a, q),
x ∈ R. We have Hx(x; a, q) > 0 for all x > c. Moreover, using that H(xˆ0; a, σˆ) = 0 we
have
H(xˆ0; a, σ) =
ψ(xˆ0; a, σˆ)
ψx(xˆ0; a, σˆ)
ψx(xˆ0; a, σ)− ψ(xˆ0; a, σ) > 0 = H(x0; a, σ),
where the inequality is due to Lemma 2.5.4 with k = 0. Since H(·; a, q) is increasing
for all x > c we have xˆ0 > x0. Analogously, we can prove that xˆ∞ > x∞ by Lemma
2.5.4 with k = 1.
To prove (2.92) we can use the arguments employed in Step 2 of the proof of
Proposition 2.5.2, upon noticing that V̂ (·, y) is convex by the second equations in
(2.57) and (2.58), and (2.64) (recall that A is positive and ψ is convex).
In the following, we assume y ≥ 0 be given and fixed. The semi-explicit nature of
our results allows us to easily study numerically the dependency of F−1(y) with respect
to a. This is shown in Figure 2.3. We see that F−1(y) increases as a increases: the
higher the level of mean reversion is, the later the company starts extracting in order
to obtain larger profits.
Figure 2.4 shows the dependency with respect to σ. We see that F−1(y) increases as
σ increases. We thus conclude that higher uncertainty, and hence higher fluctuations
around the mean-reversion level, are exploited by the company which then sells the
commodity at higher prices and increases its profits.
In Figure 2.5, we can observe the sensitivity F−1(y) with respect to b. Differently
to what it is happening when increasing σ and a, now F−1(y) increases as b decreases,
and in fact, as b ↓ 0, it converges to x?, which is the free boundary in the case b = 0
(i.e. related to the drifted Brownian motion case). The lower b is, the less transient is
the impact of the extraction's policy on the market price of the commodity. This in
turn implies a more precautionary behavior of the company.
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Figure 2.3: A drawing of the free boundary x 7→ F (x) for b = 1, σ = 0.8, ρ = 3/8, c =
0.3, α = 0.25 and various values for a: a = 0.4 (green), a = 0.5 (blue), a = 0.6 (red),
and a = 0.7 (cyan).
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Figure 2.4: A drawing of the free boundary x 7→ F (x) for a = 0.4, b = 1, ρ = 3/8, c =
0.3, α = 0.25 and various values for the volatility: σ = 0.8 (green), σ = 0.9 (blue),
σ = 1 (red), and σ = 1.1 (cyan).
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Figure 2.5: A drawing of the free boundary x 7→ F (x) for a = 0.4, σ = 0.8, ρ =
3/8, c = 0.3, α = 0.25 and various values for the mean reversion speed: b = 1 (green),
b = 0.25 (blue), b = 0.125 (red), and b = 0.05 (cyan).
As b ↓ 0, the convergence of the free boundary to x? can, in fact, be proved formally
upon showing that x0 and x∞ converge to x?. To stress the dependency on b, we shall
write x0(b) and x∞(b).
Proposition 2.5.7. We have x∞(b)→ x? and x0(b)→ x? as b ↓ 0.
Proof. For σ > 0 and a, b ∈ R, consider the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
1
2
σ2u′′(x) + (a− bx)u′(x)− ρu(x) = 0, x ∈ R, (2.93)
and let ψ(x; b) denote its increasing fundamental solution, where we have stressed the
dependency on the parameter b. We reduce (2.93) to an ODE of first order, that is,
upon setting u˜1 = u and u˜2 = u
′,
(u˜1, u˜2)
′(x) =
(
u˜2(x),−2(a− bx)
σ2
u˜2(x) +
2ρ
σ2
u˜1(x)
)
= G(b, x, u˜1(x), u˜2(x)),
where G : R4 7→ R2 is such that
G(b, x, y, z) =
(
z,−2(a− bx)
σ2
z +
2ρ
σ2
y
)
.
Clearly, the function G is continuously differentiable. Therefore, following, for example,
Section 1.1 in [44], we obtain that ψ(x; ·) is continuous at b = 0 for all x ∈ R. This
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result, together with the fact that ψ(x; 0) = enx where n = − a
σ2
+
√(
a
σ2
)2
+ 2 ρ
σ2
(cf.
(2.32)), yields ψ′(x; b)/ψ(x; b) → n and ψ′′(x; b)/ψ′(x; b) → n as b ↓ 0, which in turn
implies that x∞(b), x0(b)→ x? as b ↓ 0 (cf. (2.34) and Lemma 2.4.3).
2.6 Conclusions
We have considered a price-maker company that extracts an exhaustible commodity
from a reservoir, and sells it in the spot market. While extracting the commodity,
the company's actions have an impact on the commodity's spot price. Then, the
problem of maximizing the total expected profits from selling the commodity, net
of the total expected proportional costs of extraction, has been modeled as a two-
dimensional degenerate singular stochastic control problem with finite fuel which we
have solved explicitly. Finally, a theoretical and numerical analysis of the dependency
of the optimal extraction strategy and of the value function on the model's parameters
is provided. It is then complemented with an economical interpretation.
When the (uncontrolled) price is a drifted Brownian motion, it is optimal to ex-
tract whenever the current price level exceeds an endogenously determined constant
threshold. When the (uncontrolled) price evolves as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process,
the optimal extraction rule is triggered by a curve which depends on the current level
of the reservoir. This curve is a strictly decreasing function for which we have been
able to provide an explicit expression. A related optimal stopping problem has given
some quantitative explanations why the threshold is independent on the level of the
reservoir in both the drifted Brownian motion case and a setting without price impact.
This work could be extended in many ways that are of interest. Regarding, for
example, the extraction application, it would be natural to consider the costs as a
function of the level of the reservoir that increases, possible to infinity, when the reser-
voir gets empty. The tools, we have employed in this chapter, cannot be used for such
a mathematical formulation because one cannot apply the chain rule any more to find
an explicit formula for F ′ (cf. derivation after Lemma 2.4.3). Instead, one obtains a
proper ordinary differential equation for F , and then, the subsequent analysis aiming
at verifying the optimality of the constructed problem's solution becomes much more
involved.
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Chapter 3
Universal Bounds and Monotonicity
Properties of Ratios of Hermite and
Parabolic Cylinder Functions1
3.1 Introduction
Consider the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
u′′(x)− 2xu′(x) + 2νu(x) = 0, ν < 0, x ∈ R. (3.1)
Following Section 10.2 in [87], the solutions to (3.1) are called Hermite functions and
denoted by Hν . They are closely connected to parabolic cylinder functions. In fact, let-
ting Γ be the Euler's Gamma function, the parabolic cylinder function Dν , introduced
in [131], admits the representation (cf. Section 8.3 in [54])
Dν(x) :=
e−
x2
4
Γ(−ν)
∫ ∞
0
t−ν−1e−
t2
2
−xtdt, x ∈ R, (3.2)
and satisfies
Dν(x) = 2
− ν
2 e−
x2
4 Hν
(
x√
2
)
, x ∈ R. (3.3)
In this chapter, we study properties of the ratio Rν : R 7→ R, where
Rν(x) := (Hν−1(x))
2
Hν(x)Hν−2(x)
, x ∈ R, (3.4)
1This chapter (excluding Conclusions 3.3) has been first published in Proc. Amer. Math. Soc.,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/proc/14896 (January 2020), published by the American Mathematical
Society, c© American Mathematical Society.
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and thanks to (3.3), our results carry over to the ratio of Dν as well. In particular, we
show that Rν is strictly decreasing, and we derive its best possible upper and lower
bounds.
The ratio (3.4) is closely related to the so-called Turán types inequalities. Those
inequalities have been discovered in 1941 by P. Turán (published in 1950, see [126]) for
Legendre Polynomials Pn, n ∈ N, and for those functions they read as
Pn−1(x)Pn+1(x)− P 2n(x) < 0, for all x ∈ (−1, 1). (3.5)
Notice that the validity of (3.5) was first proved by G. Szegö in 1948 (see [123]).
Since then, inequalities of this form have attracted a lot of attention, and have been
proved to be valid for other polynomials such as Hermite (obtained from Hermite
functions by taking ν ∈ N), Jacobi, Laguerre or ultraspherical polynomials (see [67,
123], among others), and for special functions as (modified) Bessel, Gamma, parabolic
cylinder or hypergeometric functions (see [10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 125], among many others).
Applications of Turán type inequalities can be found in many fields, ranging from
biophysics (see [14] and the references therein) to information theory (see [94]) and
stochastic control (see [22, 60]).
Properties of ratios of special functions as in (3.4) have also gained interest in recent
years. In [120], conjectures about the monotonicity of a ratio associated to exponential
series sections are formulated. Those conjectures are then proved in [95, 96] for classical
Kummer and Gauss hypergeometric functions, as well as for the so-called q-Kummer
confluent hypergeometric and q-hypergeometric functions. Moreover, the monotonicity
of a ratio like (3.4) associated to Bessel and modified Bessel functions have been studied
by [121], and used for the proofs of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 3.1 in [15]. Our focus on
(3.4) is motivated by an optimal liquidation problem in a financial market (see Remark
6.8 in [22]). Lower and upper bounds for Rν have already been derived by [119], but
we are able to show that our bounds are the best possible ones, and this leads to a
discrepancy between the results in [119] and ours (see Remark 3.2.4).
In all the aforementioned references on Turán type inequalities (see [10, 15, 16, 17,
18, 67, 95, 96, 123, 125, 126]), the authors use purely analytic approaches to prove
their results. Instead, in the next section, we follow a completely different approach
that uses probabilistic arguments, and leads to a simple and short proof of our results.
In particular, we exploit the relation of Hermite functions to the eigenfunctions of the
infinitesimal generator of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Conclusions are then drawn
in Section 3.3.
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3.2 Monotonicity of Ratios of Hermite Functions
We use the link between the well known results on Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes (pre-
sented in Appendix A) and the Hermite functions in order to study the monotonicity
of the ratio Rν from (3.4).
Theorem 3.2.1. For all ν < 0, the function Rν as in (3.4) is strictly decreasing.
Proof. To prove the claim, we adopt the setting from Appendix A with µ ∈ R, σ > 0
and κ = 1. In light of (3.3) and (A.5), we can identify the positive strictly increasing
eigenvector of L = 1
2
σ2 ∂
2
∂x2
+ (µ− x) ∂
∂x
corresponding to the eigenvalue −ν with
ψ(x) = Hν
(
µ− x
σ
)
, x ∈ R. (3.6)
We now complete the proof in two steps. First, Step 1 proves that the function Ψ :
R 7→ R such that
Ψ(x) :=
ψ′(x)2
ψ(x)ψ′′(x)
, x ∈ R,
is strictly increasing. Then, Step 2 makes the conclusion for Rν .
Step 1. Let x, y ∈ R be such that y > x, and, given the filtered probability space
(Ω,F ,F := (Ft)t≥0,P) as in Appendix A, recall Xx that evolves according to the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics as in (A.1) with κ = 1. Define the first hitting time of
Xx at level y by
τy := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ y}, P-a.s.
Direct calculations on (3.6) and the identity (cf., e.g., equation (10.4.4) in [87])
H ′ν(x) = 2νHν−1(x), x ∈ R, ν < 0, (3.7)
show that the k-th derivative of ψ, denoted by ψ(k), is a strictly increasing positive so-
lution to (L+ (ν − k))ψ(k) = 0. Now, since ψ(k) ∈ C2(R) for any k ∈ N0, Itô's formula
(together with a standard localization argument) yields, after taking expectations,
E
[
e(ν−k)τyψ(k)
(
Xxτy
)]
= ψ(k)(x),
and hence
E
[
e(ν−k)τy
]
=
ψ(k)(x)
ψ(k)(y)
, (3.8)
since τy < ∞ P-a.s. as Xx is positively recurrent (cf. Appendix 1.24 in [31]). Now,
Hölder's inequality yields
E [eντy ]
1
2 E
[
e(ν−2)τy
] 1
2 > E
[
e(ν−1)τy
]
, (3.9)
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which is strict since the function f(z) := eνz is not a multiple of the function g(z) :=
e(ν−2)z, and the random variable τy has a distribution which is absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure on R+. From both (3.8) with k = 0, 1, 2 and
(3.9), we find
Ψ(y) > Ψ(x).
Since y > x were arbitrary, we have that x 7→ Ψ(x) is strictly increasing.
Step 2. Exploiting the identities (3.6) and (3.7), we find that for any x ∈ R
Ψ(x) =
ν
ν − 1Rν
(
µ− x
σ
)
.
Therefore, because ν < 0, we conclude by Step 1 that the function Rν is strictly
decreasing.
The following corollary gives the best possible bounds for Rν . These in turn imply
the Turán type inequality.
Corollary 3.2.2. For all ν < 0, the function Rν as in (3.4) is such that
1 < Rν(x) < ν − 1
ν
, for all x ∈ R. (3.10)
In particular, the following Turán-type inequality holds:
Hν−1(x)2 −Hν(x)Hν−2(x) > 0, x ∈ R.
Proof. Equations (10.6.4) and (10.6.7) in [87] provide the asymptotic behavior of Hν(x)
for both (large) positive and (large) negative values of x. In particular, it holds that
lim
x↓−∞
Rν(x) = ν − 1
ν
, lim
x↑+∞
Rν(x) = 1.
Thus, (3.10) follows from the strict monotonicity of x 7→ Rν(x) proved in Theorem
3.2.1.
Since, by (3.3), we have Rν
(
x√
2
)
= Dν−1(x)
2
Dν(x)Dν−2(x)
for any x ∈ R, the next proposition
easily follows from Theorem 3.2.1 and Corollary 3.2.2.
Proposition 3.2.3. For all ν < 0, the function R˜ν : R 7→ R defined as
R˜ν (x) := Dν−1(x)
2
Dν(x)Dν−2(x)
, x ∈ R,
is strictly decreasing. Moreover, it holds
1 < R˜ν(x) < ν − 1
ν
, for all x ∈ R.
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Remark 3.2.4. It is worth mentioning that lower and upper bounds of the function
R˜ν associated to the parabolic cylinder function U−ν− 1
2
(x) = Dν(x) (see (19.3.1) in [1])
have also been derived in [119]. In that paper, the right-hand side of equation (28) (see
also Remark 1 in [18]) yields an upper bound for R˜ν which is strictly less than the one
we have obtained in Proposition 3.2.3. Given that our upper bound is optimal by the
proved strict monotonicity of R˜ν, it seems that there is something fishy in equation (28)
of [119]. Also, a simple numerical analysis seems to contradict the upper bound found
in [119], cf. Figure 3.1 that has been obtained with MATLAB for the case ν = −1.5.
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Figure 3.1: A drawing of the function x 7→ R˜−1.5(x) = U2(x)2U1(x)U3(x) (blue line). The red
line gives the upper bound for R˜−1.5 found in equation (28) of [119], that is
√
3.5
1.5
≈ 1.53.
3.3 Conclusions
We have obtained so far unproved properties of a ratio involving a class of Hermite
and parabolic cylinder functions. Those ratios are strictly decreasing and bounded
by universal constants. Differently to usual analytic approaches, we have employed
simple purely probabilistic arguments to derive our results. In particular, we have
exploited the relation between Hermite functions (parabolic cylinder functions) and
the increasing eigenfunctions of the infinitesimal generator of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process. As a byproduct, we have obtained Turán type inequalities.
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The results of this chapter can be of interest in several fields. For instance, the
ratio, studied here, appears in some problems of stochastic control when dealing with
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, and its properties are needed when proving the opti-
mality of a so-called candidate strategy (see, for example, Remark 6.8 in [22], or the
proof of Lemma C.2.1 (in Appendix C) that is exploited in Chapter 4 of this thesis).
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Chapter 4
Optimal Installation of Solar Panels
with Price Impact: a Solvable
Singular Stochastic Control Problem
4.1 Introduction
We consider a price-maker company which generates electricity and sells it in the
spot market. The company can increase its level of installed power by irreversible
installations of solar panels. In absence of the company's economic activities, the
spot electricity price evolves as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, and therefore it has
a mean-reverting behavior. The current level of the company's installed power has a
permanent impact on the electricity price and affects its mean-reversion level. The
company aims at maximizing the total expected profits from selling electricity in the
market, net of the total expected proportional costs of installation. This problem is
modeled as a two-dimensional degenerate singular stochastic control problem in which
the installation strategy is identified as the company's control variable. We follow a
guess-and-verify approach to solve the problem. We find that the optimal installation
strategy is triggered by a curve which separates the waiting region, where it is not
optimal to install additional panels, and the installation region, where it is. The curve
depends on the current level of the company's installed power, and is the unique strictly
increasing function which solves a first-order ordinary differential equation (ODE).
Finally, our study is complemented by a numerical analysis of the dependency of the
optimal installation strategy on the underlying parameters.
The present chapter is based on the article [84], and it is organized as follows.
In Section 4.2 we introduce the setting and formulate the problem. In Section 4.3
we provide preliminary results and a Verification Theorem. Then, in Section 4.4 we
derive an expression of the free boundary via an ODE, and an explicit solution is
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constructed. A connection to an optimal stopping problem is studied in Section 4.5.
Finally, Section 4.6 provides a numerical implementation and studies the dependency
of the free boundary with respect to the model parameters. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Model and Problem Formulation
Let (Ω,F ,F := (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space with a filtration F satisfying
the usual conditions, and carrying a standard one-dimensional F-Brownian motion W .
We consider an infinitely-lived company which installs solar panels and sells the
electricity produced by those panels instantaneously in the spot market. In absence of
the company's economic activities, the fundamental electricity price (Xxt )t≥0 evolves
stochastically according to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics1
dXxt = κ
(
µ−Xxt
)
dt+ σdWt, X
x
0 = x > 0, (4.1)
for some constants µ ∈ R and κ, σ > 0.
The level of installed power can be increased at constant proportional cost c ≥ 0
due to the installation costs of solar panels. It is assumed that the firm cannot reduce
the number of solar panels, and thus the installation is irreversible. The current level
of installed power is described by the process (Y y,It )t≥0, which is given by
Y y,It = y + It, (4.2)
where the initial level of installed power is denoted by y ≥ 0, and It is identified as
the company's control variable: it is an F-adapted nonnegative and increasing càdlàg
process I = (It)t≥0, where It represents the total power installed within the interval
[0, t]. In the following, (It)t≥0 is also referred to as the installation strategy. Moreover,
we assume that the level of installed power cannot exceed a given y¯ ∈ [y,∞) since, for
example, only a finite number of solar panels can be installed. The set of admissible
installation strategies is therefore defined as
I y¯(y) := {I : Ω× [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) : (It)t≥0 is F-adapted, t 7→ It is increasing, càdlàg,
with I0− = 0 ≤ It ≤ y¯ − y a.s.}.
We write I y¯(y) in order to stress the dependency on both the initial level of installed
power y and the maximum possible level y¯.
We assume that the current level of electricity production, which is proportional to
Y y,It , affects the electricity market price. In particular, when following an installation
1We do not restrict our attention to positive fundamental prices, since negative electricity prices
can also be observed, for example, in Germany, cf. [99].
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strategy I ∈ I y¯(y), the mean level of the market price X is instantaneously reduced at
time t by βY y,It , for some β > 0, and therefore the spot price X
x,y,I evolves as
dXx,y,It = κ
(
(µ− βY y,It )−Xx,y,It
)
dt+ σdWt, X
x,y,I
0− = x > 0. (4.3)
The company aims at maximizing the total expected profits from selling electricity in
the market, net of the total expected costs of installation. That is, the company aims
at determining
V (x, y) := sup
I∈Iy¯(y)
J (x, y, I), (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯], (4.4)
where for any I ∈ I y¯(y)
J (x, y, I) := E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtXx,y,It
(
αY y,It
)
dt− c
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtdIt
]
, α > 0. (4.5)
In (4.5), the parameter α is the proportional factor between the average electricity
produced in a generic unit of time and the current level of installed power. Thus, the
running gain Xx,y,It (αY
y,I
t ) can be viewed as a weekly-averaged revenue deriving from
solar production.
For the sake of simplicity, we set α = 1 in the following. In fact, the problem
of finding an optimal control I ∈ I y¯(y) in (4.5) does not change for α > 0 upon
introducing a new cost factor c˜ = c
α
.
4.3 A Verification Theorem
The aim of this section is to provide a verification theorem which characterizes the
solution to our problem.
The admissible non-installation strategy is denoted by I0 ≡ 0, and we indicate the
electricity price process implied by I0 by (Xx,yt )t≥0, that is X
x,y
t ≡ Xx,y,I
0
t . Then, the
expected profits of the firm following the non-installation strategy is described by the
function R : R× [0, y¯] 7→ R such that
R(x, y) := J (x, y, I0) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtXx,yt ydt
]
=
xy
ρ+ κ
+
µκy
ρ(ρ+ κ)
− κβy
2
ρ(ρ+ κ)
, (4.6)
The following preliminary result provides a growth condition and a monotonicity prop-
erty of the value function V , and its connection to the function R. The proof of the
proposition can be found in Appendix C.
Proposition 4.3.1. There exist a constant K > 0 such that for all (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯]
one has
|V (x, y)| ≤ K(1 + |x|). (4.7)
Moreover, V (x, y¯) = R(x, y¯), and V is increasing in x.
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In a next step we derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB), a particular partial
differential equation which characterizes the solution to our problem.
For given and fixed y ≥ 0, let Ly be the infinitesimal generator of the diffusion Xx,y
given by the second order differential operator
Lyu(x, y) := 1
2
σ2
∂2
∂x2
u(x, y) + κ
(
(µ− βy)− x
) ∂
∂x
u(x, y), (4.8)
where u(·, y) ∈ C2(R).
The HJB equation, for singular control problems as this one, follows this heuristic
argument. At time zero, the firm has two possible options: either it waits for a short
time period ∆t, in which the firm does not install additional panels and gains running
profits from selling y units of electricity in the market, or it can install solar panels
immediately in order to increase its level of installed power. After each of these actions
the firm behaves optimally. Suppose that the firm follows the first action. Since this
action is not necessarily optimal, it is associated to the inequality
V (x, y) ≥ E
[ ∫ ∆t
0
e−ρsXx,ys yds+ e
−ρ∆tV (Xx,y∆t , y)
]
, (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯). (4.9)
Employing Itô's formula to the last term of the right-hand side of (4.9), dividing by
∆t, and then letting ∆t→ 0, we obtain
LyV (x, y)− ρV (x, y) + xy ≤ 0, (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯).
Now, suppose the firm follows the second option, i.e. to increase its level of installed
power by ε > 0 units and then to continue optimally. This action is associated to
V (x, y) ≥ V (x, y + ε)− cε,
which in turn, by dividing by ε and letting ε ↓ 0, implies
Vy(x, y)− c ≤ 0.
The previous observations suggest that V should identify with an appropriate so-
lution w to the HJB equation
max
{
Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy, wy(x, y)− c
}
= 0, (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯), (4.10)
with boundary condition
w(x, y¯) = R(x, y¯).
With reference to (4.10), we introduce the waiting region
W := {(x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯) : Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy = 0, wy(x, y)− c < 0}, (4.11)
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where we expect it not to be optimal to install additional solar panels, and the instal-
lation region
I := {(x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯) : Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy ≤ 0, wy(x, y)− c = 0}, (4.12)
where we expect it to be.
We move on by proving a Verification Theorem. It shows that an appropriate
solution to the HJB equation (4.10) identifies with the value function, if an admissible
installation strategy exists which keeps the state process (X, Y ) inside the waiting
region W with minimal effort, i.e. the level of installed power is increased only at the
time when (X, Y ) enters the installation region I. Here, we have denoted by W the
closure of W.
Theorem 4.3.2 (Verification Theorem). Suppose there exists a function w : R ×
[0, y¯] 7→ R such that w ∈ C2,1(R× [0, y¯]) solves the HJB equation (4.10) with boundary
condition w(x, y¯) = R(x, y¯), and satisfies the growth condition
|w(x, y)| ≤ K(1 + |x|), (4.13)
for a constant K > 0. Then w ≥ v on R× [0, y¯].
Moreover, suppose that for all initial values (x, y) ∈ R × [0, y¯), there exists a process
I? ∈ I y¯(y) such that
(Xx,y,I
?
t , Y
y,I?
t ) ∈W, for all t ≥ 0, P-a.s., (4.14)
I?t =
∫ t
0−
1{(Xx,y,I?s ,Y y,I?s )∈I}dI
?
s , for all t ≥ 0, P-a.s. (4.15)
Then we have
V (x, y) = w(x, y), (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯],
and I? is optimal; that is, V (x, y) = J (x, y, I?).
Proof. Since we have w(x, y¯) = R(x, y¯) = V (x, y¯) by assumption, we let y < y¯. In a
first step, we prove that w ≥ v on R× [0, y¯), and then in a second step, we show that
w ≤ v on R× [0, y¯) and the optimality of I? satisfying (4.14) and (4.15).
Step 1. Let (x, y) ∈ R × [0, y¯) be given and fixed, and I ∈ I y¯(y). For N > 0 we
set τR,N := τR ∧ N, where τR := inf{s > 0 : Xx,y,Is /∈ (−R,R)}. In the following, we
write ∆Is := Is − Is−, s ≥ 0, and Ic denotes the continuous part of I ∈ I y¯(y). By an
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application of Itô's formula, we have
e−ρτR,Nw(Xx,y,IτR,N , Y
y,I
τR,N
)− w(x, y)
=
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
(
Lyw(Xx,y,Is , Y y,Is )− ρw(Xx,y,Is , Y y,Is )
)
ds+ σ
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρswx(Xx,y,Is , Y
y,I
s )dWs︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:MτR,N
+
∑
0≤s≤τR,N
e−ρs
[
w(Xx,y,Is , Y
y,I
s )− w(Xx,y,Is , Y y,Is− )
]
+
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρswy(Xx,y,Is , Y
y,I
s )dI
c
s ,
(4.16)
upon noticing that t 7→ Xx,y,It is continuous almost surely for any I ∈ I y¯(y). Now, we
find
w(Xx,y,Is , Y
y,I
s )− w(Xx,y,Is , Y y,Is− ) =w(Xx,y,Is , Y y,Is− + ∆Is)− w(Xx,y,Is , Y y,Is− )
=
∫ ∆Is
0
wy(X
x,y,I
s , Y
y,I
s− + u)du,
which substituted back into (4.16) gives the equivalence∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsXx,y,Is Y
y,I
s ds− c
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsdIs
=
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
(
Lyw(Xx,y,Is , Y y,Is )− ρw(Xx,y,Is , Y y,Is ) +Xx,y,Is Y y,Is
)
ds+MτR,N
+
∑
0≤s≤τR,N
e−ρs
∫ ∆Is
0
[
wy(X
x,y,I
s , Y
y,I
s− + u)− c
]
du
+
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρs
[
wy(X
x,y,I
s , Y
y,I
s )− c
]
dIcs + w(x, y)− e−ρτR,Nw(Xx,y,IτR,N , Y y,IτR,N ),
upon adding
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsXx,y,Is Y
y,I
s ds − c
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsdIs on both sides of (4.16). Since w
satisfies (4.10) and (4.13), by taking expectations on both sides of the latter equation,
and using that E[MτR,N ] = 0, we have
E
[ ∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsXx,y,Is Y
y,I
s ds− c
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsdIs
]
≤ w(x, y) +KE
[
e−ρτR,N
(
1 + |Xx,y,IτR,N |
)]
.
(4.17)
In order to apply the dominated convergence theorem in (4.17), we notice on the one
hand that Xx,y,It ≤ Xxt P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0, and therefore that
Xx,y,It = x+
∫ t
0
κ
(
(µ− βY y,It )−Xx,y,Is
)
ds+ σWt
≥ x+
∫ t
0
κ
(
µ−Xxs
)
ds+ σWt − κβy¯t = Xxt − κβy¯t ≥ −|Xxt | − κβy¯t,
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where we have used that Y y,It ≤ y¯ P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0. Also, one clearly has Xx,y,It ≤
Xxt ≤ |Xxt |+ κβy¯t. Hence,
|Xx,y,It | ≤ |Xxt |+ κβy¯t. (4.18)
Now, we find that P-a.s.∣∣∣∣ ∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsXx,y,Is Y
y,I
s ds− c
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsdIs
∣∣∣∣ ≤ y¯ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρs
(
|Xxs |+ κβy¯s
)
ds+ cy¯,
(4.19)
and the first expression on the right-hand side of (4.19) is integrable by Lemma A.1.1
with q = 1. On the other hand, so to take care of the expectation on the right-hand
side of (4.17), we employ again (4.18) to get for some constant C1 > 0
E
[
e−ρτR,N (1 + |Xx,y,IτR,N |)
]
≤ C1E
[
e−ρτR,N (1 + τR,N)
]
+ E
[
e−
ρ
2
τR,N sup
t≥0
e−
ρ
2
t|Xxt |
]
≤ C1E
[
e−ρτR,N (1 + τR,N)
]
+ E
[
e−ρτR,N
] 1
2E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρt(Xxt )
2
] 1
2
,
(4.20)
where we have used Hölder's inequality in the last step. As for the last expectation in
(4.20), observe that by Itô's formula we find
e−ρt(Xxt )
2 ≤ x2 +
∫ t
0
e−ρu
[
ρ(Xxu)
2 + σ2
]
du
+
∫ t
0
2e−ρu|Xxu |(κ(|µ|+ |Xxu |))du+ 2σ sup
t≥0
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρuXxudWu
∣∣∣∣. (4.21)
By an application of the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality (cf. Theorem 3.28 in
[81]), we find that
E
[
sup
t≥0
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρuσXxudWu
∣∣∣] ≤ C2(1 + |x|), (4.22)
for some constant C2 > 0. Then, exploiting Lemma A.1.1, we obtain from (4.21) and
(4.22)
E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρt(Xxt )
2
]
≤ C3(1 + x2), (4.23)
for some constant C3 > 0, and therefore, it follows with (4.20)
lim
N↑∞
lim
R↑∞
E
[
e−ρτR,N (1 + |Xx,y,IτR,N |)
]
= 0. (4.24)
Hence, we can invoke the dominated convergence theorem in order to take limits as
R→∞ and then as N →∞, so to get
J (x, y, I) ≤ w(x, y). (4.25)
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Since I ∈ I y¯(y) is arbitrary, we have
V (x, y) ≤ w(x, y), (4.26)
which yields V ≤ w by arbitrariness of (x, y) in R× [0, y¯).
Step 2. Let I? ∈ I y¯(y) satisfying (4.14) and (4.15), and τ ?R,N := inf{t ≥ 0 :
Xx,y,I
?
t /∈ (−R,R)} ∧ N . Arguing in the same way as in Step 1 all the inequalities
become equalities and we obtain
E
[ ∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsXx,y,I
?
s Y
y,I?
s ds− c
∫ τR,N
0
e−ρsdI?s
]
+ E
[
e−ρτ
?
R,Nw(Xx,y,I
?
τ?R,N
, I?τ?R,N )
]
= w(x, y).
(4.27)
Now, because I? is admissible and upon employing (4.13) and (4.24), we proceed as in
Step 1 , and take limits as R ↑ ∞ and N ↑ ∞ in (4.27), so to find J (x, y, I?) ≥ w(x, y).
Since clearly V (x, y) ≥ J (x, y, I?), then V (x, y) ≥ w(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ R × [0, y¯).
Hence, using (4.26) V = w on R× [0, y¯) and I? is optimal.
4.4 Constructing an Optimal Solution to the Instal-
lation Problem
In this section, we first construct a candidate value function, and a candidate optimal
strategy. Then, we move on by verifying their optimality.
We make the guess that there exists an injective function F : [0, y¯]→ R, called the
free boundary which separates the waiting region W and the installation region I, such
that
W = {(x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯) : x < F (y)}, (4.28)
I = {(x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯) : x ≥ F (y)}. (4.29)
For all (x, y) ∈W, the candidate value function w should satisfy (cf. (4.11))
Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy = 0. (4.30)
Recall (4.6). It is straightforward to check that a particular solution to (4.30) is given
by the function R. Moreover, it is well known that, for y ≥ 0 be given and fixed, the
homogeneous differential equation
Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) = 0, (4.31)
admits two fundamental strictly positive solutions φ( · ; y) and ψ( · ; y) with φ( · ; y)
being strictly decreasing and ψ( · ; y) being strictly increasing. Therefore, our candidate
value function w takes the form
w(x, y) = A(y)ψ(x; y) +B(y)φ(x; y) +R(x, y), (x, y) ∈W, (4.32)
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for some functions A,B : [0, y¯] 7→ R to be found. Notice that φ(x; y) grows to +∞
exponentially fast whenever x ↓ −∞, see Appendix 1 in [31]. In light of both the
linear growth of V (cf. Proposition 4.3.1) and the structure of the waiting region W
(cf. (4.28)), we must have B(y) = 0 for all y ∈ [0, y¯]. Moreover, letting ψ(x) ≡ ψ(x; 0),
we find from Lemma A.1.2-(2) that ψ(k), k ∈ N0, satisfies
σ2
2
ψ(k+2)(x+ βy) + κ
(
(µ− βy)− x)ψ(k+1)(x+ βy)− (ρ+ kκ)ψ(k)(x+ βy) = 0.
(4.33)
Thus, we can identify ψ(x; y) = ψ(x + βy). Given the previous results, we conjecture
that
w(x, y) = A(y)ψ (x+ βy) +R(x, y), for (x, y) ∈W. (4.34)
We move on to derive equations that characterize the function A and the free
boundary F . With reference to (4.12), for all (x, y) ∈ I, w should instead satisfy
wy(x, y)− c = 0, (4.35)
implying
wyx(x, y) = 0. (4.36)
Now, we impose the so-called Smooth Fit condition, i.e. we suppose that w ∈ C2,1(R×
[0, y¯]), and therefore by (4.34),(4.35) and (4.36), we must have for all (x, y) ∈ W ∩ I
(that is, where x = F (y))
A′(y)ψ
(
F (y) + βy
)
+ βA(y)ψ′
(
F (y) + βy
)
+Ry(F (y), y)− c = 0, (4.37)
A′(y)ψ′
(
F (y) + βy
)
+ βA(y)ψ′′
(
F (y) + βy
)
+Ryx(F (y), y) = 0. (4.38)
Notice that the derivatives of R can be easily obtained from (4.6), which gives
Ry(x, y) =
x
ρ+ κ
+
µκ
ρ(ρ+ κ)
− 2κβy
ρ(ρ+ κ)
, and Rxy(x, y) = (ρ+ κ)
−1 .
The following lemma provides essential properties of the function A and a lower
bound for F that are needed for results of Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.4.2. Its proof
can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.4.1. The function A is strictly positive and strictly decreasing. Moreover,
A admits the representation
A(y) = (βρ(ρ+ κ))−1 ×
(ρ+ κ)
(
cρ+ κβ
ρ+κ
y − F (y)
)
ψ′(F (y) + βy) + σ
2
2
ψ′′(F (y) + βy)
ψ′(F (y) + βy)2 − ψ′′(F (y) + βy)ψ(F (y) + βy) ,
(4.39)
and we have
F (y) ≥ cρ+ κβ
ρ+ κ
y ≥ cρ, for all y ∈ [0, y¯]. (4.40)
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4.4.1 The Free Boundary: Existence and Characterization
For the sake of simplicity, we introduce a function F˜ for a substitution, that is, we let
F˜ (y) = F (y) + βy. (4.41)
We aim to prove the existence and a monotonicity property of F˜ , satisfying (4.37) and
(4.38) (with F being replaced according to (4.41)), so to draw the implications for F
after.
We have
Ry(F (y), y) =
ρF (y) + µκ− 2κβy
ρ(ρ+ κ)
=
µκ+ ρF˜ (y)− β(ρ+ 2κ)y
ρ(ρ+ κ)
= R˜(F˜ (y), y),
where R˜ : R2 7→ R is defined as
R˜(x, y) :=
µκ+ ρx− β(ρ+ 2κ)y
ρ(ρ+ κ)
.
Notice that
R˜x(F˜ (y), y) = (ρ+ κ)
−1 = Ryx(F (y), y).
From now on, we will often use the functions Qk : R 7→ R, k ∈ N0, and their first
derivatives, given by
Qk(z) :=ψ
(k)(z)ψ(k+2)(z)− ψ(k+1)(z)2,
Q′k(z) =ψ
(k)(z)ψ(k+3)(z)− ψ(k+1)(z)ψ(k+2)(z).
(4.42)
Substituting F according to (4.41) in both (4.37) and (4.38), and solving for A and A′,
gives
A(y) = β−1 ×
ψ′(F˜ (y))
(
c− R˜(F˜ (y), y)
)
+ (ρ+ κ)−1 ψ(F˜ (y))
−Q0(F˜ (y))
, (4.43)
and
A′(y) =
ψ′′(F˜ (y))
(
c− R˜(F˜ (y), y)
)
+ (ρ+ κ)−1 ψ′(F˜ (y))
Q0(F˜ (y))
. (4.44)
Lemma A.1.2-(3) ensures that Qk is strictly positive for all k ∈ N0, and therefore the
denominator on the right-hand side of both (4.43) and (4.44) is nonzero.
In light of the boundary condition w(x, y¯) = R(x, y¯) (cf. Theorem 4.3.2), we impose
A(y¯) = 0. (4.45)
Due to (4.43) and (4.45), we must have that there exists a point x˜ = F˜ (y¯) ∈ R solving
H(x) = 0, where H : R 7→ R is defined as
H(x) := ψ′(x)
(
c− R˜(x, y¯)
)
+ (ρ+ κ)−1 ψ(x). (4.46)
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Lemma 4.4.2. There exists a unique solution x˜ ∈ R to the equation H(x) = 0.
Proof. We rewrite H(x) := − (ρ+ κ)−1
(
ψ′(x)
(
(ρ+ κ)R˜(x, y¯)− c(ρ+ κ)
)
− ψ(x)
)
.
Now, the proof is a slight modification of the proof of Lemma 2.4.3 in Chapter 2 upon
adjusting the cost factor by c(ρ+ κ)− µκ−β(ρ+2κ)y¯
ρ
.
Differentiating (4.43), we find
A′(y) =(β(ρ+ κ))−1 × P (y, F˜ (y), F˜
′(y))
Q0(F˜ (y))2
, (4.47)
where P : R3 7→ R is given by
P (y, z, w) :=w(ρ+ κ)
(
c− R˜(z, y)
)
ψ(z)
(
ψ′′′(z)ψ′(z)− ψ′′(z)2
)
+
β(ρ+ 2κ)
ρ
ψ′(z)
(
ψ′(z)2 − ψ(z)ψ′′(z)
)
− wψ(z)
(
ψ′(z)ψ′′(z)− ψ(z)ψ′′′(z)
)
=− β(ρ+ 2κ)
ρ
ψ′(z)Q0(z) + wD(y, z),
with D : R2 7→ R defined as
D(y, z)= ψ(z)
[
(ρ+ κ)(c− R˜(z, y))Q1(z) +Q′0(z)
]
. (4.48)
Now, equating both expressions (4.44) and (4.47), we get
P (y, F˜ (y), F˜ ′(y)) = βQ0(F˜ (y))
(
(ρ+ κ)
(
c− R˜(F˜ (y), y)
)
ψ′′(F˜ (y)) + ψ′(F˜ (y))
)
.
(4.49)
Letting N : R2 7→ R be such that
N(y, z) = Q0(z)
(
ρ+ 2κ
ρ
ψ′(z) +
(
(ρ+ κ)
(
c− R˜(z, y)
)
ψ′′(z) + ψ′(z)
))
, (4.50)
we obtain from (4.49) the ODE
F˜ ′(y) = G(y, F˜ (y)), (4.51)
with boundary condition F˜ (y¯) = x˜, cf. Lemma 4.4.2, and where G : (R×R) \ {(y, z) ∈
R2 : D(y, z) = 0} 7→ R is such that
G(y, z) = β × N(y, z)
D(y, z)
. (4.52)
The next goal is to prove that the ODE (4.51) admits a unique solution F˜ on [0, y¯]
such that F˜ ′(y) ≥ β, so to obtain the existence and uniqueness of a strictly increasing
free boundary F on [0, y¯] (cf. (4.41)). As a preliminary result we show that the
monotonicity property holds at y¯, that is G(y¯, x˜) > β.
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Lemma 4.4.3. We have D(y¯, F˜ (y¯)) > 0, and it holds F˜ ′(y¯) > β.
Proof. Recall the function H from (4.46) which is such that H(F˜ (y¯)) = H(x˜) = 0 (cf.
Lemma 4.4.2). Therefore, y¯ satisfies
(ρ+ κ)
(
c− R˜(F˜ (y¯), y¯)
)
= − ψ(F˜ (y¯))
ψ′(F˜ (y¯))
. (4.53)
We get from (4.48) and (4.53) that
D(y¯, F˜ (y¯)) =
Q0(F˜ (y¯))ψ(F˜ (y¯))ψ
′′(F˜ (y¯))
ψ′(F˜ (y¯))
> 0, (4.54)
upon recalling that Q0 > 0. Now, Lemma C.2.1 implies N(y¯, F˜ (y¯))−D(y¯, F˜ (y¯)) > 0.
Hence, we find
F˜ ′(y¯) = G(y¯, F˜ (y¯)) = β × N(y¯, F˜ (y¯))
D(y¯, F˜ (y¯))
> β. (4.55)
Now, we state the main result in this subsection. It guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of a solution F˜ on [0, y¯] of (4.51) which is such that F˜ ′(y) > β for all
y ∈ [0, y¯].
Proposition 4.4.4. There exists a unique solution F˜ on [0, y¯] of the ODE (4.51) with
boundary condition F˜ (y¯) = x˜. Moreover, F˜ ′(y) ≥ β for all y ∈ [0, y¯].
Proof. The proof is organised in two steps: in a first step, we provide a representation
of the function D that is used after. Then, in Step 2, we show the existence and
uniqueness of a strictly increasing maximal solution F˜ of the ODE (4.51), and prove
(by a contradiction) that F˜ in fact exists on the interval [0, y¯].
Step 1. Recall (4.48), and let D˜ : R× R 7→ R be a function which is given by
D˜(y, z) = [(ρ+ κ)ψ(z)Q0(z)]
−1D(y, z). (4.56)
Then, where F˜ exists, we find upon employing (4.43) and (4.44)
D˜(y, F˜ (y)) = −βψ′′′(F˜ (y))A(y)− ψ′′(F˜ (y))A′(y). (4.57)
Now, Lemma A.1.2-(2) gives for any k ∈ N0
σ2
2
ψ(k+2)(x) + κ(µ− x)ψ(k+1)(x)− (ρ+ kκ)ψ(k)(x) = 0, x ∈ R, (4.58)
and therefore we have
ψ(k+2)(F˜ (y)) = −2κ
σ2
(
µ− F˜ (y)
)
ψ(k+1)(F˜ (y)) +
2(ρ+ kκ)
σ2
ψ(k)(F˜ (y)). (4.59)
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Using (4.57) and the latter equation (4.59) with k = 0, 1, we obtain
D˜(y, F˜ (y)) =
2
σ2
[
κ
(
µ− F˜ (y)
) (
βψ′′(F˜ (y))A(y) + ψ′(F˜ (y))A′(y)
)
− ρ(βψ′(F˜ (y))A(y) + ψ(F˜ (y))A′(y))− κβψ′(F˜ (y))A(y)]
=
2
σ2
[
F˜ (y)− cρ− (ρ+ 2κ)β
ρ+ κ
y − κβψ′(F˜ (y))A(y)
]
,
(4.60)
where we have employed (4.37) and (4.38) (with F being replaced according to (4.41))
for the last equality.
Step 2. Recall (4.51) and (4.52). In the following, we denote by DG the domain
of G, that is DG = (R × R) \ {(y, z) ∈ R2 : D(y, z) = 0}. Since ψ(k) is continuously
differentiable for any k ∈ N, the functions N and D are continuously differentiable
respectively. Therefore, G(y, ·) is locally Lipschitz-continuous on its domain DG which
is an open set. Hence, we find that the ODE (4.51) with the boundary condition
F˜ (y¯) = x˜ admits a unique maximal solution F˜ on an interval Imax = (y−, y+) with
y¯ ∈ Imax. Since we want to show the existence and uniqueness of a solution on [0, y¯], it
is enough to prove that y− < 0. Following, for example, Theorem 2.10 in [13], y− < y¯
is such that
(i) either lim
y↓y−
(
||(y, F˜ (y))||
)−1
= 0,
(ii) or lim
y↓y−
inf
w∈∂DG
||(y, F˜ (y))− w|| = 0,
where ∂DG = {(y, z) ∈ R2 : D(y, z) = 0} is the boundary of the domain of G, and || · ||
is a norm in R2.
Now, suppose that y− ≥ 0. Notice that N(y, F˜ (y)) > D(y, F˜ (y)) > 0 for all
y ∈ Imax by Lemma 4.4.3 and Lemma C.2.1, and therefore we have F˜ ′ > β > 0 on
Imax. Adjusting slightly the proof of Lemma 4.4.1, we find that F˜ is bounded from
below on (y−, y¯], and together with its monotonicity property, we must have that
lim
y↓y−
(
||(y, F˜ (y))||
)−1
> K, for some K > 0. Thus, in order to derive a contradiction, it
is left to prove that condition (ii) above is not satisfied, so to show lim
y↓y−
D(y, F˜ (y)) 6= 0.
Again, due to the boundedness of F˜ and the fact that both Q0 and ψ are strictly
positive, we find
ψ(F˜ (y))Q0(F˜ (y)) > K1, for all y ∈ (y−, y¯],
for some K1 > 0. Therefore, upon recalling (4.56), we can complete the proof by
showing that lim
y↓y−
D˜(y, F˜ (y)) 6= 0. Lemma 4.4.3 implies
D˜(y¯, F˜ (y¯)) > 0. (4.61)
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Computing the total derivative of D˜(y, F˜ (y)) with respect to y ∈ Imax, upon using
(4.60), gives
d
dy
D˜(y, F˜ (y)) =
2
σ2
[
F˜ ′(y)
(
1− κβψ′′(F˜ (y))A(y)
)
− (ρ+ 2κ)β
ρ+ κ
− κβψ′(F˜ (y))A′(y)
]
=
2
σ2
(
F˜ ′(y)− β
)(
1− κβψ′′(F˜ (y))A(y)
)
,
(4.62)
where the last equality holds by an application of (4.38) (again, with F being re-
placed according to (4.41)). Next, we write the last coefficient in (4.62), that is
1− κβψ′′(F˜ (y))A(y), as a function of G : R× R 7→ R defined as
G(y, z) = ((ρ+ κ)Q0(z))
−1
×
[
(ρ+ 2κ)ψ(z)ψ′′(z)− (ρ+ κ)ψ′(z)2 + κ(ρ+ κ)
(
c− R˜(z, y)
)
ψ′(z)ψ′′(z)
]
.
Employing (4.43), we get 1− κβψ′′(F˜ (y))A(y) = G(y, F˜ (y)), and thus we have
d
dy
D˜(y, F˜ (y)) =
2
σ2
(
F˜ ′(y)− β
)
G(y, F˜ (y)). (4.63)
Now, let (y?, z?) ∈ R × R be such that D˜(y?, z?) = 0. We find from (4.56) that
D(y?, z?) = 0. Hence, upon recalling (4.48), it holds
(ρ+ κ)
(
c− R˜(z?, y?)
)
= −Q
′
0(z
?)
Q1(z?)
. (4.64)
Then, exploiting (4.64), we obtain
G(y?, z?) =
(
(ρ+ κ)Q0(z
?)Q1(z
?)
)−1
×
[
(ρ+ κ)ψ(z?)ψ′(z?)ψ′′(z?)ψ′′′(z?)
− (ρ+ 2κ)ψ(z?)ψ′′(z?)3 + (ρ+ 2κ)ψ′(z?)2ψ′′(z?)2 − (ρ+ κ)ψ′(z?)3ψ′′′(z?)
]
=− σ
2
2
(
(ρ+ κ)Q1(z
?)
)−1
Q2(z
?) < 0.
(4.65)
In (4.65) we have used: (4.58) with k = 0, 1, 2 for the last equality, and the fact that
Q1 and Q2 are strictly positive for the strict inequality.
Recalling that F˜ ′ − β > 0 on Imax, we conclude from (4.61), (4.63) and (4.65) that
D˜(y, F˜ (y)) cannot tend to zero as y ↓ y−. This completes the proof.
Corollary 4.4.5. The free boundary F as in (4.28) and (4.29) is well defined. More-
over, it is strictly increasing and given by
F (y) = F˜ (y)− βy, for all y ∈ [0, y¯].
Proof. The existence and uniqueness is an implication of Proposition 4.4.4. It also
ensures that F ′(y) = F˜ ′(y)− β > 0 for all y ∈ [0, y¯].
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4.4.2 The Optimal Strategy and the Value Function: Verifica-
tion
In the following, the initial price level at which the company starts to install solar
panels is denoted by x0 := F (0), and we define x¯ := F (y¯) = x˜− βy¯ (cf. (4.41)). Since
F is strictly increasing, its inverse function exists on [x0, x¯] and is denoted by F
−1.
We divide the (candidate) installation region I into
I1 := {(x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯) : x ∈ [F (y), x¯)},
and
I2 := {(x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯) : x ≥ x¯}.
An optimal installation strategy can be described as follows: in W (cf. (4.28)), that
is, when the current price x is sufficiently low such that x < F (y), the company does
not increase the level of installed power. Whenever the price crosses F (y), then the
company makes infinitesimal installations so to keep the state process (X, Y ) insideW.
Conversely, if the current price x is sufficiently large such that x ≥ F (y) (i.e. in I, cf.
(4.29)), then the company makes an instantaneous lump sum installation. In particular,
on the one hand, whenever the maximum level of installed power y¯, that the firm is
able to reach, is sufficiently high (that is (x, y) ∈ I1), then the company pushes the
state process (X, Y ) immediately to the locus of points {(x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯] : x = F (y)}
in direction (0, 1), so to increase the level of installed power by F−1(x) − y units.
The associated payoff to this action is then the difference of the continuation value
starting from the new state (x, F−1(x)) and the costs associated to the installation
of additional solar panels, that is c(F−1(x) − y). On the other hand, whenever the
firm has to restrict its actions due to the upper bound y¯ (that is (x, y) ∈ I2), then
the company immediately installs the maximum number of panels, so to increase the
level of installed power up to y¯ units, and the associated payoff to such a strategy is
R(x, y¯)− c(y¯ − y).
In light of the previous discussion, we now define our candidate value function
w : R× [0, y¯] 7→ R as
w(x, y) =

A(y)ψ
(
x+ βy
)
+R(x, y), if x ∈W ∪ ((−∞, x¯)× {y¯}) ,
A(F−1(x))ψ
(
x+ βF−1(x)
)
+R(x, F−1(x))− c(F−1(x)− y), if (x, y) ∈ I1,
R(x, y¯)− c(y¯ − y), if (x, y) ∈ I2 ∪ ([x¯,∞)× {y¯}) .
(4.66)
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The next two results verify that w is a classical solution to the HJB equation (4.10).
Lemma 4.4.6. The function w is C2,1(R× [0, y¯]).
Proof. In the following, we denote by Int(·) the interior of a set. Clearly, by (4.66) it
holds for all (x, y) ∈ Int(W) that
wx(x, y) = A(y)ψ
′(x+ βy) +Rx(x, y), (4.67)
wxx(x, y) = A(y)ψ
′′(x+ βy), (4.68)
wy(x, y) = A
′(y)ψ(x+ βy) + βA(y)ψ′(x+ βy) +Ry(x, y), (4.69)
and moreover,
wx(x, y) = Rx(x, y¯), wxx(x, y) = 0, wy(x, y) = c, for all (x, y) ∈ Int(I2). (4.70)
To evaluate wx, wxx and wy inside I1, we need some more work. We find for all (x, y) ∈
Int(I1)
wx(x, y) =A(F
−1(x))ψ′
(
x+ βF−1(x)
)
+Rx
(
x, F−1(x)
)
+ (F−1)′(x)
[
A′
(
F−1(x)
)
ψ
(
x+ βF−1(x)
)
+ βA
(
F−1(x)
)
ψ′
(
x+ βF−1(x)
)
+Ry
(
x, F−1(x)
)− c],
=A(F−1(x))ψ′
(
x+ βF−1(x)
)
+Rx
(
x, F−1(x)
)
,
(4.71)
wxx(x, y) =A(F
−1(x))ψ′′(x+ βF−1(x)) + (F−1)′(x)
[
A′(F−1(x))ψ′
(
x+ βF−1(x)
)
+ βA(F−1(x))ψ′′
(
x+ βF−1(x)
)
+Ryx(x, F
−1(x))
]
=A(F−1(x))ψ′′(x+ βF−1(x)),
(4.72)
wy(x, y) =c, (4.73)
where we have used (4.37) in (4.71), and (4.38) in (4.72). Notice that the functions
A, F−1, ψ, ψ′, Ry and Rx are continuous. The previous equations and (4.37) easily
provide the continuity of the derivatives on R × {y¯}. Letting (xn, yn)n ⊂ I1 be any
sequence converging to (F (y), y), y ∈ [0, y¯), we find the required continuity results
alongW∩ I1 upon employing (4.37). Moreover, (4.45) ensures the continuity of wx and
wxx along I1 ∩ I2, and we clearly have the continuity of wy along I1 ∩ I2.
Proposition 4.4.7. The function w from (4.66) is a C2,1(R× [0, y¯]) solution to
max
{
Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy, wy(x, y)− c
}
= 0, for all (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯),
(4.74)
such that w(x, y¯) = R(x, y¯).
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Proof. Lemma 4.4.6 guarantees the claimed regularity of w. Moreover, from (4.66)
we see that w(x, y¯) = R(x, y¯) since A(y¯) = 0, and by construction, we clearly have
Lyw(x, y) − ρw(x, y) + xy = 0 for all (x, y) ∈ W, and wy(x, y) − c = 0 for all (x, y) ∈
I1 ∪ I2. We prove the inequalities Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy ≤ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ I, and
wy(x, y)− c ≤ 0 for all (x, y) ∈W, in the following three steps separately. It is worth
to bear in mind that Rx(x, y) =
y
ρ+κ
by (4.6).
Step 1. Let (x, y) ∈ I1 be fixed. From the second line of (4.66), (4.71) and (4.72),
we find
Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy
=LF−1(x)w(x, F−1(x))− ρw(x, F−1(x)) + xF−1(x)
+ κβwx(x, F
−1(x))(F−1(x)− y) + (cρ− x)(F−1(x)− y)
=(F−1(x)− y) (cρ+ κβwx(x, F−1(x))− x) ,
(4.75)
where we have employed that w(x, F−1(x)) solves
LF−1(x)w(x, F−1(x))− ρw(x, F−1(x)) + xF−1(x) = 0.
For any (x, y) ∈ I1, we have x ≥ F (y) implying F−1(x) ≥ y because F , and hence
F−1, is strictly increasing (cf. Corollary 4.4.5). Thus, in order to show that (4.75) is
negative on I1, it suffices to prove that the function
Z(x, F−1(x)) := cρ+ κβwx(x, F−1(x))− x, (4.76)
is negative for any x ∈ [x0, x¯]. Due to the regularity of w, we can use (4.71), and the
fact that A(F−1(x¯)) = A(y¯) = 0, to obtain
Z(x¯, F−1(x¯)) = cρ+Rx(x¯, y¯)− x¯ < 0, (4.77)
where the inequality holds by (4.40) with y = y¯. Taking the total derivative of
Z(x, F−1(x)) with respect to x gives
dZ(x, F−1(x))
dx
=κβwxx(x, F
−1(x))− 1 = κβA(F−1(x))ψ′′(x+ βF−1(x))− 1
=
[
ρ
(
ψ(x+ βF−1(x))ψ′′(x+ βF−1(x))− ψ′(x+ βF−1(x))2)]−1
×
[
ρ
(
ψ′(x+ βF−1(x))2 − ψ(x+ βF−1(x))ψ′′(x+ βF−1(x)))
− κψ′(x+ βF−1(x))ψ′′(x+ βF−1(x))
(
cρ+
κβ
ρ+ κ
F−1(x)− x
)
− σ
2
2
κψ′′(x+ βF−1(x))2Rxy(x, F−1(x))
]
,
(4.78)
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where we have employed: wxy(x, F
−1(x)) = 0, cf. (4.36), for the first equality, and
(4.39) for the last equality (after rearranging terms). Now, suppose that there exists a
point x? ∈ [x0, x¯) such that Z(x?, F−1(x?)) = 0. It follows from (4.76), together with
(4.39) and (4.71), that (x?, F−1(x?)) satisfies
cρ+
κβ
ρ+ κ
F−1(x?)− x?
=
−σ2
2
κψ′(x? + βF−1(x?))ψ′′(x? + βF−1(x?))Rxy(x?, F−1(x?))
(ρ+ κ)ψ′(x? + βF−1(x?))2 − ρψ(x? + βF−1(x?))ψ′′(x? + βF−1(x?)) .
(4.79)
Then, exploiting the latter, one can find with (4.78) that
dZ(x, F−1(x))
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=x?
=
σ2
2
Q1(x
? + βF−1(x?))−1Q2(x? + βF−1(x?)) > 0, (4.80)
after using (4.33) with k = 0, 1, 2, and some simple algebra. We conclude from both
(4.77) and (4.80) that there cannot exist a point x? ∈ [x0, x¯) such that Z(x?, F−1(x?)) =
0. Therefore, we have Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy ≤ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ I1.
Step 2. For all (x, y) ∈ I2 we find from the third line of (4.66) and (4.70)
Lyw(x, y)− ρw(x, y) + xy
= Ly¯R(x, y¯)− ρR(x, y¯) + xy¯ + κβRx(x, y¯)(y¯ − y) + (cρ− x)(y¯ − y)
= (y¯ − y)
(
κβ
ρ+ κ
y¯ + cρ− x
)
≤ (y¯ − y)
(
κβ
ρ+ κ
y¯ + cρ− x¯
)
≤ 0,
where we have used that R(x, y¯) solves (Ly¯−ρ)R(x, y¯)+xy¯ = 0 for the second equality,
x ≥ x¯ for any (x, y) ∈ I2 for the first inequality, and (4.40) with y = y¯ and F (y¯) = x¯
for the last inequality.
Step 3. Let (x, y) ∈W be fixed. We define
S(x, y) := wy(x, y)− c = A′(y)ψ(x+ βy) + βA(y)ψ′(x+ βy) +Ry(x, y)− c,
where the last equality holds true by (4.69). We clearly have S(F (y), y) = 0 from
(4.37). Hence, it suffices to show that Sx(x, y) ≥ 0 because x < F (y) for all (x, y) ∈W.
Computing the derivative of S with respect to x gives
Sx(x, y) = A
′(y)ψ′(x+ βy) + βA(y)ψ′′(x+ βy) +Rxy(x, y),
and from (4.38) we observe that Sx(F (y), y) = 0. Moreover, we have
Sxx(x, y) = A
′(y)ψ′′(x+ βy) + βA(y)ψ′′′(x+ βy). (4.81)
Recall (4.41) and (4.48). Lemma 4.4.3 and Proposition 4.4.4 imply that
D(y, F (y) + βy) > 0, for all y ∈ [0, y¯]. (4.82)
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Now, exploiting (4.43) and (4.44), we find
Sxx(F (y), y)
= − [(ρ+ κ)ψ(F (y) + βy)Q0(F (y) + βy)]−1D(y, F (y) + βy) < 0, for all y ∈ [0, y¯],
(4.83)
where the inequality is due to (4.82) and the fact that Q0 is (strictly) positive. Since
ψ′′′(·)
ψ′′(·) is increasing by Lemma A.1.2-(3), and A(y) is positive for all y ∈ [0, y¯] by Lemma
4.4.1, we have for all x ≤ F (y)
A′(y) +
ψ′′′(x+ βy)
ψ′′(x+ βy)
βA(y) < A′(y) +
ψ′′′(F (y) + βy)
ψ′′(F (y) + βy)
βA(y) < 0,
where we have employed both (4.81) and (4.83) for the last inequality. Thus, we have
Sxx(x, y) < 0, and therefore Sx(x, y) > 0 for all (x, y) ∈ W. This completes the
proof.
We conclude that w identifies with the value function.
Theorem 4.4.8. Recall w from (4.66), and let ∆ := (y¯ − y)1{x≥x¯} + (F−1(x) −
y)1{x¯>x>F (y)}. The function w identifies with the value function V from (4.4), and
the optimal installation strategy, denoted by I?, is given by
I?0− = 0,
I?t =
∆ +Kt, t ∈ [0, τ),∆ +Kτ , t ≥ τ,
(4.84)
where τ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Kt = y¯ − (y + ∆)}, and where (X,K) is the unique F-adapted
process on [0, τ ] with increasing K and starting point (X0, K0) = (x, 0) such that
Xt ≤ F (y + ∆ +Kt),
dXt = κ
(
(µ− β(y + ∆ +Kt))−Xt
)
dt+ σdWt,
dKt = 1{Xt=F (y+∆+Kt)}dKt.
(4.85)
Proof. To prove the claim, we aim at applying Theorem 4.3.2. We already know that
w ∈ C2,1(R × [0, y¯]) is a solution to the HJB equation (4.10) by Proposition 4.4.7.
Moreover, the function w satisfies the growth condition in (4.13) upon exploiting the
facts that A is continuous, ψ is continuous and increasing, and |R(x, y)| ≤ K(1 + |x|)
for any y ∈ [0, y¯] and some constant K > 0.
In a next step, we show the existence of (X,K) satisfying the stochastic differential
equation (4.85). To do so, we borrow ideas from [42], cf. Section 5 therein. We let
(Ω, F˜ , (F˜t)t≥0,Q) be a filtered probability space with a filtration (F˜t)t≥0 satisfying the
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usual conditions, and let B be a (F˜t)t≥0-Brownian motion under Q. Define the process
(X,K) such that
dXt = κ
(
(µ− β(y + ∆))−Xt
)
dt+ σdBt, (4.86)
Kt = min
{
sup
0≤s≤t
{F¯−1(Xs)}, y¯ − (y + ∆)
}
, (4.87)
with starting point (X0, K0) = (x, 0), and where F¯
−1 is such that
F¯−1(x) :=

0, if x < x0,
F−1(x), if x ∈ [x0, x¯],
y¯, if x > x¯.
(4.88)
Notice that the pair (X,K) satisfies
Xt ≤ F (y + ∆ +Kt),
dKt = 1{Xt=F (y+∆+Kt)}dKt,
for any t ≤ τ . Since K is increasing and Kt ≤ y¯ − (y + ∆) for any t ≤ τ , we apply
Girsanov's Theorem (cf. Section 3.5 in [81]), so to obtain an equivalent probability
measure P with respect to Q such that for any T > 0
dP
dQ
∣∣∣∣
FBT
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
κβ
σ
KsdBs − 1
2
∫ T
0
(
κβ
σ
Ks
)2
ds
)
,
and
Wt = Bt +
∫ t
0
κβ
σ
Ksds,
is a standard Brownian motion on (Ω,FB, (FBt)t≥0,P), where (FBt)t≥0 is the σ-algebra
generated by B, and FB = FB∞. The pair (X,K) constructed in this way is a weak
solution to (4.85). We will prove in the following that (X,K) is pathwise unique, hence
a strong solution. Recall (4.41). We obtain
0 <
(
F−1
)′
(x) ≤ max
x0≤x′≤x¯
β−1
D(F−1(x′), x′)
N(F−1(x′), x′)−D(F−1(x′), x′) , for all x ∈ [x0, x¯],
where the first inequality is due to the monotonicity of F−1 and the last inequality is
due to (4.51) and (4.52). The continuity of the functions N and D, and the fact that
N(F−1(x), x)−D(F−1(x), x) > 0, for all x ∈ [x0, x¯],
which is due to Lemma 4.4.3, Proposition 4.4.4 and Lemma C.2.1, imply (F−1)′ (x) <
∞ for all x ∈ [x0, x¯]. The previous results show that F¯−1 is (globally) Lipschitz
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continuous. Now, fix ω ∈ Ω, and let (X˜, K˜) and (Xˆ, Kˆ) be two solutions of (4.85).
The (global) Lipschitz continuity of F¯−1 and the second line of (4.85) imply∣∣∣K˜t − Kˆt∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ sup
0≤s≤t
{
F−1(X˜s)− (y¯ − (y + ∆))
}+ − sup
0≤s≤t
{
F−1(Xˆs)− (y¯ − (y + ∆))
}+∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
0≤s≤t
{ ∣∣∣F−1(X˜s)− F−1(Xˆs)∣∣∣ }
≤ sup
0≤s≤t
K¯
∣∣∣X˜s − Xˆs∣∣∣ ≤ C0 ∫ t
0
∣∣∣X˜s − Xˆs∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣K˜s − Kˆs∣∣∣ ds,
(4.89)
for some constant C0 > 0. Then, again with the second line of (4.85) and (4.89), we
find for some constant C1 > 0 the estimate
0 ≤
∥∥∥(X˜t − Xˆt, K˜t − Kˆt)∥∥∥ ≤ C1 ∫ t
0
∣∣∣X˜s − Xˆs∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣K˜s − Kˆs∣∣∣ ds, (4.90)
where || · || denotes the euclidean norm in R2. Now, Grönwall's inequality yields∥∥∥(X˜t − Xˆt, K˜t − Kˆt)∥∥∥ ≤ 0, (4.91)
upon recalling that t 7→ Xt is continuous for any solution of (4.85). Thus, by (4.91),
pathwise uniqueness holds, and (4.85) admits a unique strong solution.
Finally, since I? from (4.84) satisfies (4.14) and (4.15), we conclude that w identifies
with V , and I? is an optimal installation strategy by Theorem 4.3.2.
4.5 A Related Optimal Stopping Problem
In this section, we provide an optimal stopping problem which is related to our optimal
control problem. In particular, we show that the function u := −Vy identifies with the
value function of an optimal stopping problem. For the subsequent analysis recall that
(Xx,yt )t≥0 denotes the electricity price when the company follows the non-installation
strategy I0.
Proposition 4.5.1. The function u : R× [0, y¯) 7→ R defined by
u(x, y) := −Vy(x, y),
admits the probabilistic representation
u(x, y) = sup
τ≥0
E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−ρt (κβVx(X
x,y
t , y)−Xx,yt ) dt− ce−ρτ
]
, (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯),
(4.92)
103
Optimal Installation of Solar Panels with Price Impact
where the optimization is taken over the set of F-stopping times. Moreover, with F as
derived in Section 4.4.1, we have that
τ ?(x; y) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xx,yt ≥ F (y)}, (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯),
is optimal in (4.92).
Proof. Let y ∈ [0, y¯) be given and fixed. Notice that u(·, y) ∈ C1(R) by construction
(cf. (4.37) and (4.38)). Direct calculations on (4.66) show that uxx(·, y) ∈ L∞loc(R).
Now, we show in Step 1 that u(·, y) solves the HJB equation
max
{
Lyw(x)− ρw(x) + κβVx(x, y)− x, −c− w(x)
}
= 0, a.e. x ∈ R, (4.93)
and then, in Step 2, we draw the conclusions.
Step 1. Recall the waiting region W and the installation region I, and let x ∈ R be
such that (x, y) ∈W. Employing (4.69), we have
u(x.y) = −Vy(x, y) = −A′(y)ψ(x+ βy)− βA(y)ψ′(x+ βy)−Ry(x, y),
and therefore we obtain with (4.67)
Lyu(x, y)− ρu(x, y) + κβVx(x, y)− x
=
1
2
σ2 (−A′(y)ψ′′(x+ βy)− βA(y)ψ′′′(x+ βy))
+ κ(µ− x− βy) (−A′(y)ψ′(x+ βy)− βA(y)ψ′′(x+ βy)−Rxy(x, y))
− ρ (−A′(y)ψ(x+ βy)− βA(y)ψ′(x+ βy)−Ry(x, y))
+ κβA(y)ψ′(x+ βy) + κβRx(x, y)− x
=− A′(y)(Lyψ(x+ βy)− ρψ(x+ βy))− A(y)(Lyψ′(x+ βy)− (ρ+ κ)ψ′(x+ βy))
=0,
upon using (4.33) with k = 0, 1 for the last equality.
Now, let x ∈ R be such that (x, y) ∈ I, so that u(x, y) = −c (recall (4.70) and
(4.73)). On the one hand, if (x, y) ∈ I1 then we obtain
Lyu(x, y)− ρu(x, y) + κβVx(x, y)− x = cρ− x+ κβVx(x, F−1(x)) ≤ 0,
where we have used (4.71) for the first equality, and the inequality holds true by the
proof of Proposition 4.4.7 (cf. Step 2 therein).
On the other hand, letting (x, y) ∈ I2 and recalling (4.70), we have x ≥ F (y¯) and
hence
Lyu(x, y)− ρu(x, y) + κβVx(x, y)− x = cρ− x+ βκ
ρ+ κ
y¯ ≤ ρc− F (y¯) + βκ
ρ+ κ
y¯ ≤ 0,
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where the last inequality holds true by (4.40) with y = y¯.
Finally, from Proposition 4.4.7 we have −c− u(x, y) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ R.
Step 2. The inequalities proved in Step 1 show that u(·, y) identifies with a
W 2,∞loc (R)-solution to (4.93). Then, employing a standard verification theorem based
on an application of (a generalized version of) Itô's formula, we find (4.92) and that
the stopping time τ ?(x; y) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xx,yt ≥ F (y)} is optimal for (4.92).
Remark 4.5.2. Two comments are worth being done.
1. The related optimal stopping problem (4.92) is consistent with the findings in
[42], cf. (3.27) therein. In [42], a central bank tries to contain the inflation by
acting on the nominal interest rate. Hereby, the authors study a two-dimensional
stochastic control problem with Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics which leads to a
stochastic differential game.
2. With regard to Remark 2.4.16 in Chapter 2, the stopping time τ ?(x; y) can be
interpreted as the optimal time at which the company should increase its level of
installed power by an additional unit. We can observe that the stopping problem
(4.92) has running cost in terms of −Xx,yt reflecting the forgone gains of not
having increased the installed power Y by an additional unit up to time τ , running
gains from the indirect change in V which is due to the company's inaction up to
time τ and therefore the non-existing (additional) negative price impact on Xx,yt ,
and terminal proportional cost c for acting.
4.6 Numerical Implementation
The ODE (4.51) cannot be solved analytically, but we are able to solve it numerically
with MATLAB. Figure 4.1 displays a plot of the inverse of the free boundary with three
different values for the drift coefficient µ. In particular we take those parameters' values
as given in Table 4.1, and µ ∈ {0.2; 1.4, 2.25}.
κ σ ρ c β y¯
0.10 0.50 0.05 0.30 0.15 5
Table 4.1: Parameters' values.
The dashed sloped red line is a plot of the inverse of the function M : [0,∞) 7→
(−∞, µ] given by M(y) := µ − βy (to which we shall refer as line of means). The
functionM provides the underlying mean reversion level of the process Xx,y depending
on the level of installed power y. Figures 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 4.1(c) show three different
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(a) The functions F−1 and M−1 with µ = 0.2.
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(b) The functions F−1 and M−1 with µ = 1.4.
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(c) The functions F−1 and M−1 with µ = 2.25.
Figure 4.1: Plots of the functions x 7→ F−1(x) and x 7→M−1(x) with various values for
µ. The optimal installation strategy prescribes the following. In the region {(x, y) ∈
R × [0, y¯) : x < F (y)} it is optimal not to install additional solar panels. Conversely,
if, at the initial time, (x, y) is such that x ≥ F (y) and y ∈ [0, y¯), then the (optimally
controlled) process (X, Y ) should be pushed in direction (0, 1) as follows: for x ≥ x¯,
the firm should immediately install the maximum number of panels, so to increase the
level of installed power by y¯ − y units. For (x, y) such that x ∈ [F (y), x¯), the firm
should make an initial lump sum installation of size F−1(x) − y, and then keep on
making infinitesimal installations just preventing the price to exceed F (y) until the
maximum quantity of panels is installed.
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scenarios. The red line can lie entirely to the left or to the right of F−1 (see Figure
4.1(a) and Figure 4.1(c)), or it can intersect F−1 (see Figure 4.1(b)). Notice that the
position of the current mean reversion level in fact influences the expected time of the
next action: if the red line is entirely to the left of F−1 (i.e. the current mean reversion
level is below F (y) for any y ∈ [0, y¯]), then the electricity price tends to move towards
the line of means and therefore to stay below the firm's threshold, at which it starts
to undertake the installation of additional solar panels. Conversely, the electricity
price tends to move above the firm's threshold F (y) for some y ∈ [0, y¯], if the red line
intersects or lies in the installation region I. Such a case in turn implies that the firm
will increase its level of installed power faster. The limiting situation is when the red
line is entirely on the right of F−1 (i.e. lies entirely in I2). In this case, the electricity
price tends to exceed F independently of the firm's level of installed power. Therefore,
the firm will quickly install the maximum possible level y¯.
The next proposition gives a characterization of when and how the line of means
intersects the installation region I, either at the free boundary F or at the locus of
points {(x, y) : y = y¯, x ≥ x¯}.
Proposition 4.6.1. Given the upper bound y¯ for the level of installed power and the
corresponding free boundary F , the line of means
1. has no intersection with the installation region I if F (0) > µ;
2. intersects the boundary of I at the free boundary F (y) if F (0) ≤ µ and y¯ ≥ y∗,
where
y∗ := (β(ρ+ 2κ))−1
(
(µ− ρc)(ρ+ κ)− ρ ψ(µ)
ψ′(µ)
)
; (4.94)
3. intersects the boundary of I at its upper bound y = y¯ if y¯ ≤ y∗.
Proof. For case (1), since the line of means x = µ− βy is decreasing in y and the free
boundary F is increasing, there is no intersection if µ− β × 0 = µ < F (0).
For cases (2) and (3), let us now assume that µ ≥ F (0), and recall that x¯ = F (y¯) =
x˜ − βy¯ where x˜ is such that H(x˜) = 0, with H defined in (4.46). The line of means
x = µ− βy and the free boundary x = F (y) have one or zero intersection according to
whether x¯ = F (y¯) > µ − βy¯ or not, respectively, i.e. whether F (y¯) + βy¯ = x˜(y¯) > µ,
where we have written x˜(y¯) in order to stress the dependency of x˜ on y¯. Employing
Lemma 4.4.2 and the implicit function theorem, we get
x˜′(y¯) =
ψ′(x˜)R˜y(x˜, y¯)
ψ′′(x˜)
(
c− R˜(x˜, y¯)
) = − β(ρ+ 2κ)ψ′(x˜)
ρ(ρ+ κ)ψ′′(x˜)
(
c− R˜(x˜, y¯)
) > 0,
where the strict inequality holds as c − R˜(x˜, y¯) < 0 by Lemma 4.4.1 together with
(4.43). Therefore, x˜(·) is increasing. Consequently, if there exists a point y∗ such
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that x˜(y?) = µ, then there is an intersection with F for y¯ ≥ y∗, and there is no
intersection with F for y¯ < y∗. The point y∗ is characterized by the fact that the line
of means x = µ − βy intersects both the free boundary x = F (y) and the locus of
points {(x, y) : y = y¯, x ≥ x¯} at the same point (x¯, y∗). Thus, in order to find y∗, we
must impose simultaneously
x¯ = µ− βy∗,
x¯ = x˜(y?)− βy∗,
ψ′(x˜(y?))(c− R˜(x˜(y?), y∗)) + (ρ+ κ)−1ψ(x˜(y?)) = 0.
Therefore, in this case x˜(y?) = µ, and the third equation can be rewritten as
ψ′(µ)
(
c− (ρ+ κ)µ− β(ρ+ 2κ)y
∗
ρ(ρ+ κ)
)
+ (ρ+ κ)−1ψ(µ) = 0.
The solution is easily obtained as in equation (4.94).
Remark 4.6.2. Unfortunately, to discriminate between case (1) and the other two
ones in Proposition 4.6.1, one has to solve (4.51) numerically in order to check whether
F (0) > µ or not. Instead, discriminating between case (2) and case (3) is much easier,
as the point y∗ in equation (4.94) is given explicitly in terms of initial parameters and
known functions.
4.6.1 Comparative Statics
In this section, we study the sensitivity of the free boundary on the model parameters
numerically. The preliminary parameters' values are given as in Table 4.2, and in the
following, we let each of those parameters vary within a particular set. The numerical
results can be observed in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3.
µ σ κ ρ c β y¯
0.20 0.50 0.1 0.05 0.30 0.15 5
Table 4.2: Parameters' values for the numerical sensitivity analysis.
We first study the behavior of the free boundary with respect to the volatility dis-
played in Figure 4.2(a). Here the volatility parameter σ takes values in {0.5; 0.6; 0.7; 0.8},
and we can observe that F−1 is shifted to the right as σ increases; that is, the instal-
lation of additional panels is undertaken at higher prices. The firm might be afraid of
receiving negative future prices due to higher uncertainty. This behavior is in line with
the real options literature: when uncertainty increases, the agent is more reluctant to
act, see for example [93].
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(a) The function F−1 with σ = 0.5 (black),
σ = 0.6 (red), σ = 0.7 (blue), σ = 0.8 (cyan).
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(b) The function F−1 with µ = 0.2 (black),
µ = 0.3 (red), µ = 0.4 (blue), µ = 0.5 (cyan).
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(c) The function F−1 with β = 0.15 (black),
β = 0.175 (red), β = 0.2 (blue), β = 0.225
(cyan).
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(d) The function F−1 with κ = 0.1 (black),
κ = 0.15 (red), κ = 0.20 (blue), κ = 0.25 (cyan).
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(e) The function F−1 with c = 0.3 (black),
c = 0.8 (red), c = 1.3 (blue), c = 1.8 (cyan).
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(f) The function F−1 with ρ = 0.035 (black),
ρ = 0.04 (red), ρ = 0.045 (blue), ρ = 0.05 (cyan).
Figure 4.2: Sensitivity of the function x 7→ F−1(x). In each subfigure, the parameter
values which are not varied are those provided in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: Sensitivity of the function x 7→ F−1(x) with respect to y¯. In particular
y¯ = 0.5 (black), y¯ = 1 (red), y¯ = 2 (blue), y¯ = 5 (cyan), and all the other parameter
values are those provided in Table 4.2.
Now, we let the mean-reversion level µ vary in {0.2; 0.3; 0.4; 0.5}. Figure 4.2(b)
reveals that the critical threshold F−1 moves to the left. A higher value for µ leads the
firm to undertake the installation at lower prices. This observation can be explained
by the fact that the company is eager to act earlier, the higher the expected future
profits.
In Figure 4.2(c), the impact parameter β takes values in {0.15; 0.175; 0.2; 0.225},
and as a consequence we find that the F−1 is shifted to the right as β increases. We
explain this observation by the fact that the impact of a higher electricity production
on the future electricity prices is higher as β increases. Therefore, the company starts
to produce more electricity at higher prices, so to avoid lower (and possibly negative)
electricity prices in the short run.
The dependency on κ can be observed in Figure 4.2(d). Here, we let κ taking values
in {0.1; 0.15; 0.2; 0.25}. We find that higher values for the mean reversion speed κ leads
the company to start installing solar panels at lower prices, but after some point, the
company becomes more reluctant. This behavior can be explained by the fact that two
effects play a role: on the one hand, a higher mean reversion speed reduces its ratio with
respect to σ, the uncertainty is decreased, and hence a converse behavior with respect
to Figure 4.2(a) can be observed. On the other hand, a higher mean reversion speed
also intensifies the impact of the company's actions on the price dynamics. Therefore,
it behaves as in Figure 4.2(c).
Figure 4.2(e) shows the dependency on the proportional cost of installation c which
is valued in {0.3; 0.8; 1.3; 1.8}. The shift is not parallel as one could suggest from the
figure. The function F−1 moves to the right, thus the company starts installing solar
panels at higher prices. This observation is reasonable since the company waits for
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higher electricity prices to install additional solar panels whenever the proportional
cost of installation increases.
Varying the discount factor ρ in {0.035; 0.04; 0.045; 0.05}, we find from Figure 4.2(f)
that F−1 moves to the left, that is, the company starts to install solar panels so to
produce more electricity at lower prices. Clearly, a higher discount factor reduces the
discounted future profits of the firm. Thus, the firm tends to produce more electricity
earlier.
Finally, we let y¯ vary in {0.5; 1; 2; 5}, and we observe that F−1 moves to the right
as y¯ increases. Consequently, the possibility to increase the level of installed power up
to a higher level makes the company more reluctant to act.
Remark 4.6.3. Regarding the sensitivity of the value function V with respect to µ, β
and σ, we can analytically obtain the monotonicity properties in the same way as in
Proposition 2.5.2 of Chapter 2 upon noticing that V is convex by (4.68), the second
equation of (4.70) and (4.72). In particular, one has that V is increasing with respect
to µ and σ, and decreasing in β. Also, V is clearly decreasing in c upon recalling (4.5).
Furthermore, letting y¯2 > y¯1, we have I y¯1(y) ⊂ I y¯2(y) for any y ∈ [0, y¯1]. Therefore,
V is increasing with respect to y¯.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have considered a price-maker company which generates electricity
and sells it instantaneously in the spot market. The company can increase its level of
installed power, which is proportional to its electricity generation, by irreversible instal-
lations of solar panels. In absence of any actions of the company, the spot electricity
price evolves as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Including the company's economic
activities in the market, the current level of the company's installed power has a per-
manent impact on the electricity price and affects its mean-reversion level. We have
modeled the problem of maximizing the expected net profits as a two-dimensional
degenerate singular stochastic control problem in which the installation strategy is
identified as the company's control variable. Finally, our study is complemented by
a numerical analysis of the dependency of the optimal installation strategy on the
model's parameters, and an economical interpretation for those results is provided.
We have followed a guess-and-verify approach to solve the problem. The optimal
installation strategy is triggered by a curve which depends on the current level of the
company's installed power, and it is the unique strictly increasing function which solves
a first-order ODE. It has been shown that this curve coincides with the threshold of
a related optimal stopping problem. This stopping problem highlights the (economic)
components taken into account by the firm when increasing the level of installed power.
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One can think about extensions in many interesting ways. For instance, one could
include the possibility of electricity storage. More precisely, the company can decide
whether to store the electricity generated by the solar panels, or to sell it in the spot
market. Hereby, the storage capacity is finite, and whenever it is fully used, then the
company is forced to sell the electricity in the market immediately. The spot electricity
price is then solely affected by the amount of electricity which the company sells in the
market. The mathematical formulation leads to a daunting three dimensional singular
stochastic control problem which requires a solution method that differs from the one
used in this chapter. Another extension would be to consider a competition among
several market players. In particular, one can study a situation in which there is a
fixed number of firms which produce and sell electricity in the market while the total
amount of installed power affects the electricity price. This problem would lead to a
stochastic game with singular controls.
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Facts and Properties of the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process
This appendix introduces the so-called Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and presents some
of its well known properties that are exploited in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter
41.
Let (Ω,F ,F := (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space with a filtration F satisfy-
ing the usual conditions, and carrying a standard one-dimensional F-Brownian motion
W .
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process has been introduced for the first time in [103],
and in modern stochastic analysis it is defined as the unique strong solution to the
stochastic differential equation
dXxt = κ (µ−Xxt ) dt+ σdWt, Xx0 = x ∈ R, (A.1)
for µ ∈ R and κ, σ > 0. For any given initial value x ∈ R, the process Xx := (Xxt )t≥0
is Gaussian. In particular, equation (A.1) admits the explicit solution
Xxt = xe
−κt + µ(1− e−κt) +
∫ t
0
σeκ(s−t)dWs, (A.2)
and it follows from (A.2) that for any t ≥ 0
Xxt ∼ N
(
xe−κt + µ
(
1− e−κt) , σ2
2κ
(
1− e−2κt)) ,
where N (α, γ) denotes the Gaussian distribution function with mean α ∈ R and vari-
ance γ > 0.
The following result provides a useful estimate involving the absolute value of Xx.
Lemma A.1.1. Let q ∈ {1, 2}. We have
E
[|Xxt |q] ≤ C(1 + |x|q), for some C > 0. (A.3)
1Parts of this appendix have been published in [60] and [83].
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Proof. Exploiting (A.2), and the fact that∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
eκ(s−t)dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + (∫ t
0
eκ(s−t)dWs
)2
, P-a.s.,
we obtain the result by simple calculations that employ Itô isometry.
The infinitesimal generator associated toXx is denoted by L and, for any u : R 7→ R
s.t. u ∈ C2(R), it is defined by
[Lu] (x) := lim
t↓0
E (u(Xxt ))− u(x)
t
, x ∈ R. (A.4)
In particular, by an application of Dynkin's formula (cf. Theorem 7.4.1 in [100]) and
of the mean-value theorem, one obtains
Lu(x) = σ
2
2
u′′(x) + κ(µ− x)u′(x), x ∈ R
Given ρ > 0, the ODE (L − ρ)u = 0 admits a strictly increasing positive fundamental
solution denoted by ψ(x). We recall some important properties of the aforementioned
function in the next lemma.
Lemma A.1.2. The following hold true.
(1) The strictly increasing positive fundamental solution ψ(·) to the ordinary differ-
ential equation (L − ρ)u = 0 is given by
ψ(x) = e
κ(x−µ)2
2σ2 D− ρ
κ
(
− x− µ
σ
√
2κ
)
, (A.5)
where
Dν(x) :=
e−
x2
4
Γ(−ν)
∫ ∞
0
t−ν−1e−
t2
2
−xtdt, x ∈ R, (A.6)
is the cylinder function of order ν < 0 and Γ( · ) is the Euler's Gamma function.
Moreover, ψ is strictly convex.
(2) Denoting by ψ(k) the k-th derivative of ψ, k ∈ N0, one has that ψ(k) is strictly
convex and it is (up to a positive constant) the positive strictly increasing funda-
mental solution to (L − (ρ+ kκ))u = 0.
(3) For any k ∈ N0, one has ψ(k)(x)ψ(k+2)(x)− ψ(k+1)(x)2 > 0 for all x ∈ R.
Proof. (1) We refer the reader to [76], among others. Moreover, the strict convexity
of ψ can be checked by direct calculations on (A.5).
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(2) Define the function f : R+ × R→ R+ by
f(t, x) =
1
Γ( ρ
κ
)
t
(
ρ
κ
−1
)
e−
t2
2
+t
(
x−µ
σ
)√
2κ,
that, once differentiated with respect to x, yields
fx(t, x) =
ρ
√
2κ
κσ
1
Γ(ρ+κ
κ
)
t
(
ρ+κ
κ
−1
)
e−
t2
2
+t
(
x−µ
σ
)√
2κ.
Notice that f is the integrand appearing in (A.6) for β = − ρ
κ
. Then, differenti-
ating (A.5) with respect to x, and invoking the dominated convergence theorem,
we obtain
ψ′(x) ∝ eκ(x−µ)
2
2σ2 D− ρ+κ
κ
(
− x− µ
σ
√
2κ
)
,
upon noticing that fx(t, x) is the integrand of D− ρ+κ
κ
(
− x−µ
σ
√
2κ
)
(cf. (A.6)).
Hence, ψ′ can be identified (modulo a constant) as the positive strictly increasing
fundamental solution to (L − (ρ + κ))u = 0, and by direct calculations it can
be checked that it is strictly convex. By iterating the previous argument, we see
that, for any k ∈ N, the function ψ(k) is strictly convex and identifies with the
positive strictly increasing fundamental solution to (L − (ρ+ kκ))u = 0.
(3) We define the function f (k) : R+ × R→ R+ by
f (k)(t, x) =
(√
2κ/σ
) k
2
Γ( ρ
κ
)
1
2
t
1
2
(
ρ
κ
+k−1
)
e−
t2
4
+ t
2
(
x−µ
σ
)√
2κ.
By direct calculations, we find
ψ(k+1)(x) =
∫ ∞
0
f (k+2)(t, x)f (k)(t, x)dt, x ∈ R,
that, by the help of Hölder's inequality (which is strict as f (k)(·, x) is not a
multiple of f (k+2)(·, x)), gives(∫ ∞
0
f (k+2)(t, x)f (k)(t, x)dt
)2
<
∫ ∞
0
(
f (k+2)(t, x)
)2
dt
∫ ∞
0
(
f (k)(t, x)
)2
dt.
The latter is in fact equivalent to
ψ(k+2)(x)ψ(k)(x)− ψ(k+1)(x)2 > 0.
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Appendix B
Supplemental Material for Chapter 2
In the following, we complete the results of Chapter 2 by presenting the missing proofs
and an auxiliary result. We thereby adopt the setting and the notations from that
chapter.
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3.
Let k ∈ N ∪ {0} be given and fixed, and define Λ(x) := (x− c)ψ(k+1)(x)− ψ(k)(x),
x ∈ R. We then have the following.
(i) For x ≤ c, it is readily seen that Λ(x) < 0.
(ii) One has Λ(x) > 0 for all x > c+ ψ
(k)(c)
ψ(k+1)(c)
. To see this, rewrite Λ(x) = ψ(k)(x)
[
(x−
c)ψ
(k+1)(x)
ψ(k)(x)
− 1], and notice that by Lemma A.1.2
(
ψ(k+1)(x)
ψ(k)(x)
)′
=
ψ(k+2)(x)ψ(k)(x)− (ψ(k+1)(x))2
(ψ(k)(x))2
> 0.
Hence, for all x > c+ ψ
(k)(c)
ψ(k+1)(c)
> c one has that ψ
(k+1)(x)
ψ(k)(x)
> ψ
(k+1)(c)
ψ(k)(c)
, which implies
(x− c)ψ
(k+1)(x)
ψ(k)(x)
− 1 > (x− c)ψ
(k+1)(c)
ψ(k)(c)
− 1 > 0,
for all x > c+ ψ
(k)(c)
ψ(k+1)(c)
. The latter clearly gives Λ(x) > 0 for all x > c+ ψ
(k)(c)
ψ(k+1)(c)
.
Since Λ′(x) = (x− c)ψ(k+2)(x) > 0 for all x > c, we conclude from (i) and (ii) that
there exists a unique solution on (c,∞) to the equation Λ(x) = 0 by continuity of Λ.
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Proof of Lemma 2.4.4.
We argue by contradiction, and we suppose x∞ ≥ x0. Then by definition of x0 and
x∞ we have
x0 − x∞ = (x0 − c)− (x∞ − c) = ψ(x0)
ψ′(x0)
− ψ
′(x∞)
ψ′′(x∞)
. (B.1)
Since by Lemma A.1.2( ψ(x)
ψ′(x)
)′
=
ψ′(x)2 − ψ(x)ψ′′(x)
ψ′(x)2
< 0, for any x ∈ R,
we have by (B.1) that
x0 − x∞ ≥ ψ(x∞)
ψ′(x∞)
− ψ
′(x∞)
ψ′′(x∞)
> 0,
again due to Lemma A.1.2. But this contradicts x∞ ≥ x0.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.8.
First of all notice that for the existence of a solution z to (2.54) it is necessary that
y − z ≥ 0 since F ≥ 0, and that x − αz ∈ (x∞, x0] since the domain of F is (x∞, x0].
Hence, if a solution to (2.54) exists, it must be such that z(x, y) ∈ (x−x0
α
, x−x∞
α
∧ y], for
all (x, y) ∈ S2.
Let (x, y) ∈ S2 with y > F (x) be given and fixed, and defineR(z) = y−z−F (x−αz),
for z ∈ (x−x0
α
, x−x∞
α
∧ y). Then, one has R(0) = y−F (x) > 0 and lim
z↑(x−x∞α ∧y)
R(z) < 0.
Since z 7→ R(z) is strictly decreasing (by strict monotonicity of F ) it follows that there
exists a unique solution to (2.54).
Finally, (2.55) follows by noticing that 0 solves (2.54) when y = F (x) and by
uniqueness of the solution. Analogously, (2.56) follows by noticing that x−x0
α
uniquely
solves (2.54), since F (x0) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.5.4.
The first equality in (2.90) follows from (2.88). In order to prove the last inequality
in (2.90), we find by Lemma A.1.2-(2) that
σ2
2
ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ) + (a− bx)ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)− (ρ+ kb)ψ(k)(x; a, σ) = 0. (B.2)
From (B.2), recalling that ψ(k+1) > 0, we obtain
(a− bx) = −σ
2ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)
2ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
+ (ρ+ kb)
ψ(k)(x; a, σ)
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
.
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and we thus have
(a− bx)
[
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)2 − ψ(k)(x; a, σ)ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)
]
+ bψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)ψ(k)(x; a, σ)
=(ρ+ (k + 1)b)ψ(k)(x; a, σ)ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)− (ρ+ kb)ψ(k)(x; a, σ)2ψ
(k+2)(x; a, σ)
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
+
σ2ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)
2ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
[
ψ(k)(x; a, σ)ψ(k+2)(x, a, σ)− ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 by Lemma A.1.2
>
ψ(k)(x; a, σ)
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
[
(ρ+ (k + 1)b)ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)2 − (ρ+ kb)ψ(k)(x, a, σ)ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)
]
.
We now aim at establishing that the last term on the right-hand side of the
latter equation is positive. With regard to (2.90), this would clearly imply that
∂(ψ(k)(x;a,σ)/ψ(k+1)(x;a,σ))
∂σ
> 0. From (B.2) we have
(ρ+ (k + 1)b)ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ) =
σ2
2
ψ(k+3)(x; a, σ) + (a− bx)ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ),
which then yields
ψ(k)(x; a, σ)
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
[
(ρ+ (k + 1)b)ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)2 − (ρ+ kb)ψ(k)(x; a, σ)ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)
]
=
ψ(k)(x;σ)
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
[σ2
2
ψ(k+3)(x; a, σ)ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
+ ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)
(
(a− bx)ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)− (ρ+ kb)ψ(k)(x; a, σ))]
=
σ2
2
ψ(k)(x;σ)
ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)
[
ψ(k+3)(x; a, σ)ψ(k+1)(x; a, σ)− ψ(k+2)(x; a, σ)2
]
> 0,
where the last equality follows again by an application of (B.2), and the last inequality
by Lemma A.1.2. Hence ∂(ψ
(k)(x;a,σ)/ψ(k+1)(x;a,σ))
∂σ
> 0 and the proof is completed.
B.2 An Auxiliary Result
Lemma B.2.1. Let x0 be the solution to (2.47) and
x¯ :=
a+ ρc
ρ+ b
. (B.3)
We have
x¯ < x0.
Proof. Define H(x) := (x− c)ψ′(x)− ψ(x), x ∈ R. Since ψ satisfies
σ2
2
ψ′′(x) + (a− bx)ψ′(x)− ρψ(x) = 0, for all x ∈ R,
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and σ
2
2
ψ′′(x) > 0, we find −ψ(x) < − (a−bx)
ρ
ψ′(x), ∀x ∈ R. Thus, we have
H(x¯) < (x¯− c)ψ′(x¯)− (a− bx¯)
ρ
ψ′(x¯) =
[
(x¯− c)ρ− (a− bx¯)
]ψ′(x¯)
ρ
= 0,
by the definition of x¯. Since H(x0) = 0, H(x) < 0 for all x < x0 and H(x) > 0 for all
x > x0, it must necessarily be x¯ < x0.
120
Appendix C
Supplemental Material for Chapter 4
This appendix to Chapter 4 provides the missing proofs and an auxiliary result to
complete the results of that chapter. Its setting and its notations are adopted.
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1.
The proof employs arguments from the proof of Proposition 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 that
are adjusted to the present setting. In a first step we prove that (4.7) holds true, and
then, in a second step we show the monotonicity property of V .
Step 1. Let (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯] be given and fixed. To prove the lower bound of V ,
we take the admissible (non-)installation strategy I0, and since y ∈ [0, y¯] , we obtain
V (x, y) ≥ R(x, y) > −K1
(
1 + |x|), (C.1)
for some K1 > 0.
To determine the upper bound of V , recall the uncontrolled price process Xx from
(4.1), and notice that by an application of Itô's formula we find for any ρ˜ > 0
|e−ρ˜tXxt | ≤ |x|+ ρ˜
∫ t
0
e−ρ˜u|Xxu |du+
∫ t
0
e−ρ˜uκ(|µ|+ |Xxu |)du+
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρ˜uσdWu
∣∣∣∣,
which in turn implies
E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρ˜t|Xxt |
]
≤ |x|+ C1
(
1 +
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ˜uE
[|Xxu |]du)+ σE[ sup
t≥0
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
e−ρ˜udWu
∣∣∣∣],
(C.2)
for some C1 > 0. An application of the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality (cf. The-
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orem 3.28 in Chapter 3 of [81]) yields
E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρ˜t|Xxt |
]
≤ |x|+ C1
(
1 +
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ˜uE
[|Xxu |]du)+ C2E[(∫ ∞
0
e−2ρ˜udu
) 1
2
]
.
(C.3)
for a constant C2 > 0, and therefore, we find upon using Lemma A.1.1 with q = 1
E
[
sup
t≥0
e−ρ˜t|Xxt |
]
≤ C(1 + |x|), (C.4)
for some constant C > 0.
Now, for any I ∈ I y¯(y) we find by (C.4)
J (x, y, I) ≤ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtXx,y,It Y
y,I
t dt
]
≤ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtXxt Y
y,I
t dt
]
≤ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∣∣Xxt ∣∣Y y,It dt] ≤ y¯E[ ∫ ∞
0
e−
ρ
2
t|e− ρ2 tXxt |dt
]
≤ K2
(
1 + |x|),
(C.5)
for some K2 > 0, and upon observing that X
x,y,I ≤ Xx P-a.s. for any I ∈ I y¯(y).
Finally, from (C.1) and (C.5), we have that (4.7) holds with K = max(K1, K2).
Step 2. If y = y¯, then the only admissible strategy is I0, thus V (x, y¯) = R(x, y¯).
In order to show that x 7→ V (x, y) is increasing, let x2 > x1, and notice that one has
Xx2,y,It ≥ Xx1,y,It P-a.s. for any t ≥ 0 and I ∈ I y¯(y). Thus J (x2, y, I) ≥ J (x1, y, I)
which implies V (x2, y) ≥ V (x1, y).
Proof of Lemma 4.4.1.
In the following, Step 1 proves the positivity and the monotonicity property of the
function A, while Step 2 provides both the representation of A and the lower bound
of F .
Step 1. Recalling that Ryx(x, y) = (ρ+ κ)
−1 for all (x, y) ∈ R× [0, y¯], we find from
(4.38) that
A′(y) = −βψ
′′(F (y) + βy)
ψ′(F (y) + βy)
A(y)− ((ρ+ κ)ψ′(F (y) + βy))−1 = H(F (y) + βy,A(y)),
(C.6)
where H : R× R 7→ R is such that
H(F¯ , A) = −βψ
′′(F¯ )
ψ′(F¯ )
A−((ρ+ κ)ψ′(F¯ ))−1 = − ((ρ+ κ)ψ′(F¯ ))−1 (β(ρ+ κ)ψ′′(F¯ )A+ 1) .
In light of the boundary condition w(x, y¯) = R(x, y¯) (cf. Theorem 4.3.2), we must have
that
A(y¯) = 0. (C.7)
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Due to (C.7) and the fact that H|R×[0,∞) is strictly negative as ψ(k) is strictly positive
for any k ∈ N0 (cf. Lemma A.1.2-(2)), we conclude that A is both strictly positive and
strictly decreasing.
Step 2. Equations (4.37) and (4.38) lead to
A(y) = β−1 ×
ψ′(F (y) + βy)
(
c−Ry(F (y), y)
)
+ (ρ+ κ)−1 ψ(F (y) + βy)
ψ′(F (y) + βy)2 − ψ′′(F (y) + βy)ψ(F (y) + βy) . (C.8)
Lemma A.1.2-(3) ensures that the denominator of A is nonzero. Now, the numerator
on the right-hand side of (C.8) writes as
(ρ(ρ+ κ))−1 [ρ(ρ+ κ)ψ′(F (y) + βy) (c−Ry(F (y), y)) + ρψ(F (y) + βy)]
= (ρ(ρ+ κ))−1
[
(ρ+ κ)
(
cρ+
κβ
ρ+ κ
y − F (y)
)
ψ′(F (y) + βy) +
σ2
2
ψ′′(F (y) + βy)
]
,
upon using (4.33) with k = 0. Hence,
A(y) = (βρ(ρ+ κ))−1 ×
(ρ+ κ)
(
cρ+ κβ
ρ+κ
y − F (y)
)
ψ′(F (y) + βy) + σ
2
2
ψ′′(F (y) + βy)
ψ′(F (y) + βy)2 − ψ′′(F (y) + βy)ψ(F (y) + βy) .
(C.9)
Due to the facts that the denominator on the right-hand side of (C.9) is strictly negative
by Lemma A.1.2-(3) and that A is strictly positive by Step 1, the numerator on the
right-hand side of (C.9) must be strictly negative: this is possible only if
cρ+
κβ
ρ+ κ
y − F (y) < 0,
as ψ(k) is strictly positive for any k ∈ N. Hence, F satisfies
F (y) > cρ+
κβ
ρ+ κ
y ≥ cρ, for all y ∈ [0, y¯]. (C.10)
C.2 An Auxiliary Result
Lemma C.2.1. For any (y, z) ∈ R× R such that D(y, z) ≥ 0, we have
N(y, z) > D(y, z).
Proof. To show the implication, we exploit a result from Chapter 3: we obtain from
the proof of Theorem 3.2.1, cf. Step 1 therein, that the function Ψk : R 7→ R, k ∈ N0,
defined by
Ψk(x) =
ψ(k+1)(x)2
ψ(k)(x)ψ(k+2)(x)
,
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is strictly increasing.
Now, recall (4.48), and let (y, z) ∈ R × R be such that D(y, z) ≥ 0. The previous
inequality implies
(ρ+ κ)
(
c− R˜(z, y)
)
≥ −Q
′
0(z)
Q1(z)
, (C.11)
as Q1 is strictly positive.
In order to proceed, we introduce the function Φ : R× R 7→ R such that
Φ(z) := ψ′′(z)Q0(z)− ψ(z)Q1(z).
Exploiting the monotonicity of Ψ0, we find that Φ is strictly positive. Now, we use
both (C.11) and the positivity of Φ to get
N(y, z)−D(y, z) = (ρ+ κ)
(
c− R˜(z, y)
)
Φ(z) +
2(ρ+ κ)
ρ
ψ′(z)Q0(z)− ψ(z)Q′0(z)
≥ −Q
′
0(z)
Q1(z)
Φ(z) +
2(ρ+ κ)
ρ
ψ′(z)Q0(z)− ψ(z)Q′0(z)
= (ρQ1(z))
−1Q0(z)
[
−ρψ′′(z)Q′0(z) + 2(ρ+ κ)ψ′(z)Q1(z)
]
,
(C.12)
where we have rearranged terms after the equality. To finish the proof, we employ
(4.33) with k = 0, 1, 2 for (C.12), so to obtain
N(y, z)−D(y, z) ≥σ
2
2
(ρQ1(z))
−1Q0(z)
[
ψ′′′(z)Q1(z)− ψ′(z)Q2(z)
]
> 0, (C.13)
where the last inequality holds true upon recalling Qk > 0 and by the fact that
ψ′′′(z)Q1(z)− ψ′(z)Q2(z) > 0 since Ψ1 is strictly increasing.
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